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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Tort law occupies far more factual and conceptual territory today 
than it did a century ago.1 To cite just a few examples of this growth, 
a hundred years ago the concept of strict products liability had yet to 
appear on the jurisprudential horizon.2 William Prosser had not ex-
tracted the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress from the 
case reports.3 And compensation for negligently inflicted prenatal in-
juries4 and the imposition of liability for defective products based on 
                                                                                                                     
 * Deputy District Attorney, Mono County, California. J.D., Yale Law School. The 
author thanks Jake Dear, Lawrence Friedman, Robert Gordon, Frank Pasquale, Sudhir 
Pala, Peter Schuck, and Sheila Scheuerman, all of whom provided advice, encouragement, 
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 1. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 360 (2002). 
 2. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
dissenting) (arguing for strict liability for defective products).  
 3. See William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 
MICH. L. REV. 874, 874 (1939) (proposing a “new tort” of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress); cf. FRANCIS M. BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS ¶ 109 (3d ed. 1913) (reiterating the 
longstanding rule that mental pain or anxiety alone will not support a cause of action).  
 4. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55 
(5th ed. 1984). Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 (1979) (recognizing liabil-
360  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:359 
 
market share5 were not even gleams in the eyes of the most forward-
thinking jurists. 
 But amid this general expansion of tort law, certain theories of li-
ability have faded or disappeared. A century ago, a husband could re-
cover substantial damages from someone who had sex with his wife,6 
even if the interloper had no idea that his lover was married.7 In the 
Deep South, a Caucasian rail passenger could bring a claim against a 
railroad company if a conductor directed him or her to a compart-
ment used by African-American customers.8 And in several states, a 
wife could proceed against a tavern for the wages that its patron—
her alcoholic husband—had failed to earn due to his chronic inebria-
tion.9 Should a contemporary plaintiff have the temerity to press any 
one of these claims, most courts would reject his or her lawsuit out of 
hand. 
 Scholars have paid more attention to how new torts are born than 
to how—and why—torts die.10 But torts do die. Formerly prominent 
causes of action—of which the aforementioned criminal conversation, 
insult, and spousal alcoholism torts are but three of many—have be-
come rare or have vanished altogether. Some of these torts have been 
abolished by courts or legislatures, others have been abandoned by 
plaintiffs, and still others have been abrogated in some jurisdictions 
and deserted elsewhere. In a few instances, a particular impetus (for 
example, the end of Prohibition) clearly bears responsibility for the 
demise of a related cause of action (claims against public officers for 
failing to enforce dry laws).11 Other torts have disappeared under 
more mysterious circumstances, with the precise cause of death re-
                                                                                                                     
ity for prenatal injuries), with RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 869 (1939) (rejecting liability for 
such injuries).  
 5. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980).  
 6. E.g., Stark v. Johnson, 95 P. 930 (Colo. 1908); Smith v. Hockenberry, 109 N.W. 23 
(Mich. 1906). 
 7. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 685 cmt. d (1938); 7 STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES F. 
KRAUSE & ALFRED W. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 22.7 (1990). 
 8. E.g., Wolfe v. Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co., 58 S.E. 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907); RESTATEMENT 
OF TORTS § 48 cmt. e (1934). 
 9. E.g., Earp v. Lilly, 75 N.E. 552 (Ill. 1905). 
 10. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 1539 (1997); Robert F. Blomquist, “New Torts”: A Critical History, Taxonomy, and 
Appraisal, 95 DICK. L. REV. 23 (1990). To the extent that academics have turned their at-
tention toward why torts die, they have typically focused on the passage of particular torts. 
See, e.g., M.B.W. Sinclair, Seduction and the Myth of the Ideal Woman, 5 LAW & INEQ. 33, 
98-102 (1987) (attributing the decline of the tort of seduction to changes in the status and 
perception of women in the United States during the twentieth century); Stephen D. 
Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California Experience with “New” 
Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455 (1999) (discussing the abrogation of torts recognized by the 
California Supreme Court under Chief Justice Rose Bird and attributing this development 
to changes in the political and philosophical leanings of the court). 
 11. See Act of Apr. 21, 1917, ch. 187, § 53, 1917 Neb. Laws 425, 448-49 (repealed 
1935) (conferring a cause of action against government authorities who failed to enforce 
Prohibition).  
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maining unknown. Adding to the mystery, these claims have with-
ered and died even as other torts have thrived in seemingly inhospi-
table environments. 
 A few authors have performed autopsies on specific torts and 
identified the suspected reasons behind their deaths.12 These analy-
ses, though interesting, are by their own admission of limited scope 
and do not provide especially useful analytic or predictive tools. This 
Article has a broader goal. Just as pathologists and epidemiologists 
study how fatal illnesses spread,13 conservation biologists examine 
why animal species go extinct,14 and geographers and anthropologists 
try to understand why societies succeed or fail,15 this Article surveys 
the roster of dead and dying torts and then asks (and tries to answer) 
a novel question: Why do torts die? This question quickly breaks 
down into several other queries, of which the following are just a few: 
Do defunct tort theories share a common fatal flaw? Do torts die for 
reasons of substance, procedure, or some combination of both? What 
roles do courts, legislatures, and plaintiffs each play in the deaths of 
torts? And what, if anything, can the disappearance of some tort 
theories tell us about what makes other claims survive and prosper?  
 This Article proposes some answers to these questions. The dis-
cussion below offers and develops a framework for analyzing why 
torts die that focuses upon the contributions made by the following 
six factors: (1) the changes in the cultural atmosphere surrounding a 
tort; (2) the quality of the arguments directed against the tort; (3) the 
interests, abilities, and limitations of the audiences that entertain 
and act upon these arguments; (4) the influence exerted by the 
agents who advocate or oppose the elimination of the tort; (5) the at-
tractiveness of alternatives, if any, that may exist to tort liability; 
and (6) the attributes of the tort itself that make it more or less sus-
ceptible to abolition or abandonment. When tested through case 
studies, this model suggests that torts die when atmosphere, argu-
ments, audiences, agents, alternatives, and attributes combine to di-
rect a tort toward abolition, abandonment, or both. Put another way, 
most bygone torts have not died simply because times changed. 
Changing times, or other ambient conditions of the environment in 
which a tort operates, may prove lethal to a tort if and when they 
produce arguments against the cause of action that are properly at-
                                                                                                                     
 12. E.g., Sinclair, supra note 10, at 98-102 (attributing the disappearance of the tort 
of seduction in the United States to shifts in “the myth of the ideal woman”); Sugarman, 
supra note 10. 
 13. CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, EXPLAINING EPIDEMICS AND OTHER STUDIES IN THE 
HISTORY OF MEDICINE 293-304 (1992). 
 14. E.g., RICHARD ELLIS, NO TURNING BACK: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF ANIMAL SPECIES 
(2004); DAVID M. RAUP, EXTINCTION: BAD GENES OR BAD LUCK? (1991). 
 15. E.g., JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 
(2005). 
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tuned to the interests, concerns, and capabilities of the agents and 
audiences who endorse or reject theories of liability, and the attrib-
utes of the tort and any available alternatives accelerate, rather than 
defuse, the drive toward abolition or abandonment. Where these fac-
tors are not properly aligned, a tort may prove capable of tacking into 
the prevailing cultural winds.  
 This Article proceeds as follows. The first step in developing the 
argument summarized above requires that I establish that some 
torts actually have died or are dying. Toward this purpose, Part II of 
this Article maps the graveyard of extinct or moribund torts, in 
which are buried the “amatory” or “heartbalm”16 torts (alienation of 
affections, breach of promise to marry, criminal conversation, and 
seduction); bad faith denial of contract claims; corpse mishandling 
claims; claims for insult; the torts of maintenance and champerty; 
claims seeking consequential damages for injuries negligently in-
flicted on servants; certain nuisance suits; support actions by the 
wives of alcoholics; suits involving unsent, misdirected, or garbled 
telegrams; tort claims attacking a range of unfair trade or labor prac-
tices; and personal injury actions against employers, to the extent 
these suits sound in negligence. In this Part, I briefly describe the 
gist of each departed cause of action and review the evidence of its 
decrease or demise.  
 Next, Part III discusses how atmosphere, arguments, audiences, 
agents, alternatives, and the attributes of a given tort theory affect 
its ability to survive. To better ascertain how these factors operate 
and interact, Parts IV, V, and VI relate how claims for insult, “obe-
sity lawsuits,” and the heartbalm torts have arrived at the brink of 
extinction. To summarize these studies, the insult tort has vanished 
due to an atmospheric change—a marked decrease in passenger rail 
travel (which formerly produced the lion’s share of insult claims)—
combined with the cannibalizing effect of an alternative form of re-
lief, the “new tort” of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The 
“obesity lawsuit” has come under attack because it threatens the in-
terests of a cohesive group of potential defendants and has no compa-
rably motivated base of supporters; additionally, holding the food in-
dustry accountable for the health effects of its products has been por-
trayed, effectively, as inconsistent with prevailing values. Finally, 
the amatory torts have fallen victim to the legal equivalent of a “per-
fect storm,” in which fierce opponents, persuasive arguments, flaws 
within the torts themselves, and unfriendly cultural trends produced 
                                                                                                                     
 16. The “heartbalm” label was affixed to these torts by their critics. See Frederick L. 
Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 65 (1936). The derogatory 
nickname stuck. This Article uses “heartbalm torts” as a shorthand reference to these 
claims, but in so doing, I do not mean to suggest a dismissive attitude toward the torts. 
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two perversely complementary rounds of abolitionist fervor—the first 
of which followed from a perceived excess of heartbalm suits in the 
1920s and early 1930s, and the second, decades later, from a sense 
that so few of these claims were being filed by then that the torts no 
longer served a useful purpose. In each instance, the studied tort or 
torts succumbed to a confluence of compromising circumstances, im-
plicating multiple components of the framework proposed in this Ar-
ticle. 
 Finally, Part VII of this Article reviews a few lessons that the 
three case studies provide. These studies establish the need to ac-
count for the impacts of atmosphere, arguments, audiences, agents, 
alternatives, and attributes when studying the death of a tort. Not 
all of these factors may be involved in the death of a cause of action, 
but as the case studies suggest, they often interact in interesting and 
unanticipated ways. The case studies also indicate that an unused 
tort is an endangered one, and thus portend that even modest “tort 
reform” measures cast as mending, not ending, the tort system may 
lead to the demise of tort theories by setting in motion a series of 
events in which the causes of action are first forsaken by plaintiffs 
and then eventually abolished by courts or legislatures.     
II.   DEAD OR DYING TORTS 
 Tort plaintiffs today can recover for far more affronts than their 
ancestors ever dreamed possible. Across our nation, courts and legis-
latures seem to place an ever-broadening array of causes of action in 
the hands of plaintiffs and their attorneys.17 But it would be a mis-
take to conclude from this overall expansion of tort liability that, 
once born, torts never die. On the contrary, just as animal species go 
extinct, buildings collapse, and stars implode into black holes, certain 
torts have already vanished, and others will disappear in the future.  
 To give an idea of the menagerie of defunct causes of action, the 
following is a partial18 roster of extinct or endangered torts.19  
                                                                                                                     
 17. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 1, at 3 (observing that “[n]ew and nameless torts 
are being recognized constantly . . . where none had been recognized before”).  
 18. For a discussion of a few other now-defunct causes of action, see 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 140 (identifying the marriage of a 
son without parental consent as giving rise to an actionable injury), 218 (addressing nui-
sances involving disturbances with markets), and 237-39 (discussing the surcharge or mis-
use of common areas). 
 19. The author recognizes that the lines separating one tort theory from another are 
sometimes hard to discern, making it difficult to tell when a distinct tort has been born or 
has died. Cf. ELLIS, supra note 14, at 3 (observing that there are more than twenty defini-
tions of “species” in use). For lack of any better taxonomic tools, in identifying distinct 
“torts,” I have relied upon criteria including whether or not the tort has been assigned its 
own name; whether treatises, courts, and practitioners have regarded the tort as somehow 
distinct from other causes of action; and the differences, if any, between the legal rules 
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A.   The “Heartbalm” Torts 
 The heartbalm or amatory torts all involve derailed intimate rela-
tionships. An alienation of affections claim arises when a defendant20 
intentionally interferes with a marriage, straining relations between 
husband and wife.21 Criminal conversation occurs when the defen-
dant engages in sexual intercourse with a married person.22 The 
plaintiff in a breach of promise to marry suit attacks a failure to fol-
low through with an accepted promise of marriage.23 Seduction, the 
fourth and final heartbalm tort, involves at least one act of inter-
course between the defendant and an unmarried woman, accom-
plished by way of artifices and persuasions. 24  
 A century ago, leading treatises devoted extensive discussion to 
the amatory torts.25 Today, these claims barely survive. As of this 
writing, all but a handful of states have abolished or substantially 
limited claims for alienation of affections26 and criminal conversa-
tion,27 and about half of the states have abrogated or pared back 
claims for breach of promise to marry28 and seduction.29 Even where 
these claims persist, few plaintiffs show much interest in them. With 
                                                                                                                     
formulated for the tort and those applicable to other types of claims. Cf. Bernstein, supra 
note 10, at 1541 (defining “new torts” as “roughly what torts people say they are”).  
 20. Alienation of affections claims typically fell into one of two classes: (1) suits 
against a man or woman with romantic designs on a spouse and (2) claims brought against 
meddling in-laws. A higher burden of proof applied to alienation of affections suits against 
the latter class of defendants; a presumption existed that relatives acted with proper mo-
tives. See McCollister v. McCollister, 138 A. 472, 473 (Me. 1927); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 
686(a) (1938).  
 21. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 124, at 917. Some authorities have recognized a re-
lated heartbalm tort, “enticement,” in situations where a person influences, assists, or 
forces one spouse to separate or remain apart from the other. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS § 684 (1938).  
 22. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 124, at 917. A plaintiff alleging criminal conversa-
tion did not have to prove alienation of affections or loss of companionship and service in 
order to recover damages, though such evidence could aggravate the damages associated 
with a criminal conversation claim. The gist of the action lay in the defilement of the mar-
riage bed and the violation of the husband’s exclusive right to intercourse with his wife. 
See H. GERALD CHAPIN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 95, at 460 (1917); 1 THOMAS M. 
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY 
OF CONTRACT § 167 (4th ed. 1932). 
 23. Jeffrey Brian Greenstein, Sex, Lies and American Tort Law: The Love Triangle in 
Context, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 723, 729 (2004).  
 24. Carter v. Murphy, 75 P.2d 1072, 1079-80 (Cal. 1938) (describing tort); 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 701 (1938); CHAPIN, supra note 22, § 66. For recent takes on the 
seduction tort, see Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Na-
ture ‘Deceit’ ”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (1993); Lea 
VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1996). 
 25. E.g., 2 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 585-95 (1859). 
 26. See infra notes 370-77, 382, 390, 408-34, 454-60 and accompanying text.  
 27. See infra notes 370-77, 382, 390, 408-34, 443-53 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra notes 370-77, 382, 390, 408-34, 461-62 and accompanying text.  
 29. See infra notes 370-77, 382, 390, 408-34, 464-65 and accompanying text. 
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the notable exceptions of Mississippi30 and North Carolina31 (both of 
which have recently entertained a spate of alienation of affections 
suits), over the past several years very few states have witnessed 
even a handful of cases implicating any of the heartbalm torts.32 
B.   Support Actions by Wives of Alcoholics 
  An ancient common law rule provided that the mere provision 
of alcohol to someone who subsequently committed a liquor-fueled 
wrong did not provide a basis for imposing liability on the seller.33 
This rule changed starting in 1849,34 when the temperance move-
ment brought about the enactment of the first of the more than 
thirty civil liability laws—also known as “dramshop acts”—passed by 
various states.35 
 Consistent with one of the principal evils associated with alcohol 
back in the 1800s—the abandonment or neglect of families by chroni-
cally inebriated husbands and fathers36—several of these statutes 
were construed as allowing the wives of alcoholics to recover dam-
ages against saloonkeepers who sold drinks to their drunkard, un-
employed—but otherwise healthy—husbands. The theory underlying 
these suits was that these sales worsened the husbands’ alcoholism 
and thus prevented them from supporting their families through 
gainful employment.37 Spousal alcoholism claims of this type were 
                                                                                                                     
 30. E.g., Fitch v. Valentine, 959 So. 2d 1012 (Miss. 2007); Children’s Med. Group, P.A. 
v. Phillips, 940 So. 2d 931 (Miss. 2006); Bland v. Hill, 735 So. 2d 414 (Miss. 1999); Hancock 
v. Watson, No. 2005-IA-00413-COA, 2007 Miss. App. LEXIS 7 (Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2007). 
 31. E.g., Misenheimer v. Burris, 637 S.E.2d 173 (N.C. 2006); Stann v. Levine, 636 
S.E.2d 214 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); Nunn v. Allen, 574 S.E.2d 35 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Julie 
Scelfo, Heartbreak’s Revenge, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 4, 2006, at 57 (estimating that approxi-
mately two hundred alienation of affections suits are being filed annually in North Caro-
lina).  
 32. Marianne Funk, Taking Heartbreak to Court Becomes Less Promising, DESERET 
MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Oct. 18, 1995, at B4 (observing that prior to a re-
cently decided breach of promise suit, only three published cases existed in Utah concern-
ing the tort, the last of which had been decided fifty years before); William Rabb, ‘Other 
Woman’ Safe in State, MOBILE REGISTER, Aug. 13, 1997, at B1 (noting that suits by par-
ents for their daughter’s seduction are “extremely rare” in Alabama); Doug Smeath, Alien-
ated Spouses Can Sue, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Sept. 26, 2004, at 
B1 (observing that “by all accounts, alienation-of-affections cases are very rare in Utah’s 
courts”); see infra text accompanying notes 403-04. 
 33. Largo Corp. v. Crespin, 727 P.2d 1098, 1101 (Colo. 1986) (discussing the common 
law rule and the development of exceptions thereto).   
 34. This was the year that Wisconsin adopted the first dramshop act. Julius F. Lang, 
Jr. & John J. McGrath, Comment, Third Party Liability for Drunken Driving: When “One 
for the Road” Becomes One for the Courts, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1119, 1124 n.21 (1984). 
 35. See Richard Smith, Note, A Comparative Analysis of Dramshop Liability and a 
Proposal for Uniform Legislation, 25 J. CORP. L. 553, 555 (2000). 
 36. See LaGuire v. Kain, 487 N.W.2d 389, 394 (Mich. 1992); Smith, supra note 35, at 
565. 
 37. For example, a Nebraska dramshop law enacted in 1881 set up a licensing and 
bonding scheme for the sale of liquor in the state. Act of Feb. 28, 1881, ch. 61, 1881 Neb. 
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quite common in the early 1900s, particularly in the Midwestern 
states.38 There, church groups went so far as to give seminars that 
taught women how to bring these suits.39  
 Spousal alcoholism actions dwindled during Prohibition, as the 
taps ran dry at the saloons whose owners once had been named as 
defendants. These claims disappeared altogether once temperance 
fervor abated,40 leading to the repeal of both Prohibition41 and many 
of the dramshop acts from which the spousal alcoholism tort 
sprouted.42 Notwithstanding the recent reemergence of statutes and 
                                                                                                                     
Laws 270 (repealed 1917). This statute provided that a saloonkeeper “shall pay all dam-
ages that the community or individuals may sustain in consequence of such traffic, he shall 
support all paupers, widows and orphans, and the expenses of all civil and criminal prose-
cutions growing out of, or justly attributed to, his traffic in intoxicating drinks,” id. § 15, at 
275, and permitted married women to bring actions in their own names “for all damages 
sustained by herself and children on account of such traffic.” Id. § 16, at 275. This law was 
repealed in 1917 and replaced with another statute that provided, in pertinent part, as fol-
lows: 
Any wife, child, parent, guardian, employee, or other person who shall 
be injured in person or property or means of support, by intoxication of 
any person, shall have a right of action against any person, association, 
or corporation, who by himself, his agent, or servant illegally furnished 
the intoxicating liquor that caused or contributed to the intoxication of 
such person, for all damages sustained. 
Act of Apr. 21, 1917, ch. 187, § 52, 1917 Neb. Laws 425, 448 (repealed 1935). 
 38. E.g., Earp v. Lilly, 75 N.E. 552 (Ill. 1905); Siegle v. Rush, 50 N.E. 1008 (Ill. 1898); 
Wolfe v. Johnson, 38 N.E. 886 (Ill. 1894); Leverenz v. Stevens, 124 Ill. App. 401 (App. Ct. 
1906); League v. Ehmke, 94 N.W. 938 (Iowa 1903); Ennis v. Shiley, 47 Iowa 552 (1877); 
Gilmore v. Mathews, 67 Me. 517 (1877); Baker v. Mohl, 158 N.W. 187 (Mich. 1916); Kehrig 
v. Peters, 2 N.W. 801 (Mich. 1879); Colman v. Loeper, 143 N.W. 295 (Neb. 1913); Selders v. 
Brothers, 129 N.W. 170 (Neb. 1910); Acken v. Tinglehoff, 119 N.W. 456 (Neb. 1909); Jessen 
v. Wilhite, 104 N.W. 1064 (Neb. 1905); Mulford v. Clewell, 21 Ohio St. 191 (1871); Schnei-
der v. Hosier, 21 Ohio St. 98 (1871); Garrigan v. Thompson, 95 N.W. 294 (S.D. 1903); San-
didge v. Widmann, 80 N.W. 164 (S.D. 1899); see also John A. Appleman, Civil Liability 
Under the Illinois Dramshop Act, 34 ILL. L. REV. 30, 35 (1939) (describing the cause of ac-
tion as a common one).   
 39. “Try” Saloon Men in Court; Give Drunkard’s Wife $10,000, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 26, 
1912, at 1. 
 40. This void has not been filled by claims brought under common law negligence 
principles. Drafted around the time Prohibition collapsed, the Restatement of Torts ex-
pressly excepted sales of liquor from the general rule that one who knowingly sells a habit-
forming drug to a husband or wife is liable to the spouse for any resulting harm to pro-
tected marital interests. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 696 cmt. c (1938). But see Pratt v. Daly, 
104 P.2d 147, 151 (Ariz. 1940) (concluding that the sale of liquor to an alcoholic spouse by 
one with knowledge of his or her alcoholic condition gave rise to a common law negligence 
claim).  
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1. 
 42. By 1978, more than half of the states that once had dramshop laws on the books 
had repealed them, Lang & McGrath, supra note 34, at 1124-25, and many of the remain-
ing statutes limited liability to situations in which the alcohol had been sold to a minor or 
to a visibly intoxicated person. Vincent L. Ricci, Note, Dram Shop Liability—A Judicial 
Response, 57 CAL. L. REV. 995, 996 n.6 (1969); Smith, supra note 35, at 559-60. Nebraska 
and Illinois, the two states with the largest number of published opinions addressing the 
spousal alcoholism tort, were among the states taking action against these suits. Ne-
braska’s dramshop act, with its civil-liability provisions, was repealed in 1935. Act of May 
24, 1935, ch. 116, § 107, 1935 Neb. Laws 373, 430-31; see also Holmes v. Circo, 244 N.W.2d 
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case law that permit suits against bars and restaurants for the con-
sequences of questionable or unlawful alcohol sales,43 claims seeking 
recovery for lost wages due to spousal alcoholism alone are almost 
certainly a thing of the past.  
C.   Maintenance and Champerty 
 Maintenance occurs when a third party provides a plaintiff with 
money for the purpose of bringing or sustaining a lawsuit.44 A main-
tenance claim holds the sponsor liable for any injurious consequences 
of these payments.45 Champerty, a particular type of maintenance, 
develops when a person or entity otherwise without a stake in a law-
suit agrees to fund the suit in exchange for a share of the profits, if 
any, reaped by the action.46  
 Tort claims for maintenance or champerty have never been 
common in the United States.47 Beginning in the mid-1800s, Ameri-
can courts and legislatures determined that contingency-fee con-
tracts between attorneys and their clients were not champertous, 
withdrawing the most common form of “officious intermeddling”48 
from the maintenance theory.49 Maintenance and champerty have 
been invoked in modern cases typically only as defenses to allegedly 
unlawful contracts, not as affirmative causes of action in tort.50 In the 
rare situations in which plaintiffs have alleged these theories as 
torts, a majority of courts have determined that maintenance and 
                                                                                                                     
65, 67 (Neb. 1976) (discussing the effect of repeal). In Illinois, while a few dramshop cases 
continued to be brought into at least the 1960s, see, e.g., E. Alton Family Sues 3 Taverns 
Serving Husband, EDWARDSVILLE INTELLIGENCER (Edwardsville, Ill.), July 7, 1962, at 7; 
Ex-Wife Sues 40 Taverns for $490,000, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 15, 1955, at 1, a measure enacted 
in 1986 drove a stake into the heart of this tort by amending the civil liability provisions of 
the state dramshop act to provide, in relevant part, that 
[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to confer a cause of action for 
injuries to the person or property of the intoxicated person himself, nor 
shall anything in this Act be construed to confer a cause of action for 
loss of means of support or society on the intoxicated person himself or 
on any person claiming to be supported by such intoxicated person . . . . 
1986 ILL. LAWS 84-634.  
 43. Smith, supra note 35, at 556. 
 44. Schnabel v. Taft Broad. Co., 525 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). 
 45. Id.; CHAPIN, supra note 22, § 103, at 497. 
 46. Id.; see also Merchants’ Protective Ass’n v. Jacobsen, 127 P. 315, 317 (Idaho 1912) 
(discussing the origins of the champerty tort). 
 47. See CHAPIN, supra note 22, § 103, at 497 (commenting on the rareness of the 
torts); see also Golden Commissary Corp. v. Shipley, 157 A.2d 810, 814 n.2 (D.C. 1960) (cit-
ing sources stating or suggesting the same). 
 48. CHAPIN, supra note 22, § 103, at 497. 
 49. Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of 
Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 239-42 (1998). 
 50. Sec. Underground Storage, Inc. v. Anderson, 347 F.2d 964, 969 (10th Cir. 1965); 
Hardick v. Homol, 795 So. 2d 1107, 1110 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Rancman v. Interim Settle-
ment Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 2003) (recognizing champerty and main-
tenance as contract defenses).  
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champerty claims are no longer viable, if they were ever recognized 
at all.51  
D.   Bad Faith Denial of Contract 
 A tort does not have to be old to die. A tort claim for bad faith 
denial of the existence of a contract was first recognized in Seaman’s 
Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,52 a 1984 decision by 
the California Supreme Court that espied a tort when a defendant, in 
addition to breaching a contract, “seeks to shield itself from liability 
by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the con-
tract exists.”53 That same court repudiated the bad faith denial of 
contract tort just eleven years later.54  
 Other claims embraced by the California Supreme Court in the 
1980s under Chief Justice Rose Bird ultimately shared the fate of the 
bad faith denial of contract tort after Bird and two other progressive 
justices were replaced by more conservative jurists in 1986.55 Under 
Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas, who took over for Bird after the 1986 
election, the court revisited language in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield 
Co.56 that suggested that an employee could sue his or her employer 
in tort for a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that 
was implicit in an employment contract.57 In Foley v. Interactive Data 
Corp.,58 the Lucas court concluded that no such cause of action ex-
isted.59 The court also backed off its earlier position60 that a landlord 
was strictly liable for injuries caused by defects associated with 
rented premises,61 a retreat construed by some as abandoning what 
had been a new cause of action against landlords.62 Also, in Moradi-
                                                                                                                     
 51. E.g., Alexander v. Unification Church of Am., 634 F.2d 673, 677 n.6 (2d Cir. 1980); 
Sec. Underground Storage, Inc., 347 F.2d at 969; Hardick, 795 So. 2d at 1111; McCullar v. 
Credit Bureau Sys., Inc., 832 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Ky. 1992); Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 
1224, 1226 (Mass. 1997); Tosi v. Jones, 685 N.E.2d 580, 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). But see 
Weigel Broad. Co. v. Topel, No. 83 C 7921, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23862, at *16 (N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 19, 1985) (recognizing maintenance as a cause of action); Toste Farm Corp. v. Had-
bury, Inc., 798 A.2d 901, 906 (R.I. 2002) (recognizing maintenance as a valid tort). 
 52. 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984).  
 53. Id. at 1167.  
 54. Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 670 (Cal. 1995).  
 55. See Frank Clifford, Voters Repudiate 3 of Court’s Liberal Justices, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 5, 1986, at 1.  
 56. 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).  
 57. Id. at 1337 n.12. In the interim, several California courts of appeal had construed 
Tameny as endorsing these claims. See, e.g., Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 215 Cal. Rtpr. 860 
(Ct. App. 1985); Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (Ct. App. 1983); 
Cleary v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980).  
 58. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). 
 59. Id. at 401. 
 60. Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 122 (Cal. 1985). 
 61. Peterson v. Superior Court, 899 P.2d 905, 920 (Cal. 1995). 
 62. Sugarman, supra note 10, at 468.  
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Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Cos.,63 the court overruled an 
earlier decision, Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court,64 to the 
extent that Royal Globe had read into state insurance law a statu-
tory cause of action against insurers for an unreasonable failure to 
settle a claim.65 
E.   Mishandling of Dead Bodies 
 Sometimes a tort remains viable in theory, but ignored in prac-
tice, as when it is displaced by an alternative cause of action without 
ever being formally abolished. One such forsaken tort concerns the 
abuse or mishandling of dead bodies. Courts and commentators once 
treated claims involving such facts as giving rise to a distinct and 
unique “corpse mishandling” tort.66 It was said that the deceased’s 
next of kin had a property right in,67 or “a right of custody, control 
and disposition” of,68 the corpse for purposes of burial or cremation 
and that infringements of this right would support a tort claim for in-
jured feelings.69 Thus, an action lay when a passenger on a steamship 
died during a voyage and his body could have been returned to the 
decedent’s relatives, but was buried at sea instead.70 Unauthorized 
dissections or autopsies also provided fertile grounds for litigation 
under this theory of recovery.71 
 The occasional decision recognizing a distinct wrongful autopsy 
or mishandled cremation tort still appears from time to time.72 In 
practice, however, this cause of action is slowly being swallowed by 
the “new torts” of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. This is a case of a child overtaking its parent; as originally 
devised, the emotional distress torts knit together under a single 
theory several formerly distinct torts, of which corpse mishandling 
was one, which shared little except that they all permitted plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                     
 63. 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988). 
 64. 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979). 
 65. Moradi-Shalal, 758 P.2d at 68. 
 66. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 868 (1939); BURDICK, supra note 3, ¶ 115; THOMAS M. 
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT 
OF CONTRACT 280-81 (2d ed. 1888); PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF 
BURIAL AND BURIAL PLACES 136 (2d prtg. 1937). 
 67. E.g., Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 238-39 (Minn. 1891); England v. Cent. Poco-
hontas Coal Co., 104 S.E. 46, 47 (W. Va. 1920); JACKSON, supra note 66, at 124; William L. 
Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 51-52 (1956). 
 68. BURDICK, supra note 3, ¶ 115. 
 69. Id.; JACKSON, supra note 66, at 137-46, 158-75 (listing decisions).  
 70. Finlay v. Atl. Transp. Co., 115 N.E. 715, 717-18 (N.Y. 1917). 
 71. See, e.g., Burney v. Children’s Hosp., 47 N.E. 401, 402 (Mass. 1897); Hill v. Trav-
elers’ Ins. Co., 294 S.W. 1097, 1099 (Tenn. 1927). 
 72. E.g., Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 801 P.2d 37, 44 (Idaho 1990) (treating 
corpse mishandling cases as a special species of negligence claims); Kelly v. Brigham & 
Women’s Hosp., 745 N.E.2d 969, 971 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001); Kellogg v. Office of the Chief 
Med. Exam’r of New York, 791 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279 (Sup. Ct. 2004). 
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to recover emotional distress damages even if they had not suffered 
any physical harm.73 The widespread acceptance of the emotional dis-
tress torts over the past half-century has meant that plaintiffs suing 
upon facts that once would have supported a claim labeled “corpse 
mistreatment” are instead choosing to plead and prove their lawsuits 
under a negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress 
framework.74 Courts, meanwhile, have taken to treating the formerly 
distinct cause of action for corpse mishandling as a mere subspecies 
of the emotional distress torts,75 in some cases requiring plaintiffs to 
apply an emotional distress label to their corpse mishandling 
claims.76  
 The net result has been a leaching away of corpse mistreat-
ment’s identity as a distinct tort—death by absorption, one might 
say. The Restatement (Second) of Torts continues to devote a separate 
section to corpse mishandling claims.77 The treatise acknowledges, 
however, that “in reality the cause of action has been exclusively one 
for the mental distress,”78 and its drafters expressed some doubt as to 
whether this type of claim still merited independent treatment in 
light of recent recognition of the emotional distress torts. Ultimately, 
the drafters concluded that it was “probably” desirable to retain the 
original Restatement’s discussion of corpse mishandling claims, “at 
least for this Restatement.”79  
F.   Loss of Services Actions 
  As masters and servants have evolved into employers and em-
ployees, the law governing their respective rights has likewise un-
dergone a transformation. In the past, a master could recover for 
consequential damages attributable to an injury negligently inflicted 
upon his servant.80 This cause of action vindicated and protected the 
                                                                                                                     
 73. See Prosser, supra note 3.  
 74. E.g., Perry v. St. Francis Hosp. & Med. Center, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1560-61 
(D. Kan. 1995); Janicki v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d 963, 967 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999); 
Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438, 440 (W. Va. 1985).  
 75. E.g., Janicki, 744 A.2d at 967-70; Guth v. Freeland, 28 P.3d 982, 989 (Haw. 2001); 
Whitehair, 327 S.E.2d at 440. A tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, circu-
lated in 1970, acknowledged the trend toward treating corpse mistreatment as a type of in-
tentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
868 (Tentative Draft No. 16, 1970). 
 76. E.g., Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 882 (Colo. 1994). 
 77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1979). 
 78. Id. § 868 cmt. a.  
 79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (Tentative Draft No. 16, 1970). 
 80. 2 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 479-80 (3d ed. 
1866); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 129, at 980. 
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master’s property interest in the servant,81 whom the master was re-
quired to support.82 
 Attempts have been made to transfer this rule to the modern 
context of business employers and employees,83 but the doctrine has 
not thrived in this new setting. Scholarly criticism of this cause of ac-
tion as archaic and ill-suited to modern employment relations has 
not helped matters.84 As it stands, opinions in which an employer has 
been allowed to seek or recover consequential damages assignable to 
an injury negligently wrought upon an employee represent a decided, 
and possibly extinct, minority of modern decisions addressing this 
subject.85 
G.   Insult 
 The insult tort departs from the general rule that denigrating 
(but nonslanderous) words normally provide no basis for a tort 
claim.86 A century ago, if an employee of a railroad or another com-
mon carrier directed harsh words toward a customer or (in some ju-
risdictions) failed to protect a passenger from verbal abuse by third 
parties, this action or inaction conferred a cognizable tort claim upon 
the victim.87  
                                                                                                                     
 81. See Warren A. Seavey, Liability to Master for Negligent Harm to Servant, 1956 
WASH. U. L.Q. 309, 310-11. 
 82. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 129, at 998. 
 83. See Jones v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 155 F.2d 992, 997-98 (3d Cir. 1946); Darmour 
Prods. Corp. v. Herbert M. Baruch Corp., 27 P.2d 664, 665 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933); Min-
eral Indus., Inc. v. George, 255 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115-16 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Woodward v. 
Washburn, 3 Denio 369, 374 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846). 
 84. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 129, at 979 (discussing criticism of tort); Seavey, 
supra note 81, at 313 (“It would appear . . . that this action is obsolescent; and that there is 
no valid reason for reviving it.”). 
 85. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. P.D.C., Inc., 931 F.2d 1429, 1431 (10th Cir. 1991) (listing cases 
concluding that an employer has no cause of action against one who negligently injures an 
employee); Zawadzki v. Checker Taxi Co., 539 F. Supp. 207, 208 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (same); I.J. 
Weinrot & Son, Inc. v. Jackson, 708 P.2d 682, 691 (Cal. 1985) (refusing to recognize cause 
of action); Klosterman v. Rogers, 973 P.2d 161, 163 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (same); Anderson 
Plasterers v. Meinecke, 543 N.W.2d 612, 614 (Iowa 1996) (same); Domingue v. Reliance 
Ins. Co., 619 So. 2d 1220, 1224 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (same); Ferguson v. Green Island Con-
tracting Corp., 355 N.Y.S.2d 196, 198 (App. Div. 1974); Hartridge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 598, 599-600 (Wis. 1978); Champion Well Serv., Inc. v. NL Indus., 769 
P.2d 382, 383 (Wyo. 1989) (refusing to recognize cause of action); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 316 cmt. b (1958) (noting that “[f]or several hundred years . . . there 
have been few cases in which a master has brought an action for negligent harm to a ser-
vant not a member of his family”); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Employer’s Right of Action 
for Loss of Services or the Like Against Third Person Tortiously Killing or Injuring Em-
ployee, 4 A.L.R. 4th 504, 511-17 (1981 & Supp. 2007) (listing cases rejecting the rule).  
 86. See BURDICK, supra note 3, ¶ 109; John W. Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and 
Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REV. 63, 63 (1950). 
 87. Wade, supra note 86, at 66-67. 
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 To recover under this theory, the plaintiff (often a woman)88 
merely had to be subjected to language that would offend “a normal 
person of ordinary sensibility”89—that is, “such language as is by 
common consent among civilized people regarded as vulgar, coarse, 
immodest, and offensive.”90 Actionable misconduct included  
[p]rofane and indecent language, abusive and insulting epithets, 
indecent proposals, accusations of dishonesty or immoral conduct, 
insinuations as to poverty or stinginess, threats of violence, the at-
tempt to put a white man into a Jim Crow car, shaking a ticket 
punch under a passenger’s nose, and other assorted varieties of 
unpleasantness.91  
 The Restatement (Second) of Torts continues to recognize the tort 
of insult92 as an exception to the more general rule that only extreme 
and outrageous behavior by a defendant will lead to liability for 
“pure” emotional distress unaccompanied by an invasion of another 
personal or property right.93 But if the tort of insult still exists in 
theory, today it is a mere shadow of its former self. One author has 
observed that the “cause of action has largely vanished from Ameri-
can tort practice.”94 The available evidence bears out this statement. 
While an American Law Reports annotation on liability for insulting 
or abusive language identifies several dozen decisions implicating 
the tort of insult,95 the vast majority of these cases date from the late 
1800s or the first few decades of the 1900s, and the author has lo-
cated only a smattering of published decisions over the past half-
century in which plaintiffs have recovered even a pittance under an 
insult theory.96  
                                                                                                                     
 88. See, e.g., Austro-Am. S.S. Co. v. Thomas, 248 F. 231, 233 (2d Cir. 1917); Yazoo & 
M.V.R. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 50 So. 631, 632 (Miss. 1909); Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 
70 N.E. 857, 858 (N.Y. 1904). In fact, one Alabama court believed it necessary to remind 
the reader that the cause of action for insult was available to men, too. S. Ry. Co. v. Car-
roll, 70 So. 984, 985 (Ala. Ct. App. 1915). 
 89. Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Baker, 58 S.E. 88, 91 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907). 
 90. Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Glenn, 60 So. 111, 112 (Ala. 1912).  
 91. Prosser, supra note 67, at 61-62 (footnotes omitted). 
 92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 48 (1965). 
 93. Id. § 46. 
 94. James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 
1279, 1377 (2000). 
 95. W.J. Dunn, Annotation, Civil Liability for Insulting or Abusive Language not 
Amounting to Defamation, 15 A.L.R.2d 108, 114-17 (1951 & Supp. 2000). 
 96. See Wiggs v. Courshon, 355 F. Supp. 206, 211 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Gebhardt v. Pub. 
Serv. Coordinated Transp., 137 A.2d 48, 53-54 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1957); Brown v. 
Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 185 N.Y.S.2d 923, 928 (Mun. Ct. 1959); cf. Crites v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 264, 267 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); Ricci v. Am. Airlines, 544 A.2d 428, 
433 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (remanding case to trial court for determination of 
whether a stewardess’ conduct toward a passenger was insulting and abusive). By way of 
comparison, in the 1980s alone roughly six hundred opinions cited the Restatement section 
that relates to the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Jean C. Love, 
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H.   Nuisance 
 Make no mistake: the law of nuisance is alive and well. But this 
“impenetrable jungle”97 no longer covers certain factual acreage. For 
instance, courts in the United States have rejected the old English 
“ancient lights” doctrine.98 Long ago, a landowner invoking this rule 
could acquire a prescriptive right to the free flow of sunlight and air 
across neighboring land owned by another,99 a right enforceable 
through a nuisance action.100 As Blackstone wrote, “to erect a house 
or other building so near to mine, that it obstructs my ancient lights 
and windows is a [nuisance].”101 Although some jurisdictions in this 
country initially embraced this doctrine,102 the switch was flipped 
more than a century ago. Over the past one hundred and fifty years, 
one decision after another has gainsaid a compensable right to the 
maintenance of ancient lights.103 During this span, only a handful of 
states, desirous of encouraging solar power, have permitted tort 
claims for interrupted sunlight.104  
I.   Telegram Suits 
 Telegraph companies used to find themselves on the wrong end 
of verdicts holding them liable in tort for the negligent transmission 
of messages. Even though the transmission of a telegram was gov-
erned by a contract, tort liability adhered to Western Union and 
other companies when they did not send a message or somehow gar-
bled the transmission.105 One common fact pattern involved a failure 
to transmit, or the delayed transmission of, a message conveying a 
lucrative job offer or another business opportunity.106  
                                                                                                                     
Discriminatory Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123, 127 (1990).  
 97. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 71, at 549 (1941). 
 98. The ancient lights doctrine has been traced as far back as the sixteenth century. 
J. Michael Banas, Note, Return to Ancient Lights? Prah v. Maretti, 1984 DET. C.L. REV. 
101, 104-05.  
 99. Id. at 105. 
 100. See 2 HILLIARD, supra note 80, at 2-3. 
 101. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 216-17. 
 102. H.G. WOOD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN THEIR VARIOUS 
FORMS § 152 (1875); Sophia Douglass Pfeiffer, Ancient Lights: Legal Protection of Access to 
Solar Energy, 68 A.B.A. J. 288, 289 (1982). 
 103. See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 
359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959) (noting the widespread rejection of the doctrine); Prah v. Maretti, 
321 N.W.2d 182, 188 n.8 (Wis. 1982) (same); 2 HILLIARD, supra note 80, at 5-7; WOOD, su-
pra note 102, §§ 152-53, at 152. 
 104. See Tenn v. 889 Assocs., Ltd., 500 A.2d 366, 370 (N.H. 1985); Prah, 321 N.W.2d at 
191. 
 105. BURDICK, supra note 3, ¶¶ 588-89. 
 106. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Bowman, 37 So. 493, 495 (Ala. 1904); McPherson v. W. Union 
Tel. Co., 155 N.W. 557, 558 (Mich. 1915); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Longwill, 21 P. 339, 340 
(N.M. 1889); BURDICK, supra note 3, ¶ 600, at 559. 
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 This sort of claim disappeared in the early 1900s, once the fed-
eral and state governments began to comprehensively regulate the 
telegraph industry.107 These schemes typically required telegraph 
companies to file tariffs with the appropriate regulatory agencies.108 
The tariffs set the rates and terms of service; they also typically in-
cluded terms limiting the liability of the regulated interest for lapses 
or mistakes in service.109 In 1921, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the validity of these liability limitations, holding that they 
went hand-in-hand with the strict government control and rate struc-
tures to which the companies had submitted.110 This determination, 
and the gradual displacement of the telegraph by other methods of 
communication, triggered a decline in this type of litigation.111 
J.   Unfair Trade and Labor Practices 
 The common law of the late 1800s treated certain labor and 
marketing practices as essentially tortious in nature. Grievances as-
sessed under a tort rubric included labor strikes and boycotts, which 
were adjudicated under principles borrowed from the torts of inter-
ference with contract and interference with prospective economic ad-
vantage,112 and claims alleging that the defendant passed off its 
products as those of the plaintiff, behavior that was regarded as a 
type of deceit.113  
 Plaintiffs still sue for similar wrongs today. However, lawyers no 
longer dress these claims in tort clothing, and courts do not look to 
tort law to supply the pertinent rules of decision. Instead, we regard 
                                                                                                                     
 107. See Rendi L. Mann-Stadt, Limitation of Liability for Interruption of Service for 
Regulated Telephone Companies: An Outmoded Protection?, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 631-
32. 
 108. Id. at 635-36; Christy Cornell Kunin, Comment, Unilateral Tariff Exculpation in 
the Era of Competitive Telecommunications, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 907, 909 (1992). 
 109. Mann-Stadt, supra note 107, at 636. 
 110. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 571-72 (1921); see also W. 
Union Tel. Co. v. Priester, 276 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1928); Waters v. Pac. Tel. Co., 523 P.2d 
1161, 1163-66 (Cal. 1974); S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co v. Ivenchek, Inc., 204 S.E.2d 457, 459-60 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1974); Mann-Stadt, supra note 107, at 641-43; Kunin, supra note 108, at 910-
12. 
 111. That said, over the past three decades several courts have determined that excul-
patory clauses in filed tariffs do not preclude certain tort claims brought against telephone 
companies. Kunin, supra note 108, at 915 n.45 (listing decisions). 
 112. See, e.g., Old Dominion Steam-Ship Co. v. McKenna, 30 F. 48, 50 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1887); Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, 13-15 (1870); Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 30 A. 
881, 890 (N.J. Chan. 1894); Moores & Co. v. Bricklayers’ Union, 1889 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 
119, at *26-30 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1889); COOLEY, supra note 66, at 329-33; WILLIAM B. HALE, 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 189 (1896); Jeremiah Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor 
Litigation, 20 HARV. L. REV. 253 (1907). 
 113. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS introductory note to Interference with Business by Trade 
Practices chapter (Preliminary Draft No. 5, 1938); BURDICK, supra note 3, ¶¶ 467-79; 
COOLEY, supra note 66, at 413-20, 423-30; J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:2 (4th ed. 2007).  
2008] WHY TORTS DIE 375 
 
these claims as properly addressed by, and under, the distinct fields 
of labor and trademark law.114 Statutes enacted to dispel the confu-
sion (or repeal the rules) attendant to the adjudication of these dis-
putes under common law principles115 now provide the rules of deci-
sion for these actions. In labor law, the forum for resolution of these 
conflicts has changed as well, with administrative agencies assuming 
responsibility for entertaining most grievances between labor and 
management and between individual employees and unions.116  
 The disappearance of trademark and labor disputes from the 
Restatement of Torts reflects their reassignment from tort law to 
newly developed fields of study. The First Restatement devoted nu-
merous sections to distinguishing fair from unfair trade practices117 
and legitimate from illegitimate labor activities.118 These sections 
were deleted from the Second Restatement, which was published just 
a few decades later. An introductory note in the Second Restatement 
explained the drafters’ decision to omit the discussion of unfair trade 
practices: 
The rules relating to liability for harm caused by unfair trade 
practices developed doctrinally from established principles in the 
law of Torts, and for this reason the decision was made that it was 
appropriate to include these legal areas in the Restatement of 
Torts, despite the fact that the fields of Unfair Competition and 
Trade Regulation were rapidly developing into independent bodies 
of law with diminishing reliance upon the traditional principles of 
Tort law. In the more than 40 years since that decision was ini-
tially made, the influence of Tort law has continued to decrease, so 
that it is now largely of historical interest and the law of Unfair 
Competition and Trade Regulation is no more dependent upon 
                                                                                                                     
 114. See, e.g., R.K. Enter., LLC v. Pro-Comp Mgmt., Inc., 158 S.W.3d 685, 690 (Ark. 
2004) (holding that state trade secrets act preempted a common law misappropriation 
claim); Jones v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc., 308 N.E.2d 512, 518-19 (Mass. 1974) (dis-
cussing the application of federal and state statutes to secondary boycotts); MCCARTHY, 
supra note 113, § 1:15 (observing that “[w]hile the law of unfair competition was born an 
offspring of the law of torts, it has grown and matured into an independent field of law 
that can stand on its own feet”); 2 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 6.8, 
6.13 (2d ed. 1986) (noting the displacement of tort law with developments in labor law). 
 115. For example, as enacted in 1932, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C § 101 et 
seq., barred courts from treating most types of labor picketing as an actionable form of in-
tentional interference with contract or prospective economic advantage. See CHARLES O. 
GREGORY & HAROLD A. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAW 184-99 (3d ed. 1979); Joseph Tanen-
haus, Picketing as a Tort: The Development of the Law of Picketing from 1880 to 1940, 14 
U. PITT. L. REV. 170 (1953) (discussing the use of labor injunctions against picketers, end-
ing with the passage and enforcement of the Norris-LaGuardia Act). 
 116. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-46 (1959) (dis-
cussing the vesting of jurisdiction over certain labor disputes with the National Labor Re-
lations Board).  
 117. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757-761 (1939); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 711-756 
(1938). 
 118. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 775-812 (1939). 
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Tort law than it is on many other general fields of the law and 
upon broad statutory developments, particularly at the federal 
level. The Council formally reached the decision that these chap-
ters no longer belong in the Restatement of Torts, and they are 
omitted from this Second Restatement.119 
 The Council directed a similar comment toward the Restate-
ment’s abandoned chapter thirty-eight, which concerned the inter-
play between tort law and labor disputes: 
Obviously, the law of labor disputes and their effect in interfering 
with contractual relations has ceased to be regarded as a part of 
Tort Law and has become an integral part of the general subject of 
Labor Law, with all of its statutory and administrative regula-
tions, both state and federal. Chapter 38 has therefore also been 
omitted from the Second Restatement of Torts.120 
K.   Personal Injury Lawsuits by Employees 
 Negligence suits against employers for personal injuries suffered 
at work represented the front line of American tort litigation in the 
late 1800s.121 This changed in the early 1900s, when states replaced 
these suits with proceedings before administrative agencies that ap-
plied strict liability principles to compensate workers for their inju-
ries.122 Employers who participate in worker’s compensation pro-
grams typically receive immunity from negligence suits brought by 
their employees,123 meaning that personal injury claims against em-
ployers occupy a far less prominent position within the law of torts 
today than they did a century ago.124  
                                                                                                                     
 119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS division 9, introductory note 1-2 (1979). 
 120. Id. at 2.   
 121. See Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Work-
ers’ Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 775 (1982).  
 122. See generally PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE 
WELFARE STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (Univ. Chicago Press 2000) 
(discussing the background and origin of workers’ compensation); Price V. Fishback & 
Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’ Compensation in the United States, 
1900–1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305 (1998) (same).  
 123. E.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-52 (1975); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(a) (West 2007).  
 124. That said, the preemptive effect of workers’ compensation is limited, meaning 
some vestiges of the old regime still remain intact. Federal laws continue to allow employ-
ees in certain industries to sue their employers for on-the-job injuries, see, e.g., Jones Act, 
46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (2000) (merchant marine); Federal Employer’s Liability Act, 45 
U.S.C. § 51 (2000) (railroads); businesses that do not participate in workers’ compensation 
programs may remain subject to suit, 6 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW §§ 102.01[1], 102.02[2] (2001) (discussing the few remain-
ing states in which workers’ compensation is elective and the retention of liability for em-
ployers in compulsory jurisdictions who do not participate in workers’ compensation 
schemes); and workers’ compensation statutes often contain exceptions for intentionally in-
flicted injuries, id. § 103.01. 
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 This list of defunct torts could go on, but hopefully it has made 
its point: many tort theories have not withstood the tests of time. 
This survey also reveals that there is no single explanation for how 
torts die. Generally speaking, torts can be either abolished or aban-
doned, with these broad categories being susceptible to further pars-
ing to produce more precise labels such as reassignment, absorption, 
etc. The similarly diverse set of explanations for why torts die will be 
addressed in the next part of this Article.  
III.   FACTORS INFLUENCING THE RETENTION OR REJECTION OF TORT 
THEORIES 
 Lest one conclude from the preceding discussion that torts in-
variably succumb to even the most modest of cultural downdrafts, it 
bears mentioning that some claims seem impervious to even sus-
tained and potent criticism. One tort, for example, still “suffers from 
considerable doctrinal confusion”125 long after its inception.126 A 
commentator has written that “courts [have] impose[d] liability un-
der the rubric of [this tort] in a variety of contexts, but they have 
failed to develop common or consistent doctrines.”127 Liability under 
this theory hinges in large part on the tricky question of the defen-
dant’s motive, creating knotty problems of proof.128 The tort has pro-
duced enormous (and heavily criticized) jury verdicts, with billions of 
dollars being awarded to individual plaintiffs.129 Scholars have criti-
cized the tort on the ground that it deters efficient conduct130 while 
unduly chilling free speech.131 Finally, some observers have been 
troubled by the tort’s conceptual pedigree: the claim developed, in 
part, out of suits by the masters of servants against those who en-
ticed their laborers to quit or escape.132 From all these facts, one 
might conclude that this unnamed tort is in grave danger of extinc-
tion. This is far from the truth, however, for the tort is none other 
                                                                                                                     
 125. Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust 
and Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (1993). 
 126. Gary D. Wexler, Note, Intentional Interference with Contract: Market Efficiency 
and Individual Liberty Considerations, 27 CONN. L. REV. 279, 284-92 (1994) (reviewing the 
history of this tort and the contemporary confusion surrounding it). 
 127. Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: 
A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 61 (1982). 
 128. See Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. 
L. REV. 335, 347 (1980). 
 129. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). In this mat-
ter, a Texas jury awarded Pennzoil $10.53 billion. Thomas W. Lippman, Jury Awards 
$10.53 Billion to Pennzoil in Texaco Case, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1985, at A1. A Washington 
Post editorial described the jury verdict as “absurd,” adding that it was “the kind of verdict 
that is bringing the whole American tort system and its wide-open verdicts into disrepute.” 
Editorial, Corporate Breach of Promise, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1985, at A26.  
 130. See Perlman, supra note 127, at 79. 
 131. Wexler, supra note 126, at 323-25. 
 132. Id. at 326-27.  
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than intentional interference with contract, which today is “one of 
the most pervasive causes of action in American business litiga-
tion.”133  
 So if a tort does not collapse due to just any criticism, can one at 
least identify the factors that influence whether a claim lives or dies? 
Quite possibly, yes. Studies into the spread of diseases tend to exam-
ine three intertwined factors: the makeup of the pathogen, the char-
acter and constitutions of those exposed to the threat, and the condi-
tions that brought the victims into contact with the harmful agent.134 
Likewise, inquiries into the extinctions of animal populations or spe-
cies commonly start with the conditions upon which the animal de-
pended for survival, pertinent changes to this environment, and the 
characteristics of the population or species that made it vulnerable to 
these shifts.135   
 The framework proposed here for reviewing the deaths of torts 
borrows from the disease and extinction models,136 but adjusts these 
methodologies to suit the legal landscape. In so doing, the torts 
model identifies not three, but six subjects for study.137 These topics 
are the cultural environment in which a tort operates; the quality of 
the arguments directed against the tort; the interests, capabilities, 
and limitations of the audiences that decide whether to retain or re-
ject the cause of action; the relative influence of the tort’s opponents 
and supporters; the availability and desirability of alternatives to the 
tort; and the intrinsic qualities of the threatened claim itself. These 
factors can be described more alliteratively as atmosphere, argu-
ments, audiences, agents, alternatives, and attributes. The text be-
                                                                                                                     
 133. Id. at 280. In 1989, Louisiana joined the other forty-nine states in recognizing this 
tort (or at least some variations thereof). 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228, 
232-34 (La. 1989). In doing so, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court observed that 
“[s]ome aspects of this tort have been subjected to serious criticisms, leaving open a good 
many questions about the basis of liability and defense, the types of contract or relation-
ship to be protected, and the kinds of interference that will be actionable.” Id. at 234. 
 134. For a discussion of one such investigation, see STEVEN JOHNSON, THE GHOST MAP 
(2006) (relating how nineteenth century Londoners discovered how cholera spread in that 
city).  
 135. See generally ELLIS, supra note 14 (discussing the extinction of animal species); 
Michael E. Soulé, What Do We Really Know About Extinction?, in GENETICS AND 
CONSERVATION: A REFERENCE FOR MANAGING WILD ANIMAL AND PLANT POPULATIONS 111 
(Christine M. Shonewald-Cox et al. eds., 1983) (same). 
 136. This borrowing makes sense on a conceptual level; analogies long have existed be-
tween the spread of disease and the dissemination of ideas, see ANDRÉ SIEGFRIED, ROUTES 
OF CONTAGION 85-91 (Jean Henderson & Mercedes Clarasó trans., 1965); W. Goffman & 
V.A. Newill, Communication and Epidemic Processes, 298 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL 
SOC’Y OF LONDON, SERIES A, MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL SCI. 316, 316-18 (1967), and 
the disappearance of a theory is, in a sense, not too different from the extinction of an or-
ganism. 
 137. The disease and extinction models also can be made more specific. For example, 
one scientist has identified eighteen different factors that may contribute to the extinction 
of animal populations. Soulé, supra note 135, at 116. 
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low summarizes how each of these factors may contribute to the 
deaths of torts, offering hypotheses that will undergo further testing 
in the case studies to follow.  
A.   Atmosphere 
 The first factor that may influence why torts die is perhaps also 
the most obvious. If tort law reflects the society it serves,138 changes 
in the surrounding culture may bring about the extinction of a tort 
that no longer comports with the realities of the world around it. 
Torts that succumbed to changes in the ambient cultural environ-
ment are easy to find. Claims brought against those who enticed 
slaves to escape139 could not, and did not, survive our country’s repu-
diation of the peculiar institution of slavery.140 Likewise, suits charg-
ing local government officials with a failure to enforce Prohibition141 
became an anachronism as soon as the “Noble Experiment” drew to a 
close.142 The elimination of these torts represented the inescapable 
results of the collapses of the regimes that they served. 
 These examples demonstrate how changes in the cultural at-
mosphere in which a tort operates can fatally compromise a cause of 
action. As used here, “atmosphere” refers to conditions, trends, and 
events in the surrounding environment that, although not aimed at 
or concerned with any one tort specifically or even tort law generally, 
nevertheless may have an indirect effect on the viability of a tort 
theory or theories. An inhospitable atmosphere can set the stage for 
the demise of tort theories by providing grounds upon which to chal-
lenge a cause of action or by creating or emboldening an audience for 
these attacks. The emancipation and Prohibition examples offered 
above illustrate the first sort of atmospheric shift; the expulsion of 
Rose Bird and two of her colleagues on the California Supreme Court 
in 1986 offers an example of the second. This campaign was fueled 
principally by discontent over the challenged jurists’ voting records 
on issues of criminal law, especially the death penalty.143 The re-
placement of these justices also happened to produce a court more re-
ceptive to limitations on tort liability, though it was not until compel-
                                                                                                                     
 138. Francis H. Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 725, 725-26 (1937) (ob-
serving that “[i]t is, therefore, inevitable that changes in the relative importance attached 
by public opinion to the interests concerned [in litigation], should have a controlling effect 
upon the judicial decisions which create the law of Torts”). 
 139. E.g., Ohio Stats. ch. 76, § 6 (1841) (conferring upon the master of a slave or ser-
vant a cause of action against one who “counsel[s], advise[s], or entice[s]” the slave or ser-
vant to escape). 
 140. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  
 141. Act of Apr. 21, 1917, ch. 187, § 53, 1917 Neb. Laws 425, 448-49 (repealed 1935). 
 142. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 143. See Bob Egelko, Deukmejian Wins the Court Majority He Long Sought, RECORDER, 
Nov. 6, 1986, at 1 (discussing the campaign and its results). 
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ling arguments against specific torts were pressed through the 
proper channels that the Lucas court ultimately struck down several 
of the novel causes of action that had been embraced just a few years 
before.  
 Discussions of why a tort or torts have died tend to stress the 
impact of atmospheric changes. The transition of social relations 
from status to contract has doomed some torts,144 while the transfor-
mation of gender expectations and sexual relations has hamstrung 
others145—or so the stories go. To the extent that these explanations 
tend to suggest that the death of a tort represents the inevitable out-
growth of sweeping social transitions, they give unduly short shrift to 
factors that may blunt or redirect the impact of all but the most in-
auspicious cultural movements. It is simply not true that a tort the-
ory always will collapse upon the disappearance of the conditions 
that gave birth to the cause of action. For example, claims for inten-
tional interference with contract originated long ago during a labor 
shortage occasioned by the Black Death. The dearth of laborers occa-
sioned legislation that forbade the enticement of servants away from 
their masters―the precursor to modern intentional interference with 
contract law.146 This labor crisis eventually eased, and master-
servant ties have slowly disappeared.147 Intentional interference with 
contract lives on, however, because over the centuries the gravamen 
of the tort was extended to numerous other contexts outside of the 
master-servant relationship.148 The tort evolved while others stag-
nated, and as a result has survived social change that otherwise 
might have posed a grave threat to its existence. The curious persis-
tence of intentional interference with contract (and other torts) sug-
gests that while changes in the surrounding atmosphere may provide 
part of the explanation for why torts die, other factors also may enter 
into the equation.   
B.   Arguments 
 If atmosphere is not necessarily decisive, what other influences 
might make a difference in whether a tort lives or dies? Being human 
constructs, torts exist for a reason, and when they die, presumably 
                                                                                                                     
 144. See e.g., Klosterman v. Rogers, 973 P.2d 161, 163 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (attribut-
ing the death of claims seeking damages for negligent injuries inflicted on servants to this 
development). 
 145. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 433; Sinclair, supra note 10, at 98-102. 
 146. 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 114, § 6.5, at 303. 
 147. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 41-46 (3d ed. 2005). 
 148. See Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury: The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1980) 
(discussing the evolution and broadened application of this tort in the nineteenth century); 
Wexler, supra note 126, at 281 (observing that “[t]he scope of tortious interference with 
contract has expanded dramatically in the past 140 years”). 
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they also die for a reason—or, in this context, perhaps the word “mo-
tive” is more apt. These motives can be framed as arguments, and 
some arguments may resonate better than others and thus prove 
more effective in undermining a tort.  
 The substance of a criticism matters for the simple reason that 
some complaints may be intrinsically more potent than others. One 
might attack a tort on the ground that it makes plaintiffs’ lawyers 
unduly rich, but this line of reasoning does not present a compelling 
case for getting rid of the cause of action. This problem, even if real, 
is likely not isolated to any single tort and can be addressed through 
measures less drastic than outright abolition. More compelling ar-
guments challenge a tort on grounds that are both more fundamental 
and more specific. Among them, a cause of action can be attacked as 
falling outside the recognized conceptual limits of tort liability; as not 
advancing the perceived aims of tort law generally; or as an unwieldy 
tool for achieving these goals. The first of these (frequently overlap-
ping) critiques attacks a tort as being aberrant from a jurispruden-
tial standpoint; the second charges that the tort is substantively 
lacking; the third implies that alternative mechanisms would deliver 
similar benefits, but with less cost and uncertainty. 
 The first powerful line of attack alleges that a claim somehow 
falls outside the proper conceptual boundaries of tort liability. This 
argument may portray a fact pattern as susceptible to challenge, just 
not by way of a tort, or it may regard these facts as insufficient to 
create liability under any theory. These critiques often characterize 
the assignment of tort liability as unduly extending the recognized 
limits of at least one of the essential elements of tort liability, such as 
duty, causation, or resulting injury. One may question whether the 
defendant’s conduct truly “causes” the injury at issue, or assert that 
the defendant has no duty to avoid the actions integral to the tort, or 
charge that the plaintiff has suffered no injury (at least not one com-
pensable in tort). Critics of contemporary lawsuits challenging the 
marketing and distribution of handguns commonly invoked these 
themes, arguing that 
[t]he sale of a firearm merely furnishes the condition for a crime 
and, as a matter of law, there can be no finding of proximate cause 
in an action brought on behalf of a victim against the seller of the 
firearm used in the crime. In addition, any criminal misuse of a 
firearm that is not reasonably foreseeable is an intervening, or an 
independent superseding cause, which the manufacturer of a non-
defective weapon has no duty to anticipate or prevent.149 
                                                                                                                     
 149. H.R. REP. NO. 109-124, at 7-8 (2005) (footnotes omitted). 
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These attacks ultimately proved persuasive; in 2005 a sympathetic 
Congress passed legislation limiting these suits.150   
 Another batch of weighty arguments attacks a cause of action as 
being out of step with the perceived goals of tort law, such as the al-
location of measured compensation to injured parties;151 the maximi-
zation of social wealth by deterring inefficient conduct;152 or the issu-
ance and affirmation of appropriate moral judgments.153 The text be-
low addresses each of these arguments in turn. 
 First, a tort might die if it develops a reputation for either sys-
tematically overcompensating plaintiffs or chronically undercompen-
sating them. On a very basic level, a perception of overcompensation 
could arise if society concludes that a tort no longer implicates a cog-
nizable right or interest. At that point, any payment to the plaintiff 
would be excessive. But matters do not have to deteriorate quite so 
badly to place a tort at risk. A backlash might result from a sense 
that injured parties proceeding under a particular theory are recov-
ering more than they should or that the wrong plaintiffs are receiv-
ing awards due to a failure by (or inability of) courts and juries to re-
liably distinguish between bogus and meritorious claims.   
 Perceived undercompensation may also produce the death of a 
tort, though by slightly different means. Economic considerations af-
fect decisions by plaintiffs and their attorneys about when to sue and 
which theories to pursue in court.154 If a given tort promises insuffi-
cient returns—whether this state of affairs owes to unlikelihood of 
                                                                                                                     
 150. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 
(2005).  
 151. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 525 (2003); 
Jeffrey O’Connell & Christopher J. Robinette, The Role of Compensation in Personal Injury 
Tort Law: A Response to the Opposite Concerns of Gary Schwartz and Patrick Atiyah, 32 
CONN. L. REV. 137, 139 (1999). 
 152. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW 1 (1987); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public 
Tort, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1032-38 (2001); Goldberg, supra note 151, at 525. 
 153. See Bohlen, supra note 138, at 725 (“The primary purpose of the law of Torts is to 
reach a ‘fair’ adjustment between the conflicting interests of the litigating parties.”); Nancy 
A. Weston, The Metaphysics of Modern Tort Theory, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 919, 956-95 (1994) 
(discussing various “moral theories” of tort law that have been proposed by scholars). 
 154. See generally Robert M. Rosen, How to Screen for Success in Employment Cases, 
16 TOURO L. REV. 1319 (2000) (advising how to screen employment cases to maximize re-
turns); Kenneth M. Suggs, Case Selection in the Age of Tort “Reform,” in ASSOC. OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS OF AM. CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 735 (2005) (discussing the factors 
that lawyers should consider in deciding whether to take a case, including the value of a 
case and the costs associated with trying it); Mary Nell Trautner, How Social Hierarchies 
Within the Personal Injury Bar Affect Case Screening Decisions, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 215 
(2006) (reviewing the factors that affect which cases are accepted by trial lawyers, includ-
ing case value); Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: 
Case Selection and Resolution (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper 
No. 364, 1996) (discussing how both pecuniary and nonpecuniary considerations factor into 
case selection).  
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success, modest recoveries through trial or settlement, expenses as-
sociated with prosecuting the case, or difficulties in collecting from 
the defendant—absent unusual circumstances, it presumably will be 
bypassed in favor of other theories of recovery or avenues of relief.155 
Alternatively, the prospective defendant’s misconduct may not be 
challenged at all. Either way, the tort will wither and die from dis-
use. 
 Second, following from the premise that a primary goal of tort 
law is to deter inefficient conduct, a tort seen as either deterring too 
little or too much also may find itself in jeopardy. Tort liability, by its 
nature, places a price tag on behavior. Overdeterrence arguments 
may arise when the dunned activity comes across as being several 
orders of magnitude more beneficial than any invaded interest. For 
example, American courts have rejected the ancient lights doctrine 
on the asserted ground that the doctrine stands in the way of the ro-
bust development of private property.156 One court described the doc-
trine as “hostile to the spirit of [American] institutions” and “not 
adapted to the existing state of things in this country,” such that “it 
cannot be applied in the growing cities and villages of this country, 
without working the most mischievous consequences.”157 Similar 
overdeterrence arguments likely lay behind the more recent erasure 
of tort liability regarded as impeding beneficial—but not especially 
lucrative (from the defendant’s point of view)—conduct such as in-
creased food donations158 and the provision of first aid by Good Sa-
maritans,159 with legislatures crafting immunities in these contexts. 
 Other torts might be challenged as serving no useful deterrent 
function. Underdeterrence could result if a defendant cannot accu-
                                                                                                                     
 155. Eisenberg & Farber, supra note 154, at 3-4 (“First and other things equal, a po-
tential claimant will be more likely to file a lawsuit if the costs of litigation are low. This 
follows directly from the presumption that only cases with positive expected value to the 
plaintiff are filed.”). Nonpecuniary costs factor into this calculus as well. Modern plaintiffs 
may be embarrassed to press certain claims (such as spousal alcoholism suits) in court, 
whereas one’s ancestors would not hesitate to advance this type of suit; the added embar-
rassment associated with these claims today is no less a “cost” of suit than are out-of-
pocket expenses.  
 156. See Guest v. Reynolds, 68 Ill. 478, 487-88 (1873) (rejecting the ancient lights doc-
trine as inconsistent with local interest in property development); Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 
436, 441 (1847) (same); Parker & Edgarton v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309, 318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1838) (same); Notes of Cases, 18 VA. L. REG. 788, 788 (1913) (describing the ancient lights 
doctrine as “a distinct clog to progress”).  
 157. Parker & Edgarton, 19 Wend. at 318; see also Guest, 68 Ill. at 488 (finding the an-
cient lights doctrine “not applicable to our growing cities and villages”). 
 158. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1572 (2007) (providing limited immunity from civil dam-
ages to those who donate food to a nonprofit organization for distribution to the needy or 
poor). 
 159. Id. § 691.1522 (immunizing restaurants and their employees from damages at-
tributable to use of the Heimlich maneuver unless the person providing aid was grossly 
negligent). 
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rately gauge the costs and benefits associated with its conduct, lead-
ing it to persist in inefficient behavior whether or not tort liability at-
taches. Alternatively or in addition, a tort may implicate substantive 
elements or procedural rules that make it extremely difficult to re-
cover against even a culpable defendant or to receive enough dam-
ages to create an effective deterrent. Or the nature of a tort may be 
such that the defendant will refuse to obey the law even if he or she 
knows that severe consequences will follow. Whatever the reason, if 
deterrence is a salient function of tort law, reason would dictate that 
a tort shown to have no useful deterrent effect stands in danger of 
extinction.  
 Third, one may attack a cause of action as out of step with an-
other goal commonly associated with tort law, namely, the delivery of 
corrective justice or, more broadly, the maintenance of preferred 
morals and values.160 If the purpose of tort law is to prevent nonre-
ciprocal risks, permit recovery for “wrongful losses,” or rectify injus-
tices as between particular parties,161 critiques that call out a tort for 
failing to achieve these results (as by questioning the moral blame-
worthiness of the particular tortious conduct) may strike a chord. 
These sorts of arguments, of course, often overlap with contentions 
invoking compensation or deterrence themes, which themselves de-
rive from moral judgments; to defend a defendant’s conduct as un-
worthy of censure is not too different from saying that a plaintiff does 
not deserve compensation for what the defendant did. A somewhat 
different (but still potent) kind of “moral” argument arises when a 
tort takes on baggage not directly related to its delivery of corrective 
justice. For example, as times change, a tort may become perceived 
as demeaning to a particular group or institution. In this situation, 
the content and meaning of the tort may generate criticism even if 
few quibble with how the tort allocates justice between particular 
parties.  
 Finally, a tort may be challenged as overly taxing to litigants 
and courts, failing to generate predictable outcomes, producing di-
vergent liability standards across jurisdictions, or as an ineffective 
vehicle for developing optimal public policy.162 These contentions fo-
cus less on the fairness of the results generated by a tort and more on 
the supposedly excessive costs of predicting, getting to, or applying 
                                                                                                                     
 160. See Weston, supra note 153, at 956-95 (discussing various “moral theories” of tort 
law). 
 161. See id.  
 162. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 4-8 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds, 4th ed. 2001) 
(discussing the shortcomings of judicial regulation of labor conflicts, leading to the enact-
ment of federal regulatory legislation); JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: THE 
SILENT REVOLUTION 9-11 (1991) (reviewing the criteria given by the federal government 
for the exercise of its preemption power). 
2008] WHY TORTS DIE 385 
 
these outcomes—matters of process, more than substance. These ar-
guments may concede the need for a mechanism to resolve a particu-
lar class of disputes, but contend that these matters can be optimally 
resolved outside of the court system, under principles different from 
those supplied by tort law, or both. And so, a tort may provide appro-
priate compensation to injured parties, deter inefficient conduct, and 
deliver “justice” as between particular plaintiffs and defendants, but 
still come under fire because it has proven unwieldy or otherwise 
falls short in some respect relative to alternative approaches.  
 Depending on the surrounding circumstances, any or all of the 
aforementioned criticisms may gain traction—achieve “stickiness,” in 
marketing parlance163—and result in a tort’s demise. These circum-
stances include the audiences and agents who entertain and act upon 
these arguments, which represent the next subjects for discussion.   
C.   Audiences 
 The audiences to which the aforementioned arguments (and oth-
ers) are directed may affect whether these contentions will resonate 
or fall on deaf ears. Judges, legislators, plaintiffs, lawyers, defen-
dants, the general public—all play significant roles in determining 
whether a tort lives or dies. Due to institutional and individual pre-
rogatives and constraints, these audiences may respond differently to 
specific critiques of a cause of action. Plaintiffs and their attorneys, 
for instance, are the most directly affected by a tort that chronically 
undercompensates and thus are the proverbial canaries in the mine 
when a tort starts to produce inadequate paydays. At the same time, 
these same individuals are unlikely to bemoan a tort that is too lu-
crative. Courts, bound and disciplined by precedent and conditioned 
to dwell upon the essential elements of a cause of action, might re-
spond to arguments that a cause of action strays outside the accepted 
conceptual boundaries of tort law. These jurists may ignore allega-
tions that the damages available under a tort theory are too gener-
ous, even though these same arguments might prove persuasive 
among legislators if and when advanced through attention-getting 
language. One could go on; for example, courts are unlikely to re-
spond to process-oriented concerns if the solution is to create a new 
forum for the dispute at issue—typically a legislative prerogative.  
 These audiences also differ in their respective capacities to kill 
off a tort. Plaintiffs typically act by inaction, refusing to invoke a tort 
and thereby causing it to slowly waste away. Courts and legislatures 
can and will expressly abolish torts, but may differ in their relative 
willingness and ability to do so. Courts, “the least dangerous branch” 
                                                                                                                     
 163. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 92 (Bay Back Books 2002). 
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of government,164 may prove more reluctant than legislatures to abol-
ish common law and (especially) statutory rights. The institutional 
limitations of the judicial system also mean that a court will abro-
gate a tort only when presented with a case in which the plaintiff has 
alleged the theory and the defendant has responded that the tort 
should be abolished. With some rarely invoked torts, it may take 
years or even decades for a case having this posture to wind its way 
to a court of precedent. Legislatures, meanwhile, have their own 
idiosyncratic procedures and priorities that push some issues to the 
forefront of the agenda, while other bills die in committee or are 
never even placed in the hopper.  
D.   Agents 
 The vulnerability of a tort theory also may depend on whether it 
threatens or offends a coherent class of would-be defendants capable 
of organization and counterattack and lacks a comparably influential 
base of supporters. If this type of imbalance exists, opponents of a 
tort may dominate the discourse over the cause of action and place 
its abolition at the top of the legislative or judicial agenda. Con-
versely, some torts may generate strong constituencies but only 
fragmented opposition, securing their survival. The successful cam-
paign by the gun industry to limit lawsuits attacking the sale and 
distribution of handguns offers an example of a concerted, well-
organized effort by influential agents that brought down a (nascent) 
cause of action.165 The supporters and opponents of medical malprac-
tice claims are more evenly matched, meaning, among other things, 
that discontent over the costs and perceived overabundance of these 
suits166 has not come close to bringing about the abolition of this type 
of claim.167  
                                                                                                                     
 164. The quoted language is drawn from ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (Yale Univ. Press 2d 
ed. 1986). 
 165. See generally Timothy D. Lytton, The NRA, the Brady Campaign, & the Politics of 
Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN 
CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 152 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005) (discussing the political 
wrangling over state and federal legislation that would limit gun litigation). 
 166. In a 2004 Kaiser Family Foundation poll of the general public, sixty-one percent of 
survey participants said that patients bring too many lawsuits against doctors; sixty per-
cent said that “[t]oo many lawyers filing unwarranted lawsuits” was a “very important” 
factor in causing higher malpractice insurance costs; sixty percent said that the number of 
malpractice suits being filed was a “very important” factor in causing higher health care 
costs; and sixty-three percent said that “[l]owering the cost of health care and insurance” 
should be a top priority for Congress and the President. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & 
HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, HEALTH CARE AGENDA FOR THE NEW CONGRESS charts 3, 
6, 7 & 8 (2005).   
 167. The Kaiser study did not even bother to ask participants whether they would be 
in favor of an outright ban on malpractice suits. Sixty-three percent of those surveyed, 
however, expressed support for a law that would cap pain and suffering damages in mal-
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 The “agents” factor also incorporates a more idiosyncratic ele-
ment. Sometimes an individual appears who possesses unique skills 
and interests that will enable him or her to marshal and amplify op-
position to a tort or arouse support for an alternative approach.168 In 
his book The Tipping Point, Malcolm Gladwell identifies the types of 
people who facilitate the spread and acceptance of ideas as “mavens,” 
“connectors,” and “salesmen”; sometimes a single individual fits all 
three of these descriptions.169 Due to their abilities, these individuals 
may exert disproportionate influence on whether a tort lives or dies. 
Whether and when a maven, connector, or salesman will emerge in 
any given context is never certain, but when one does, it can spell 
trouble for a cause of action.  
E.   Alternatives 
 The availability of alternatives to a tort may also play a part in 
ushering claims out the door. The desirability of a tort is always a 
relative proposition. Even if all can agree that a tort addresses a le-
gitimate harm or problem, this consensus does not rule out the pos-
sibility that another approach, whether within or outside of the tort 
system, might respond to the same situation more effectively.170 The 
advent of worker’s compensation programs offers the paradigmatic 
case-in-point of an alternative remedy displacing a tort. Similarly, 
courts that recently have refused to recognize the maintenance and 
champerty torts have justified their decisions partially on their per-
ception that malicious prosecution and abuse of process theories ad-
dress similar ills, making the older torts unnecessary.171   
                                                                                                                     
practice suits, id. chart 10, and seventy-two percent of survey participants favored a law 
prohibiting individuals from filing medical malpractice lawsuits unless and until an inde-
pendent medical specialist reviewed their claims and found them “reasonable.” Id. chart 9. 
 168. Cf. Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of In-
dustrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 78-79 (1967) (critiquing the “great-man hypothe-
sis” of social change, “which holds that particular persons play irreplaceably decisive roles 
in determining the path of social change” on the ground that “[i]n difficult times, great 
businessmen, political leaders, musicians, or physicists will emerge”).   
 169. GLADWELL, supra note 163, at 30-88. “Mavens are really information brokers, 
sharing and trading what they know.” Id. at 69. A connector is someone “with a special gift 
for bringing the world together.” Id. at 38. A salesman has “the skills to persuade us when 
we are unconvinced of what we are hearing.” Id. at 70. 
 170. Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 23 (1990) (“Proposals for tort reform often amount to choices about 
which societal institution—the torts system, the criminal-regulatory system, or the mar-
ket—should be responsible for preventing particular types of injuries.”). See generally Pe-
ter H. Schuck, Why Regulating Guns Through Litigation Won’t Work, in SUING THE GUN 
INDUSTRY, supra note 165, at 225, 230 (listing the institutional capabilities needed to cre-
ate effective policy). 
 171. Hardick v. Homol, 795 So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Tosi v. Jones, 685 
N.E.2d 580, 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
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F.   Attributes 
 The sixth and final factor worth mentioning is the character and 
composition of the afflicted tort itself. Some torts may be poorly de-
signed, or more fragile and less capable of adaptation than other 
causes of action. For instance, whereas some torts (battery comes to 
mind) involve conduct that has been immediately recognizable as in-
jurious since time immemorial, the gravamen of other claims may 
rest upon values or interests that are peculiar to a particular time or 
place. If a tort is overly dependent on a particular milieu, it may be 
especially vulnerable to changes in the surrounding culture that un-
dercut the case for liability. A different problem may afflict tort theo-
ries that involve rarely arising fact patterns. These torts receive little 
exposure before attorneys, judges, and the general public, which may 
compromise the cause of action by rendering it both obscure and dif-
ficult to apply.  
 As constructed by courts and legislatures, torts may possess 
other innate flaws that leave them susceptible to attack. A certain 
conceptual awkwardness may adhere to torts founded upon interests 
classified as quasi-rights or which stand on the boundary line be-
tween tort and contract; any resulting judicial discomfort with these 
claims may make them more prone to elimination or replacement. 
Torts that incorporate few evidentiary or other procedural safe-
guards to protect against false claims may lend themselves to criti-
cism that they are unreliable instruments for determining culpabil-
ity. Similarly, torts with few or no standards or limits concerning the 
award of damages may come under fire when an occasional jury ex-
ercises its unfettered discretion and bestows a lucrative award upon 
a plaintiff. At the other end of the spectrum, a tort may incorporate 
procedural or substantive hurdles that make recovery almost impos-
sible, deterring plaintiffs from ever invoking the theory. In all of 
these situations, a tort’s composition may prove to be the claim’s 
worst enemy. 
 Torts that are factually or conceptually removed from other 
causes of action may suffer from another handicap. As discussed ear-
lier, plaintiffs and their attorneys presumably will turn their backs 
on claims that produce inadequate paydays. In practice, a claim “un-
dercompensates” when the predicted payout to the plaintiff and at-
torney is less than the opportunity cost of the time and other re-
sources invested in pursuing the claim. Some torts are both broadly 
applicable and opportunistic, in that they can easily be added to a 
suit pursued under other legal theories as well. The incremental ex-
pense of adding these claims to a case is normally quite low. Other 
torts, by contrast, are all-or-nothing propositions. Torts that impli-
cate idiosyncratic facts or occupy conceptually remote territory often 
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cannot be combined with other theories of relief. A lawsuit premised 
on one of these torts hinges entirely on that theory, meaning that the 
tort “costs” more to allege and pursue. As a result, plaintiffs and 
their attorneys may pause before embracing this latter type of tort.  
 The six factors identified above—atmosphere, arguments, audi-
ences, agents, alternatives, and attributes—all seem to play a part in 
why torts die. They also help explain why torts live. Returning to in-
tentional interference with contract, the most likely explanation for 
why that tort has survived indifferent and even hostile environments 
begins with the fact that its attributes have ensured it a fairly broad 
base of support and no steadfast enemies (outside of academia, at 
least). The tort can be added to a variety of breach of contract suits 
inexpensively, with the principal cost being the naming of an addi-
tional defendant alleged to have induced the breach.172 Its inexpen-
siveness and broad applicability guarantee that the tort will be fre-
quently invoked by plaintiffs and their lawyers, usage that sends a 
message that the tort serves some real need in modern society. The 
tort singles out no one industry or cohesive group for liability, while 
all can envision how the theory could be useful to them in the proper 
situation. Though courts are sometimes frustrated by the tort, the 
arguments levied against it have not been of a type that judges typi-
cally respond to by eliminating a cause of action, at least not without 
a ready substitute at hand. In other words, intentional interference 
with contract has survived because the six factors relevant to why 
torts die simply have not aligned in a manner that would place the 
tort in jeopardy.  
 But how do these factors interact to produce the death of a tort? 
To probe this subject, this Article next will undertake detailed autop-
sies of the tort of insult, of claims seeking to hold the food industry 
responsible for obesity, and of the heartbalm torts.  
IV.   CASE STUDY #1: THE TORT OF INSULT 
 Of the three case studies presented in this Article, the demise of 
the insult tort seems to be the easiest to explain: this tort lived and 
died on the rails. The disappearance of passenger rail traffic dealt a 
blow to the cause of action by eliminating the setting for the interac-
tions that produced most insult claims. Yet the tort might have mi-
grated to new factual settings, and thereby survived, but for an inno-
vation that blocked off this path. The new tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, which emerged just as passenger rail ser-
vice was winding down in this country, occupied this territory to the 
                                                                                                                     
 172. See Wexler, supra note 126, at 280-81 (observing that “[a]nytime there is a breach 
of contract . . . , a well-represented plaintiff looks for third parties to sue to maximize its 
total recovery”).  
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exclusion of insult claims. In so doing, the new cause of action has 
accelerated the death spiral of the insult tort by depriving it of 
needed exposure before courts, plaintiffs, and attorneys. 
 The tort of insult originated in an 1823 opinion by Supreme 
Court Justice Joseph Story, then riding circuit. The case of Chamber-
lain v. Chandler173 involved a dispute between passengers on a boat 
and the ship’s crew, in which the guests were aggrieved by some 
misbehavior (possibly consisting of “habitual obscenity, harsh 
threats, and immodest conduct”) by their hosts.174 Justice Story wrote 
that in booking their voyage the passengers had contracted “not for 
toleration merely, but for respectful treatment.”175 A breach of this 
implied term of the transportation agreement, Story concluded, could 
support a claim against the ship’s master.176 Over time, claims for in-
sult shed their contractual cocoon and became recognized as a cause 
of action sounding in tort.177 
 While the insult tort was born on the high seas, it was raised on 
the rails. Claims for insult remained few and far between until the 
advent of railroad passenger travel in the mid-to-late 1800s. Among 
its revolutionary impacts on American life, rail travel threw together 
individuals who otherwise would have had little contact with one an-
other in polite society.178 Especially once train travel became more af-
fordable after the Civil War,179 passenger cars mixed women with 
men, the wealthy with the less well-off, the Northerner with the 
Southerner, the rude with the civil, and even—until Jim Crow wan-
dered up to the tracks—one race with another.180 Some welcomed the 
diversity of backgrounds and temperaments found in rail cars.181 
Others saw only chaos and lamented the lack of civility exhibited by 
railroad staff and other passengers.182 To Victorian-era critics, the 
fact that many rail passengers were women made any deviations 
                                                                                                                     
 173. 5 F. 413 (C.C.D. Mass. 1823). 
 174. Id. at 414. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 415. 
 177. Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 70 N.E. 857, 859 (N.Y. 1904) (discussing the 
nature of the insult tort). But see Bleecker v. Colo. & S. Ry. Co., 114 P. 481, 482-83 (Colo. 
1911) (regarding insult as a type of contractual breach). 
 178. SARAH H. GORDON, PASSAGE TO UNION: HOW THE RAILROADS TRANSFORMED 
AMERICAN LIFE, 1829–1929, at 93 (1996) (discussing the diversity of rail passenger traffic); 
AMY G. RICHTER, HOME ON THE RAILS 17, 20-21 (2005) (same). 
 179. JOHN F. STOVER, AMERICAN RAILROADS 108 (2d ed. 1997).  
 180. GORDON, supra note 178, at 84, 225-26; RICHTER, supra note 178, at 17, 20-21; C. 
VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 37-40 (3d rev. ed. 1974). 
 181. RICHTER, supra note 178, at 15. 
 182. GORDON, supra note 178, at 97; RICHTER, supra note 178, at 21-22. 
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from proper behavior even more worrisome.183 If good manners had 
no place aboard a rail car, what other misbehavior might follow? 
 It was at this point that the tort of insult stepped in to provide a 
surrogate code of conduct for rail travel. The threat of being held li-
able under an insult theory encouraged railroads to take steps to en-
sure civil behavior within their cars.184 And so they did, issuing edicts 
to employees to engage passengers politely and to spot and remove 
troublemakers.185 Combined with other developments in rail service 
(such as the reservation of certain rail cars for female customers in 
order “to group women of good character on the train together, shel-
tered as far as practicable from annoyance and insult”186), the insult 
tort deterred the improper conduct that polyglot railcar communities 
might otherwise have engendered. At the same time, the tort en-
sured that employees of the railroads—the leviathan industry of the 
nineteenth century—exhibited a modicum of politeness to their cus-
tomers. The tort thus afforded the everyday citizen a symbolically 
important measure of control over, or at least respect from, an in-
strumentality that otherwise dictated many of the terms and condi-
tions of everyday American life.187  
 The insult tort reached its zenith during the final two decades of 
the 1800s and the first two decades of the next century.188 This boom 
in insult claims resulted in part from the introduction of electric rail-
car networks into numerous American towns and cities, drawing new 
classes of plaintiffs, defendants, and attorneys to the tort.189 Fur-
thermore, a substantial number of the cases brought during this era 
                                                                                                                     
 183. JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 145 (2001); RICHTER, supra 
note 178, at 93. 
 184. On this point, the Second Restatement still surmises that “[t]he chief value of the 
[insult] rule lies in the incentive which it provides for the selection of employees who will 
not be grossly discourteous to those who must come in contact with them, and for the mak-
ing of proper rules and supervision to enforce them.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
48 cmt. a (1965). 
 185. RICHTER, supra note 178, at 24.  
 186. Bass v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 450, 460 (1874); see also ELY, supra note 
183, at 145.  
 187. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 168, at 63 (discussing popular perceptions 
of the railroad industry in the late 1800s). 
 188. More than three-quarters of the decisions listed in the American Law Reports an-
notation that discusses the liability of common carriers for insulting conduct hail from this 
era. Dunn, supra note 95, at 132-36. 
 189. “By 1902, there were 22,000 miles of track in the streets of the United States,” 
and streetcars carried five billion passengers per year. ROGER YEPSEN, CITY TRAINS: 
MOVING THROUGH AMERICA’S CITIES BY RAIL 31 (1993); see also DAVID E. NYE, 
ELECTRIFYING AMERICA: SOCIAL MEANINGS OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY, 1880–1940, at 94 
(1990) (describing the increase in streetcar track mileage and ridership between 1890 and 
1902). These streetcars commingled classes, genders, and ethnicities in much the same 
manner as did railroad cars. SCOTT MOLLOY, TROLLEY WARS: STREETCAR WORKERS ON THE 
LINE 82-84 (1996). 
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originated in the American South.190 It is quite possible that the atti-
tudes of many Southerners on matters of class, gender, and race dur-
ing this period may have made them acutely sensitive to perceived 
insults.191 More easily demonstrable is the fact that rail transporta-
tion came to this part of the nation relatively late,192 making the so-
cial mixing that occurred with this method of travel a novelty and a 
threat—one that tort law might tame—to many within this region as 
Reconstruction gave way to Redemption and beyond.193  
 And then the tort disappeared, with very few insult suits being 
filed in the last several decades.194 Why? The likely culprits are de-
velopments in technology and the law that closed the factual and 
conceptual aperture for these claims, combined with the lessened at-
tractiveness of the tort to plaintiffs and their attorneys as the 
amounts obtained in plaintiffs’ judgments declined while litigation 
costs rose. These forces have converged to drive the number of insult 
suits down to a point at which the tort could not, and cannot, sustain 
itself.  
 A central purpose of the insult tort had been to create a code of 
conduct for rail travel, to be enforced by private entities acutely sen-
sitive to the financial and reputational implications of adverse judg-
ments. In the first half of the twentieth century the private automo-
bile supplanted rail travel as the principal means of transportation 
over significant distances.195 Fewer rail passengers meant fewer dis-
                                                                                                                     
 190. Of the approximately fifty American cases cited in an American Law Reports an-
notation for the principle that a common carrier is liable for insults by employees, more 
than half emanated from states of the former Confederacy, and another eight from Ken-
tucky. Dunn, supra note 95, at 132-36.  
 191. Notably, Virginia, Mississippi, and West Virginia—two Confederate states and 
one that split off from a Confederate state—were the three states that had “fighting words” 
civil liability statutes proscribing insulting language likely to lead to a breach of the peace. 
Wade, supra note 86, at 82-83. 
 192. STOVER, supra note 179, at 135. 
 193. “Redemption” refers to the return to power of the Democratic Party in the Ameri-
can South following post-bellum Reconstruction. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: 
AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 421-25, 587-601 (1st ed. 1989) (discuss-
ing Redemption).  
 194. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96. 
 195. In 1900, Americans traveled 212.5 passenger miles per capita on the nation’s rail-
roads. Malcolm M. Willey & Stuart A. Rice, The Agencies of Communication, in RECENT 
SOCIAL TRENDS 167, 169 (1933). By 1920, this figure had swelled to 444.6 miles per capita. 
Id. Over the next decade, the total underwent a sudden reversal, declining to a mere 218.3 
miles per capita by 1930. Id. The reason is easy to identify: In 1900 there were only about 
8000 automobiles in this country. Id. at 172. By January 1, 1931, more than twenty-five 
million cars littered the nation’s roads. Id. That the spread of the automobile spelled trou-
ble for the railroad was no secret; as a 1933 study noted, “imperceptibly but surely the 
automobile, and especially the private vehicle, [has] encroached upon the short haul traffic 
of the railroads” and thus “there has been created a competition between two agencies of 
transportation which seriously affects the older of them.” Id. at 171-72; see also NORMAN T. 
MOLINE, MOBILITY AND THE SMALL TOWN, 1900-1930: TRANSPORTATION CHANGE IN 
OREGON, ILLINOIS 66-67 (1971) (discussing the replacement of the railroad by automobile 
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putes over insulting conduct. Most privately operated light rail sys-
tems, meanwhile, disappeared altogether.196 These developments 
wiped out many of the entities formerly subject to insult suits.197 
While local governments have assumed responsibility for mass 
transportation in many urban areas, it has never been a central 
function of the government to protect individuals from unwelcome 
speech from other citizens198 or, for that matter, to guarantee punc-
tilious civility by municipal employees. Applying the insult tort in its 
unadulterated form to government entities would require a substan-
tial rethinking of their basic obligations to their constituents. That 
revolution simply has not occurred.  
 At the same time, the damages associated with insulting behav-
ior have not kept pace with the rising costs of litigation. Insult suits 
were never especially lucrative. Plaintiffs typically received a few 
hundred dollars for their troubles, with the occasional verdict reach-
ing four figures.199 Though decent sums, these awards were never go-
ing to make plaintiffs—let alone their lawyers—especially rich. As 
the twentieth century progressed, insult awards did not increase 
much at all; in fact, they seemed to retreat. Perhaps this owed to a 
stiffening of the collective upper lip when it came to insulting con-
duct; perhaps it owed to changing expectations regarding the level of 
service one is owed while traveling;200 or perhaps the leveling purpose 
                                                                                                                     
traffic). A similar fate befell local light rail systems, which were driven out of most cities. 
See, e.g., JAMES A. TOMAN & BLAINE S. HAYS, HORSE TRAILS TO REGIONAL RAILS: THE 
STORY OF PUBLIC TRANSIT IN GREATER CLEVELAND 136-37, 155-62, 177-78, 225-48 (1996) 
(discussing the gradual replacement of Cleveland’s street rail system by the automobile).  
 196. NYE, supra note 189, at 133-35; YEPSEN, supra note 189, at 35, 37-38, 53-56; 
Willey & Rice, supra note 195, at 180. 
 197. Sporadic attempts to identify other types of businesses that may be liable for in-
sulting conduct, meanwhile, have met with middling results. See, e.g., Stavnezer v. Sage-
Allen & Co., 152 A.2d 312 (Conn. 1959) (turning back an attempt to apply the insult doc-
trine outside of the common carrier/public utility setting); Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of 
Fla., Inc., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958) (same). Back when insult claims were relatively fre-
quent, innkeepers were the next most common type of defendant in this sort of suit. A sub-
stantial share of these claims involved overzealous hotel detectives and their recurring 
tendency to accuse guests of immoral practices. See, e.g., Emmke v. De Silva, 293 F. 17 (8th 
Cir. 1923); Dixon v. Hotel Tutwiler Operating Co., 108 So. 26 (Ala. 1926); De Wolf v. Ford, 
86 N.E. 527 (N.Y. 1908). These days, hotel detectives are even less common than railroads, 
meaning that this sort of dispute rarely arises.  
 198. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971) (holding that the state cannot 
punish vulgar speech in order to promote cleanliness in public discourse).  
 199. See, e.g., Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Baker, 58 S.E. 88, 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907) (jury ver-
dict of $775); Mobile, J. & K.C.R. Co. v. Kranfield, 46 So. 71, 72 (Miss. 1908) (finding jury 
verdict of $2500 excessive and ordering a new trial unless the plaintiff agreed to a $750 
judgment); Morris v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co., 168 S.W. 325, 326 (Mo. Ct. App. 1914) (jury 
verdict of $500); White v. Metro. St. Ry. Co., 112 S.W. 278, 279 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908) (jury 
verdict of $251). 
 200. The Restatement (Second) of Torts raised the bar for insult claims slightly above 
that of the First Restatement. The First Restatement provides that “[a] common carrier is 
subject to liability to members of the public who are entitled to and are utilizing its facili-
ties as passengers for the offense reasonably suffered by them through the insulting con-
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of the insult tort lost its importance once the railroad industry fell 
into disarray. Whatever the reason, the last few reported verdicts in 
insult cases have been very meager indeed. In Brown v. Fifth Avenue 
Coach Lines, Inc.,201 the claimant received a mere $100 for her em-
barrassment and humiliation at the hands of a bus driver.202 In 
Wiggs v. Courshon,203 an insult case arising out of a dispute at a ho-
tel, the trial judge cut the jury’s $25,000 award by ninety percent and 
granted a defense motion for a new trial unless the plaintiffs stipu-
lated to a reduction to $2500.204 As the costs of litigation continue to 
rise, these inauspicious results have likely had a chilling effect on 
other potential insult suits.  
 Up to this point, the forces that have compromised the insult 
tort have consisted of changes in the surrounding cultural atmos-
phere. But another factor more intrinsic to the law itself has also 
contributed to the disappearance of insult claims. Specifically, since 
its inception more than a half-century ago the tort of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress has cannibalized the insult cause of ac-
tion.  
 As recently as the 1930s, there was no distinct claim known as 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Technically speaking, one 
could not recover for “pure” emotional distress unaccompanied by a 
violation of another legal right, such as the right to bodily integ-
rity.205 Yet, as previously touched upon, there existed a number of re-
curring fact patterns in which courts relied on quasi-interests or 
other legal fictions as grounds for otherwise forbidden awards of 
damages for mental suffering.206 The recognition of a quasi-property 
interest in the dead body of a family member,207 discussed earlier, of-
fers an example of this functionally expedient, but analytically 
roundabout, reasoning.  
 Scholars eventually began to collect and review decisions in 
which courts had allowed recovery for mental suffering to see if any 
general principles permeated the case law. In a 1936 article208 sur-
                                                                                                                     
duct of its servants while otherwise acting within the scope of their employment.” 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 48 (1934). The Second Restatement relates that “[a] common car-
rier or other public utility is subject to liability to patrons utilizing its facilities for gross 
insults which reasonably offend them.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 48 (1965) (em-
phasis added). 
 201. 185 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Mun. Ct. 1959). 
 202. Id. at 928. 
 203. 355 F. Supp. 206 (S.D. Fla. 1973). 
 204. Id. at 210. 
 205. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 46-47 (1934) (stating the general rule disallowing 
recovery for “pure” emotional distress).  
 206. See Prosser, supra note 3, at 881-87. 
 207. See supra text accompanying note 66. 
 208. Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 
HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936).  
2008] WHY TORTS DIE 395 
 
veying these decisions, Calvert Magruder of Harvard estimated that, 
as a “general proposition . . . independently of whether a cause of ac-
tion has arisen for any other more familiar tort, the law will give 
damages for mental distress of an aggravated sort, resulting from an 
outrageous aggression by the defendant upon the plaintiff’s peace of 
mind.”209 Three years later, William Prosser went further and 
gleaned from these same decisions a “new tort,” which he labeled “in-
tentional infliction of extreme mental suffering.” In a seminal article, 
Prosser rounded up the menagerie of distinct torts implicating “pure” 
emotional distress and then advocated their summary execution. 
Prosser concluded that it would be preferable  
to jettison the entire cargo of technical torts with which the real 
cause of action has been burdened, and recognize it as standing on 
its own feet. There is every indication that this will henceforth be 
done, and that the intentional infliction of extreme mental suffer-
ing by outrageous conduct will be treated as a separate and inde-
pendent tort.210  
 Prosser proved both persuasive and prophetic. The authors of 
the Restatement of Torts, who previously had adhered to the tradi-
tional view that no recovery could be had for emotional distress 
alone, reversed course and recognized intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress as a distinct and valid tort in 1948.211 Since then, this 
tort has gained favor among judges212 because it offers a coherent 
(though vague) standard for imposing liability for emotional distress 
in a variety of contexts, and allows courts to abandon or ignore the 
awkward legal fictions that underlie the old array of torts that per-
mitted similar recoveries.213 The new claim attracts plaintiffs and 
their lawyers because the notions of extreme emotional distress, and 
the defendant’s obligation to avoid its unnecessary infliction through 
intentional means, are readily communicated to jurors.214 Further-
more, an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is easily 
grafted onto a lawsuit already premised on other grounds, meaning 
that the cost of invoking this tort is normally quite low. These attrib-
utes have produced a steady supply of case law addressing and expli-
cating the tort, making its elements, its relationship with various 
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 210. Prosser, supra note 3, at 892.  
 211. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948). 
 212. But cf. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 597-98 (Tex. 1993) (holding that, as a gen-
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procedural hurdles, and the prospect of recovery upon particular sets 
of facts ever easier to discern. The net result of this virtuous cycle is 
that today, intentional infliction of emotional distress is today one of 
the more commonly alleged torts in the nation’s courts.215 
 But the success of this new cause of action has come at the ex-
pense of the older torts from which Prosser infused life into his crea-
tion. As to some of these claims, fact patterns once pled as distinct 
torts are now commonly alleged under an intentional (or negligent) 
infliction of emotional distress theory, but without much change as to 
what amounts to actionable misconduct or any marked decrease in 
claims alleged under the sum total of these theories. The ongoing 
substitution of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress for the corpse mishandling tort offers a case in point. In these 
situations, while the older tort may be dying, the facts that once gave 
rise to this claim remain actionable under another label. Claims 
premised merely on insulting conduct by common carriers, however, 
have virtually disappeared, regardless of how they are pled.  
 The insult tort has not vanished just because it is duplicative of, 
or subsumed entirely within, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. Claims for insult and claims for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress are not the same; they merely overlap. As a general 
rule, intentional infliction of emotional distress is actionable only if 
the wrongdoer’s conduct was “extreme and outrageous.”216 The com-
mon carrier insult cases, by comparison, allow recovery for emotional 
harm caused by language that is merely thoughtless, rude, or abu-
sive. While insulting behavior by a common carrier or another pas-
senger can be extreme and outrageous,217 a plaintiff can recover un-
der an insult theory even if it is not.218 Still, the overlap between in-
sult and infliction of emotional distress has compromised the former 
tort by giving plaintiffs with claims that fit under either theory a de-
cision to make: to allege their claims under both of the theories or 
                                                                                                                     
 215. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE 271 (2003) (observing that “vir-
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 216. In defining intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Restatement (Second) of 
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developing.” Wade, supra note 86, at 82.   
 218. See Prosser, supra note 67, at 59.  
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only one. More and more, plaintiffs with strong claims implicating 
egregious misconduct have opted to forego the insult tort and proceed 
exclusively under an intentional infliction of emotional distress ru-
bric. These decisions have carved off the “best” claims from the insult 
theory, further weakening an already distressed tort. 
 In the recent case of Williams v. Tri-County Metropolitan 
Transportation District,219 for example, a bus driver allegedly “ ‘be-
rated, insulted, and belittled’ ” the plaintiff, a disabled passenger, as 
she attempted to board the bus with her assistance dog.220 The plain-
tiff allegedly suffered severe “ ‘fear, anguish, depression, anxiety, and 
humiliation’ ” due to the verbal assault.221 A hundred years ago, this 
would have presented a classic fact pattern implicating the insult 
tort. But the plaintiff in Williams, suing in the 1990s, alleged only 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the Oregon Court of 
Appeals weighed her allegations against the backdrop of rules devel-
oped for that tort.222 Nowhere within its opinion did the Williams 
court mention the existence of a separate insult tort that might also 
have supported the plaintiff’s lawsuit. 
 The plaintiff and her attorney in Williams may not have known 
that the tort of insult existed. But even if they had, it would have 
made sense to proceed exclusively under an intentional infliction of 
emotional distress theory. The absence of insult suits in recent years 
has meant that few modern decisions exist construing and applying 
the tort. This dearth of case law has increased the uncertainty of re-
covering upon even meritorious insult claims, as the substance of the 
insult tort and the procedure of trying an insult claim have become 
difficult to discern. Had the Williams plaintiff or her lawyer consid-
ered bringing an insult claim, they would have wondered what the 
essential elements of this tort were, whether it applied to govern-
ment entities, whether any jury instructions existed for the tort, and 
whether the judge or jury would even have any idea what an insult 
claim entailed. All this uncertainty drives up the cost of pursuing an 
insult claim while casting doubt on the likely returns. And so the in-
sult tort gets rejected, time and again, by plaintiffs with claims 
                                                                                                                     
 219. 958 P.2d 202 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). 
 220. Id. at 203. 
 221. Id. 
 222. To be sure, these rules implicitly assimilated much of the reasoning behind the in-
sult tort. With regard to intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, the Williams 
court noted that “a defendant’s position or role vis-à-vis a plaintiff may be one that ‘im-
poses on the defendant a greater obligation to refrain from subjecting the victim to abuse, 
fright, or shock than would be true in arm’s length encounters among strangers.’ ” Id. at 
204 (citation omitted). In finding that that a heightened standard of care applied to the 
facts before it, the court emphasized the “special” relationship between public transporta-
tion carriers and their passengers and “the public nature of the driver’s conduct.” Id. at 
206.  
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strong enough to be pursued under an intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress rubric that offers many advantages—and no apparent 
disadvantages—relative to the insult theory. 
 Decisions like those made by the Williams plaintiff have disas-
sociated the insult tort from the most egregious instances of miscon-
duct by common carriers and, in so doing, have imparted a weaker 
gravamen on the insult cause of action. The effective limitation of the 
insult tort to misconduct that does not qualify as the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress has also trapped the insult tort in a con-
ceptual no man’s land. It has long been established that no insult 
claim lies for “petty and trivial offensiveness.”223 The Second Re-
statement provides that a viable insult claim must involve “gross in-
sults which reasonably offend” the plaintiff.224 The treatise observes 
that “[e]ven profanity may not be grossly insulting, where it obvi-
ously amounts to nothing more than mere emphasis or a habit of 
speech, or where it is so customary in the particular community that 
it may be said to be generally tolerated.”225 Plaintiffs and their attor-
neys might be forgiven for failing to understand where “petty and 
trivial offensiveness” ends and actionable “gross insults” begin. 
 The abandonment of the insult tort has also meant that even 
those modern plaintiffs with claims that fall short of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress are failing to appreciate the opportunity 
provided by the increasingly obscure insult tort. In Harris v. Jeffer-
son Partners, L.P.,226 the plaintiff, a bus passenger, alleged that his 
driver was rude to him after the bus was involved in a traffic acci-
dent.227 The plaintiff framed his resulting cause of action as inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.228 The trial court granted the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.229 On appeal, the Su-
preme Court of South Dakota intimated that the plaintiff might have 
rescued his lawsuit had he alleged a claim for insult—or at least re-
lied on this theory in his briefs.230 But the plaintiff completely ig-
nored this alternative avenue to recovery and, in relevant measure, 
proceeded exclusively under an intentional infliction of emotional 
distress theory.231 Under the circumstances, the Harris court felt that 
it had no choice but to review the plaintiff’s claim under intentional 
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infliction of emotional distress standards and found his suit wanting 
under the principles applicable to that tort.232  
 And so, the insult tort has died because of troubles that would 
be familiar to any biologist tracking the extinction of an animal spe-
cies: its factual habitat vanished, its source of energy (new suits) dis-
appeared as the claim became less economically attractive, and new 
theories of relief encroached onto the tort’s conceptual habitat, forc-
ing the claim to more marginal pastures.233 The net result of this con-
fluence of an inhospitable atmosphere, an appealing alternative, and 
the peculiar interests of the audiences who either seize upon or ig-
nore tort theories is a cause of action that has been banished to the 
hinterlands of modern tort law.  
V.   CASE STUDY #2: THE “OBESITY LAWSUIT” 
 The insult tort has vanished only after an extended run as a vi-
able cause of action. At the other end of the spectrum, the recent abo-
lition of claims involving the negligent or reckless sale or distribution 
of handguns234 and the ongoing campaign to limit lawsuits seeking 
recovery in tort for obesity allegedly caused by calorie-laden food 
products illustrates the vulnerability of fledgling tort claims to at-
tacks by well-organized foes, particularly when these claims are por-
trayed as stretching the conceptual boundaries of tort law. In both 
instances, novel tort theories have come under trained fire for per-
ceived overreaching. Since slightly more has been written about the 
campaign to limit handgun lawsuits235 than the ongoing push to curb 
obesity lawsuits,236 the discussion below will focus upon the backlash 
against this second type of claim. As will be shown, this tort has suc-
cumbed to potent arguments skillfully wielded by forceful agents. 
                                                                                                                     
 232. Id. at 502; see also Khan v. Am. Airlines, 639 N.E.2d 210, 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) 
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 An extended survey of obesity litigation lies beyond the scope of 
this Article.237 For present purposes, it suffices to say that the idea of 
holding food manufacturers and retailers liable under common law 
tort principles for obesity and other health consequences of fattening 
products percolated quickly and with little warning. In 2000, the idea 
of obesity litigation seemed fantastic enough that the comic newspa-
per The Onion ran a news story on a fictitious lawsuit brought 
against “Big Chocolate.”238 The Onion story was less parody than pre-
scient. Less than three years later, prominent plaintiffs’ attorneys 
gathered in Boston for a conference titled “Legal Approaches to the 
Obesity Epidemic,”239 and a few “obesity lawsuits” had already been 
filed.240 
 These initial forays toward holding the food service industry li-
able for obesity were not well received, to say the least.241 In Febru-
ary 2003, a New York Times columnist wrote that “[f]ast-food litiga-
tion has been greeted coolly so far because it appears to run up 
against a core American value: personal responsibility.”242 A Gallup 
poll conducted five months later revealed that eighty-nine percent of 
those surveyed opposed holding the fast-food industry legally respon-
sible for the diet-related health problems of people who ate their food 
on a regular basis.243 A contemporaneous Los Angeles Times editorial 
titled Fast-Food Foolishness cast the suits as driven by venal trial 
lawyers and concluded that “[p]eople shouldn’t get stuffed, but this 
line of litigation should.”244 The Washington Post chimed in, “[t]he 
idea of suing over fat is admittedly ridiculous. Whatever the solution 
to the country’s obesity problem may be, it isn’t lawsuits.”245  
 This inauspicious welcome notwithstanding, advocates of obesity 
lawsuits understood that public opinion might eventually shift in 
their favor.246 In a frequently drawn analogy, litigation over the 
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health effects of cigarettes also had a painfully slow and unpromising 
start but eventually gained momentum and became enough of a 
threat to force tobacco companies to the bargaining table.247 A smok-
ing gun document obtained through civil discovery here,248 a favor-
able judge and jury panel there,249 and suits once regarded as frivo-
lous might eventually merge into the mainstream of tort law—or at 
least become sufficiently viable to drive potential defendants toward 
settlement talks that could produce changes in their marketing prac-
tices.250  
 That might well have happened by now, but for the mistakes 
made by the advocates of obesity lawsuits in nurturing this cause of 
action. It has been written that “new torts” are more likely to thrive 
when they are not considered new at all, but merely the logical (and 
preferably inevitable) outgrowths of well-established principles of 
law—an insight known as the “paradox of novelty.”251 As a corollary, 
close association with a particular advocate or group of advocates will 
compromise a new tort theory, an effect known as the “paradox of 
agency.”252 Proponents of obesity lawsuits violated both of these axi-
oms by self-consciously (and rather notoriously) trying to create a 
new class of claims overnight253 and by becoming too closely associ-
ated with this new cause of action, setting the tort up for arguments 
that it stood too far away from the conceptual center of tort law.  
 Of these self-inflicted wounds, the tort’s close association with 
trial lawyers likely has been the more severe. Unflattering media at-
tention has cast obesity lawsuits as the concoction of a predatory 
trial bar searching for a new kill. News articles written about these 
suits have focused on the supposed “masterminds” behind this new 
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theory of liability.254 One 2004 New York Times article observed that 
“a well-honed army of familiar lawyers who waged war against the 
tobacco companies for decades and won megamillion-dollar settle-
ments is preparing a new wave of food fights.”255 The policies em-
braced by the attorneys who developed obesity lawsuits did little to 
combat their wolf-pack reputation. Attendees at the obesity confer-
ence in Boston were forbidden to discuss the proceedings with out-
siders and even signed affidavits guaranteeing their silence.256 The 
perception was one of a cluster of attorneys plotting the next ad-
vances in tort law in the proverbial smoke-filled room, quite the op-
posite of the more organic and gradual growth patterns that have 
marked the most successful modern torts.257   
 In casting obesity litigation as a way to tackle the nation’s obe-
sity problem, these attorneys also overlooked the significance that 
the delivery of individualized corrective justice retains as a framing 
purpose of tort law. Proponents of obesity lawsuits were quite open 
about the broad goals attendant to these cases; they wanted nothing 
less than changes in how food products are marketed and sold in the 
United States.258 In an interview broadcast on the television program 
60 Minutes, Professor John Banzhaf described the strategy and pur-
pose of obesity lawsuits as follows: 
If we can win one out of 10 cases, if we can persuade one out of ten 
juries to hit these people with big verdicts, the way we have with 
tobacco, we can force them to make important changes and finally 
somebody will be doing something about the problem of obesity, 
because, at this point nobody else, not the health educators, not 
the bureaucrats, not our legislators, are doing a damn thing about 
it.259 
 Attorneys advocating this line of litigation spoke specifically of 
changing food labeling practices260 and of other policy aims that, on 
the surface, had little to do with making any particular plaintiff 
whole.261 These ambitious goals teed up arguments that obesity law-
suits were end-runs around the democratic process262 and that the re-
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lief sought in these cases had nothing to do with justice for specific 
plaintiffs and everything to do with the preferred policy outcomes of 
the attorneys.263 These criticisms also have invoked themes of over-
compensation (since obesity plaintiffs were perceived as suffering no 
injury not of their own making), overdeterrence (of both individual 
responsibility to lead a healthy lifestyle and the availability of fast 
food), and a perceived overextension of basic tort principles. Typify-
ing these attacks, the report prepared by the House of Representa-
tives Judiciary Committee on H.R. 554, The Personal Responsibility 
in Food Consumption Act of 2005, announced that this proposal to 
limit obesity lawsuits (which passed the House of Representatives, 
while companion legislation died in the Senate) “would preserve the 
separation of powers, support the principle of personal responsibility, 
and protect the largest employers in the United States from financial 
ruin in the face of frivolous obesity-related liability claims.”264  
 These arguments have gained credence because of the influence 
and fervor of the opponents of these suits, as compared to the rela-
tively flaccid and disorganized base of support for the claims. “Big 
Food” has proven to be a formidable foe, capable of driving public 
opinion even further into its corner.265 A week after the secrecy-
shrouded conference in Boston, the United States Chamber of Com-
merce released a study purporting to show an absence of evidence 
that fast food is a primary cause of obesity.266 That same month, the 
National Restaurant Association held its own conference to discuss 
obesity lawsuits,267 and the Association and its state affiliates have 
implemented a grassroots campaign designed to mobilize opposition 
to obesity lawsuits across the fifty states.268 A sophisticated ad cam-
paign appeared that attacked obesity lawsuits as overreaching by the 
trial bar. Representative television advertisements involved a lawyer 
mercilessly interrogating a Girl Scout about the fat content of her 
cookies269 and the Seinfeld “Soup Nazi” character shouting at a cus-
tomer, “Nothing for you! Come back when you’re thinner.”270  
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 Even this well-organized, well-funded campaign might have 
been stymied, had advocates of obesity lawsuits been better organ-
ized and more highly motivated. But the plaintiffs’ bar remains split 
over whether obesity lawsuits are worthwhile or even defensible.271 
No plaintiff has ever prevailed at trial on an obesity claim alleging 
common law fraud or negligence,272 and it is uncertain whether any-
one ever will in light of the problems of pleading and proof attendant 
to a suit pursued under those theories.273 Several attorneys regard 
common law tort claims involving obesity as a distraction from more 
promising suits that would challenge allegedly deceptive food-
marketing practices under state consumer protection laws.274 In all, 
the questionable viability and profitability of obesity claims has 
meant that few attorneys have strenuously opposed legislation ban-
ning this type of lawsuit.  
 The net result is that as of February 2008, twenty-three states 
have enacted laws curtailing these sorts of claims.275 Yet it may be 
too early to pronounce obesity lawsuits doomed or dead. The feared 
onslaught of obesity lawsuits having failed to materialize, legislative 
interest in measures barring these claims has flagged. The last law 
foreclosing these suits was enacted in 2006.276 Furthermore, even 
those laws that abolish most obesity lawsuits typically preserve 
claims in which the plaintiff alleges an injury attributable to identi-
fied violations of state or federal law.277 At the federal level, legisla-
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POST, Jan. 27, 2003, at E10. 
 272. That said, Professor Banzhaf’s Web site lists several actual or threatened lawsuits 
over food marketing or labeling that produced settlements or other assertedly positive out-
comes. Prof. John Banzhaf III: Using Legal Action to Help Fight Obesity, 
http://banzhaf.net/obesitylinks (last visited Feb. 15, 2008); see also Laura Parker, Legal 
Experts Predict New Rounds in Food Fight, USA TODAY, May 6, 2004, at 3A (observing 
that of eight known “fat” lawsuits, five “were at least partially successful”). 
 273. For a discussion of the hurdles facing plaintiffs in obesity lawsuits, see Donald R. 
Richardson, “Want Fries With That?”: A Critical Analysis of Fast Food Litigation, 107 W. 
VA. L. REV. 575 (2002). 
 274. See Parker, supra note 272.  
 275. Alphabetically, these states are Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming. National Restaurant Association, State Frivolous-Lawsuit Legislation, 
http://www.restaurant.org/government/state/nutrition/bills_lawsuits.cfm (last visited Feb. 
15, 2008).  
 276. Wisconsin enacted legislation in April 2006. National Restaurant Association, 
State Bill Tracking: Nutrition & Healthy Lifestyles, http://www.restaurant.org/ 
government/state/nutrition/bills_key.cfm#lawsuits (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). 
 277. Even model legislation disseminated by the National Restaurant Association ex-
empts civil actions in which the claimed injury was caused by a material violation of a 
state or federal adulteration or branding requirement or in which the defendant is alleged 
to have knowingly and willfully violated a state or federal law applicable to the manufac-
turing, marketing, distribution, advertising, labeling, or sale of food. NAT’L REST. ASS’N, 
MODEL COMMONSENSE CONSUMPTION ACT, available at http://www.restaurant.org/ 
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tion that would have limited obesity lawsuits stalled in Congress 
even when both chambers were controlled by Republicans,278 and re-
vived proposals have made little headway during the current legisla-
tive session.279  
 While it may be premature to draw lessons from a story with a 
final chapter that is as yet unwritten, the history to date of the obe-
sity lawsuit offers some additional insights into why torts die. The ef-
fects of the “novelty paradox” and the “agency paradox” on these 
claims suggest how a fledgling tort can be especially vulnerable to at-
tack, particularly if the tort is tethered to a controversial creator and 
not perceived as the organic product of well-established tort princi-
ples. The battle over obesity lawsuits also highlights the risks run by 
a cause of action that targets an influential, well-organized interest 
group—a cohesive band of agents—especially when the tort lacks a 
strong constituency of supporters. As The New York Times has noted, 
“[a]doption of commonsense consumption laws by almost half the 
states reveals how an organized and impassioned lobbying effort, 
combined with a receptive legislative climate, can quickly alter the 
legal framework on a major public health issue like obesity.”280 Fi-
nally, the recent stagnation of legislation aimed at snuffing out obe-
sity lawsuits suggests that even skillfully orchestrated, widely en-
dorsed campaigns against a tort may not have the power or urgency 
that is needed to influence the relevant audience or audiences. Insti-
tutional prerogatives and idiosyncrasies can make a difference in the 
lives and deaths of torts, as will be further established in the third 
and final case study.    
                                                                                                                     
government/state/nutrition/resources/nra_200602_modelbilltext.doc. 
 278. The Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003) would, 
with limited exceptions, have prevented any “qualified civil liability action,” which was de-
fined as 
a civil action brought by any person [including any governmental entity] 
against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product, or a trade association, 
for damages or injunctive relief based on a claim of injury resulting from a per-
son’s weight gain, obesity, or any health condition that is related to weight gain 
or obesity. 
S. 1428 § 3(5). The House of Representatives passed The Personal Responsibility in Food 
Consumption Act, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2003) by a 276-139 vote in March 2004, 150 
CONG. REC. H981 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2004), but companion legislation died in the Senate. 
Reintroduced in 2005, The Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 554, 
109th Cong. (2005) passed the House again in October 2005, this time by a 306-120 mar-
gin, 151 CONG. REC. H8940 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 2005), but, once more, the measure did not 
come to a vote in the Senate.  
 279. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2007, H.R. 2183, 110th Cong. (2007); Com-
monsense Consumption Act of 2007, S. 1323, 110th Cong. (2007). As of December 2007, 
both bills lie dormant in committee. 
 280. Warner, supra note 267. 
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VI.   CASE STUDY #3: THE HEARTBALM TORTS 
 The last, and most complicated, of the case studies concerns the 
heartbalm torts.281 Both Lawrence Friedman’s recent evaluation of 
these torts282 and M.B.W. Sinclair’s discussion of seduction283 touch 
upon the contributions that arguments, agents, audiences, and at-
tributes made to the demise of these claims, though each author ul-
timately credits the downfall of the torts principally to changing atti-
tudes regarding matters of sex and gender.284 The text below expands 
on their work, explaining that while evolving views concerning gen-
der, sex, and marriage certainly contributed to the immolation of the 
heartbalm torts, other factors provided fuel for these flames and ul-
timately determined how far they would spread.  
 The story begins a century ago, a time when the heartbalm torts 
seemed to occupy as secure a place within the tort compendium as 
they ever had before. The recent enactment of Married Women’s Acts 
had increased the number of plaintiffs who could bring alienation of 
affections and criminal conversation claims.285 A growing number of 
jurisdictions were allowing women to sue for their own seduction.286 
                                                                                                                     
 281. These torts have received a considerable amount of scholarly attention, even as 
they disappear. E.g., William R. Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Proposal to Prevent Adultery 
and Save Families: Two Old Torts Looking for a New Career, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 985 (2001); 
Nathan P. Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on “Heart Balm,” 33 MICH. L. REV. 979 (1935); 
Sinclair, supra note 10; Note, Avoidance of the Incidence of the Anti-Heartbalm Statutes, 52 
COLUM. L. REV. 242 (1952); Michele Crissman, Note, Alienation of Affections: An Ancient 
Tort—But Still Alive in South Dakota, 48 S.D. L. REV. 518 (2003); Jill Jones, Comment, 
Fanning an Old Flame: Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation Revisited, 26 
PEPP. L. REV. 61 (1998); Kay Kavanagh, Note, Alienation of Affections and Criminal Con-
versation: Unholy Marriage in Need of Annulment, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 323 (1981); William M. 
Kelly, Note, The Case for Retention of Causes of Action for Intentional Interference with the 
Marital Relationship, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 426 (1972); Nehal A. Patel, Note, The State’s 
Perpetual Protection of Adultery: Examining Koestler v. Pollard and Wisconsin’s Faded 
Adultery Torts, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1013; R.M.J., Legislation Notes, Abolition of Actions for 
Breach of Promise, Enticement, Criminal Conversation, and Seduction, 22 VA. L. REV. 205 
(1935); Rebecca Tushnet, Note, Rules of Engagement, 107 YALE L.J. 2583 (1998). 
 282. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS 206-12 (2007). 
 283. Sinclair, supra note 10. 
 284. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 282, at 209, 212 (explaining why the heartbalm torts 
have been abolished); Sinclair, supra note 10, at 98-102 (attributing the disappearance of 
the seduction tort to changes in what amounts to the “ideal woman”). 
 285. CHAPIN, supra note 22, § 96, at 464-65. A few states refused to allow women to 
bring actions for criminal conversation, but the majority rule held to the contrary. See Kar-
chner v. Mumie, 156 A.2d 537, 538-39 (Pa. 1959) (discussing the majority and minority 
rules on this topic). 
 286. Note, Avoidance of the Incidence of the Anti-Heartbalm Statutes, supra note 281, 
at 252. In ancient times, only the father of a seduced woman could bring a seduction claim, 
with the gravamen of the suit involving a real or presumed loss of services. Where suits by 
the seduced woman were permitted, the woman generally had to show that the seducer 
had used undue influence, fraud, force, duress, or other means of control or domination to 
accomplish the seduction. Otherwise, the victim was deemed in pari delicto with her 
paramour. Breece v. Jett, 556 S.W.2d 696, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).  
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And claims for breach of promise to marry, though controversial, 
were growing ever more enmeshed within the fabric of the law.  
 But these seemingly beneficial trends ultimately contributed to 
the disappearance of these causes of action. Allowing women to sue 
for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, or their own seduc-
tion undermined the traditional justifications for these torts. An ac-
cepted ground for allowing a husband to recover for criminal conver-
sation was to compensate him for any genealogical uncertainty that 
might surround the offspring of his adulterous wife.287 This explana-
tion obviously did not apply to criminal conversation suits brought by 
a wife, who could be pretty well assured that her children were her 
own.288 With both women and men as plaintiffs, this tort—and claims 
for alienation of affections—had to find support in a more nebulous 
right to spousal consortium.289 Allowing women to sue for their own 
seduction, meanwhile, pushed that tort even further from its original 
justification (which by the early 1900s was already understood to be 
a legal fiction290)—allowing parents to recover for a loss of services 
occasioned by their daughter’s debasement and any resulting preg-
nancy.291 Finally, the burgeoning number of breach of promise to 
marry suits drew renewed, unflattering attention to the anomalous 
nature of that claim, which permitted tort damages for what by all 
appearances seemed to be a breach of contract.292 Critics also worried 
that assigning tort liability to a broken marriage promise might 
make society worse off. If only the threat of suit would drive a waver-
ing groom down the aisle, what hope could the couple have for a 
healthy marriage? Better, many thought, to allow the unhappy cou-
ple to disengage in peace than to encourage a marriage with little 
hope of success.293  
                                                                                                                     
 287. Doe v. Roe, 20 A. 83, 84 (Me. 1890); Kroessin v. Keller, 62 N.W. 438, 438 (Minn. 
1895). 
 288. The Author hopes that most readers will concede this point even without a cita-
tion to authority, but here is one just in case: BURDICK, supra note 3, ¶ 330, at 315.  
 289. See Feinsinger, supra note 281, at 991 (observing that “the historical basis for the 
action of criminal conversation has been replaced by a mass of incoherent theories”); id. at 
993 (noting that “[o]nce the wife’s action was established, courts proceeded to develop rules 
which operate to remove the action from the realm of social reality”). 
 290. See, e.g., Snider v. Newell, 44 S.E. 354, 355-56 (N.C. 1903). 
 291. FOWLER VINCENT HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 264, at 572 (1933); 
2 HILLIARD, supra note 25, at 599. 
 292. See ALBERT C. JACOBS & JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 22 (3d ed. 1952); R.M.J., supra note 281, at 209; see also Tushnet, 
supra note 281, at 2586 (suggesting that the shift in justifications given for breach of prom-
ise claims, from allowing a bride to recover financial losses to compensating her for emo-
tional harms, eventually doomed the tort).  
 293. R.M.J., supra note 281, at 210-11 (observing that the threat of breach of promise 
actions “results in blighted marriages, which consequently result in desertion, separation, 
and divorce”).  
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 The heartbalm torts also suffered from several other flaws in 
their makeup and application. First, the subject matter of these torts 
had long lent them a somewhat unsavory air.294 Some observers felt 
that disputes over sex and infidelity should be resolved outside of the 
courts, both to preserve the reputation of the legal system and for the 
good of the parties involved.295 Furthermore, it was no secret that the 
amatory torts were capable of abuse, frequently being used for rea-
sons of spite296 or—worse yet—blackmail.297 Just the threat of such a 
suit, with its attendant publicity,298 led to many a discreet payoff.299 If 
matters proceeded to court, the he-said, she-said nature of many 
heartbalm claims—especially breach of promise to marry—meant 
that it could be difficult to distinguish the heartbroken lover from the 
clever fraudsmith.300  
 Second, these problems of proof extended to the question of dam-
ages; as to all of the heartbalm torts, there were few meaningful 
                                                                                                                     
 294. See McCollister v. McCollister, 138 A. 472, 473 (Me. 1927) (noting, as to an alien-
ation of affections suit, “the nature of the claims so asserted is such that such suits furnish 
a most convenient weapon for extortion and the right to bring them is a constant tempta-
tion to the unscrupulous”); William J. Burns, Blackmailing Now the Big American Crime, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1916, at SM9 (describing how blackmailers used threat of alienation 
of affections and breach of promise suits to extort their marks).  
 295. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 20 A. 83, 84 (Me. 1890) (observing that claims for alienation 
of affections seem “better calculated to inflict pain upon the innocent members of the fami-
lies of the parties than to secure redress to the person injured”).  
 296. Then there is the breach of promise case. Ninety percent of such cases are 
prompted by spite, revenge or greed, as is proved by the fair one’s usual willingness to 
paint her record black as the original sin for a chance to “show him up,” with some likeli-
hood of a cash return. Cash for Love, DES MOINES NEWS, July 13, 1918, at 4. 
 297. FRIEDMAN, supra note 282, at 116 (discussing the sordid reputation of breach of 
promise suits); Note, Breach of Promise, 7 HARV. L. REV. 372, 372 (1894) (observing that 
breach of promise to marry claims were being “used sometimes as a method of blackmail”). 
 298. Peggy Cameron, Court Doors Slam Shut on Many Broken Hearts Asking for 
Golden Balm, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1935, at FS3 (observing that “[i]n the past few years 
breach of promise suits have served as an open sesame to newspaper publicity”). 
 299. Joseph U. Dugan, States Act to Curb Evils of ‘Heart Balm’ Lawsuits, CHI. TRIB., 
Mar. 31, 1935, at E9 (“Wide publicity always has attended sensational charges of breach of 
promise, alienation of affections, and similar actions. The threat of such publicity often has 
been used by unscrupulous individuals and attorneys as a club to force settlement.”). One 
scheme that is often linked to the heartbalm torts is known as the “badger game.” See 
COMM. ON LAW REFORM OF THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON LAW REFORM OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 
ON ACTIONS TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS, FOR BREACH OF 
PROMISE OF MARRIAGE AND FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSATION 4 (1935) (discussing the connec-
tion between alienation of affections suits and the “badger game”). This con involves plac-
ing a married man in a compromising position with a woman, then blackmailing him to 
avoid disclosure of the “affair.” For a modern take on the “badger game,” see DERAILED 
(The Weinstein Co. & Miramax Films 2005). 
 300. J.M.G., Legislation, Abolition of Actions for Breach of Promise, Alienation of Affec-
tions, Criminal Conversation and Seduction, 5 BROOK. L. REV. 196, 198 (1936) (observing 
that “[d]ifficulties inherent in adducing evidence [in breach of promise cases], besides the 
failure to require any written contract, subject the action to grave abuse”).  
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standards for affixing a price tag to the injuries suffered.301 Particu-
larly as the gravamen of heartbalm claims drifted more and more 
toward emotional and psychological injuries instead of out-of-pocket 
losses,302 jury verdicts became notoriously unpredictable303 and occa-
sionally immense.304 The publicity attendant to enormous awards 
worsened an already bad situation by encouraging plaintiffs with 
questionable claims to try their luck in court.305 
 Third, even though heartbalm lawsuits always attracted sub-
stantial attention,306 this publicity disguised the fact that relatively 
few amatory actions were being filed with the courts by the early 
1900s. A study of one rural Wisconsin court district over the 100-year 
period between 1855 and 1954 identified 497 suits alleging negligent 
bodily injury over that span, 150 cases implicating negligent injury 
to personal property, 112 cases involving intentional damage to re-
alty, and thirty-four defamation cases, but only fifteen lawsuits alleg-
ing intentional damage to relational interests.307 While a few more 
heartbalm suits may have been filed in urban areas,308 as the twenti-
eth century progressed their numbers were dwarfed by the soaring 
count of lawsuits involving automobile accidents.309 Out of 22,297 
                                                                                                                     
 301. Feinsinger, supra note 281, at 984, 994-95 (listing the types of damages recover-
able in heartbalm actions); N.P. Feinsinger, Current Legislation Affecting Breach of Prom-
ise to Marry, Alienation of Affections, and Related Actions, 10 WIS. L. REV. 417, 417 (1935). 
cf. Note, Breach of Promise, supra note 297, at 372 (asserting that a breach of promise 
claim “forces the courts into a commercial view of what cannot properly be regarded as a 
matter of trade or dicker”). 
 302. Feinsinger, supra note 281, at 984, 994-95. 
 303. See What is Woman’s Love Worth, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1915, at MS2 (observing, 
as to breach of promise suits, that “[n]o medium can be struck between the decisions of ju-
ries on this absorbing question, their findings are too variable”). 
 304. See Mohn v. Tingley, 217 P. 733, 734 (Cal. 1923) (reporting a $100,000 verdict in 
alienation of affections suit); THEODORE E. APSTEIN, THE PARTING OF THE WAYS 20, 23 
(1935) (discussing large verdicts awarded in breach of promise suits in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s, including seventeen awards of $60,000 or more between 1920 and 1925); 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 282, at 115, 118, 206-07 (discussing large damage verdicts in breach 
of promise and alienation of affections suits prosecuted between the late 1800s and the 
early 1900s); Feinsinger, supra note 301, at 417 (observing that the subject matter of 
heartbalm suits “aggravates the usual tendency of juries to overcompensate for injured 
feelings and leads them to express their emotional sympathy and moral indignation in the 
guise of exemplary damages”); Girl Gets $75,000 Verdict Against Abeel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
29, 1904, at 9 (reporting on a $75,000 jury verdict in a breach of promise to marry case); 
Woman Wins Big Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1924, at 24 (reporting on a $50,000 verdict in 
an alienation of affections case). 
 305. See APSTEIN, supra note 304, at 21-22. 
 306. See Sinclair, supra note 10, at 85. 
 307. FRANCIS W. LAURENT, THE BUSINESS OF A TRIAL COURT 163 tbl.86 (1959).  
 308. ROBERT A. SILVERMAN, LAW AND URBAN GROWTH 127-28 (1981). 
 309. A review of the New Haven courts over a fourteen-year span (1919 to 1932) re-
ported only 113 alienation of affections suits (a total that may include some suits not prop-
erly classified as “heartbalm” actions) but approximately 4000 lawsuits involving automo-
bile accidents. CHARLES E. CLARK & HARRY SHULMAN, A STUDY OF LAW ADMINISTRATION 
IN CONNECTICUT 8 tbl.1 (1937). Of course, more heartbalm suits were threatened than ac-
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civil lawsuits filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court during its 1923-
1924 fiscal year, only forty-five were for alienation of affections and 
just fifteen were for breach of promise to marry.310 Suits alleging 
criminal conversation were especially uncommon. In 1935, the Asso-
ciation of the Bar for the City of New York reported that only four 
criminal conversation claims had been filed in the entire state of New 
York over the preceding thirteen years.311  
 To step back and summarize what has been said about the 
heartbalm torts up to this point, due to their attributes and long-
circulating arguments, these claims were in a precarious position 
even before the Roaring Twenties ushered in new attitudes regarding 
women and sex. The torts had been knocked off-balance by reforms 
that expanded the types of plaintiffs capable of bringing these suits; 
their character and composition left them vulnerable to charges that 
they showered riches upon undeserving plaintiffs; and, notwithstand-
ing the significant amount of negative publicity they generated, they 
were not being invoked especially often, meaning that few attorneys 
depended on these torts to put food on the table and thus would pre-
sumably fight for their survival.312 The events of the 1920s and 1930s 
removed some objections to eliminating these torts and contributed 
to a crisis atmosphere that prompted a handful of legislatures to 
abolish the claims.313 These developments, however, merely capital-
ized upon the preexisting ailments that afflicted the heartbalm torts, 
woes that had already proven potent enough to cause England to 
abolish civil suits for adultery back in 1857.314  
 The atmospheric shift of the 1920s that has been credited with 
inducing the death of the heartbalm torts involved changes in what 
young women were doing and, probably more important, in what 
                                                                                                                     
tually brought, and one does see the occasional reference to heartbalm suits “crowd[ing] 
the dockets of the [c]ourts.” What Is Woman’s Love Worth, supra note 303.   
 310. Year Shows Increase in Court Suits, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1924, at A1; see also 
Gilbert v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 269 N.Y.S. 640, 642 (City Ct. 1934) (noting that 
breach of promise actions were not as prevalent as personal injury cases).  
 311. Bar Urges Curbs on Alienation Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1935, at 44; see also 
Note, Avoidance of the Incidence of the Anti-Heartbalm Statutes, supra note 281, at 253 
(observing that criminal conversation was “[a]pparently in almost complete disuse even be-
fore 1935”). 
 312. Note, Avoidance of the Incidence of the Anti-Heartbalm Statutes, supra note 281, 
at 242 (noting that by 1935, “[f]or over a decade law reviews and tabloids publicized the 
possibilities of blackmail and extortion inherent in civil actions for breach of promise to 
marry, alienation of affections, seduction, and criminal conversation”).  
 313. See G.M.W., Twelve Years with the “Heart Balm Acts,” 33 VA. L. REV. 314, 314 (de-
scribing the first round of anti-heartbalm laws as “[c]onceived in a rash of newspaper pub-
licity and ballyhoo”). 
 314. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, § 59 (Eng.); Bernard Rudden, 
Torticles, 6/7 TUL. CIV. L. F. 105, 112 (1991-1992). Although this statute abolished the 
common law action for adultery, a husband still could recover damages from an interloper 
by petitioning the court for redress. JACOBS & GOEBEL, supra note 292, at 562. 
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they were believed to be doing. The “new woman” of the 1920s en-
gaged in liberties that would have been unthinkable just a few dec-
ades before. This woman smoked, drank, swore, and—most perti-
nently—participated in, and even enjoyed, premarital sex.315 Some 
have questioned whether the flappers of the 1920s typified the atti-
tudes and behavior of the average young woman of that period.316 But 
these bohemians did define the era within the public imagination 
and in so doing displaced earlier, more chaste models of young femi-
ninity.317 The “gold digger,” in short, replaced the Gibson Girl. This 
transition bode particularly ill for claims for seduction (as brought by 
the seduced woman) and breach of promise to marry, which rested on 
the premises that women sought marriage and were ruined (or at 
least embarrassed) by premarital sex.318  
 Yet even these changes in the status and perception of modern 
women need not have proven fatal to any or all of the heartbalm 
torts. For all their flaws, these torts still seemed to have some use. 
Many observers continued to believe that claims for alienation of af-
fections and criminal conversation protected and vindicated the valid 
consortium interests of married men and women. Writing in 1934, 
one author determined that “[i]n spite of all [the objections to the 
alienation of affections tort], it is submitted that the action is still 
justifiable and performs a useful social function. That function is the 
preservation of the home.”319 Meanwhile, few parents of that (or any) 
time welcomed the seduction of their daughters. And even the breach 
of promise to marry tort was not beyond saving. Chivalry was not 
dead yet, and some thought that the problems afflicting breach of 
promise claims could be cured simply by raising the evidentiary 
threshold for these suits through measures such as requiring written 
evidence of the marriage promise at issue.320  
                                                                                                                     
 315. FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY 67-92 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1997). 
 316. J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL 
CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 25 (1997). 
 317. Id.; Sinclair, supra note 10, at 86-90. Another, related development ascribed new-
found economic autonomy to women. “That women had magically achieved economic free-
dom was the gospel of the 1920s.” DIFONZO, supra note 316, at 20. Some critics also justi-
fied snuffing out the heartbalm torts on the ground that women had gained new legal 
rights in recent years. No Balm for Blackmail, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 2, 1935, at 
16 (describing the heartbalm torts as being “no longer consistent with the changed legal 
status of the sex”). 
 318. Sinclair, supra note 10, at 86-90; Doris Blake, Legislation Is Doom of Racket in 
Balm Suits, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 22, 1935, at D3 (quoting an anti-heartbalm opponent as de-
scribing the premise behind breach of promise suits as “[w]oman is weak and defenseless, 
without means to support herself or protect herself from the machinations of men”). 
 319. Robert C. Brown, The Action for Alienation of Affections, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 472, 
505-06 (1934). 
 320. See COMM. ON LAW REFORM OF THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., supra 
note 299, at 3 (discussing earlier, failed attempts to revise the law to require written proof 
of the marriage promise in breach of promise actions).  
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 Unfortunately for the heartbalm torts, moderate reform propos-
als were drowned out in the public discourse by a parade of sensa-
tional cases and astronomical verdicts in the decade leading up to 
1935 that lent credence to cries of a heartbalm “crisis.” Seemingly 
since time immemorial, there had always been the occasional sensa-
tional heartbalm suit321—but nothing to compare with the volume of 
scandalous cases brought in the early- to mid-1930s. During this 
span, actor Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., became embroiled in an alien-
ation of affections case.322 So too did the spiritualist/cult leader Fa-
ther Divine323 and actresses Helen Hayes324 and Katherine Holmes.325 
Breach of promise suits were, if anything, even more notorious. 
These suits ensnared doctors,326 executives,327 financiers,328 celebri-
ties,329 athletes,330 and other prominent and respected men.331 The 
fact that the plaintiffs in some of these cases were actresses332 and 
show girls333 did nothing to dampen interest in these matters.334 Me-
                                                                                                                     
 321. Sinclair, supra note 10, at 85. 
 322. Fairbanks Charges Plot, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1933, at A3; Fairbanks, Jr., Sued 
for Balm, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1933, at A1.  
 323. Father Divine Is Sued, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1935, at 9. 
 324. Helen Hayes Fights Suit, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1936, at 3. 
 325. Holmes Balm Suit Dismissed, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 1937, at 2. 
 326. Dr. E. H. Lehman Is Sued, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1934, at 19 (reporting on a 
$100,000 breach of promise suit against a doctor). 
 327. Singer Asks $1,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1934, at 7 (reporting on a breach of 
promise suit against a vice president and director of the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea 
Company).  
 328. Girl Sues George S. Groves, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1934, at 6 (reporting on a breach 
of promise suit against a local financier and yachtsman). 
 329. Vallee Scores in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1934, at 24 (reporting on a breach of 
promise suit brought against singer Rudy Vallee). 
 330. Accuses Cyril Walker: Woman Sues Ex-Golf Champion for Breach of Promise, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 7, 1934, at 24 (reporting on a breach of promise and seduction suit against a 
renowned golfer); Circus Girl Sues Baer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1933, at 9 (reporting on a 
breach of promise suit against heavyweight boxer Max Baer). 
 331. E.g., M’Cormick Settles with Mrs. Doubleday, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1934, at 14 
(reporting on a breach of promise suit in which the parties reached an out-of-court settle-
ment rumored to total $100,000). In all, it has been estimated that between 1925 and 1935, 
damages of approximately $15,000,000 were awarded to plaintiffs in breach of promise 
cases. JACOBS & GOEBEL, supra note 292, at 39. 
 332. Two Actresses Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1934, at 23 (reporting the indictment 
of Vilma Aknay and Sari Fedak, the first of whom had brought, then dropped, a breach of 
promise lawsuit against playwright Ernst Vajda). 
 333. Girl Sues Orchestra Leader, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1934, at N7 (reporting on a New 
York breach of promise suit for $100,000 brought by a show girl). 
 334. The parsimony of juries in other cases received much less notice. See, e.g., ‘$10,000 
Heart’ Put Down to $1, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1935, at 42 (reporting a jury award of $1 in 
breach or promise to marry suit); Asked $100,000, Gets 6 Cents, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1934, 
at 9; Ex-Senator France’s Kin Assessed Cent in $50,000 Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1932, at 8 
(reporting on an award of one cent in a Maryland breach of promise suit); Gets $1 in 
$200,000 Suit, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1934, at 11. Though no official statistics exist, contem-
poraneous reports suggest that alienation of affections suits were especially difficult to 
prove. See Cameron, supra note 298 (“Judging from the ultimate outcomes of most of the 
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dia coverage of heartbalm cases boomed: Between 1934 and 1935, 
The New York Times ran more than eighty stories on breach of prom-
ise and alienation of affections suits.335 The Chicago Daily Tribune, 
meanwhile, had run only 39 stories referencing “alienation of affec-
tions” between the years 1916 and 1920. That number grew to 56 be-
tween 1921 and 1925, to 102 between 1926 and 1930, and to 230 be-
tween 1931 and 1935—nearly a six-fold increase in coverage in less 
than two decades. 336  
 These news reports revealed that heartbalm plaintiffs were de-
manding enormous sums—sometimes $100,000 or more337—and that 
                                                                                                                     
suits now outlawed, wives have had a bad time collecting green-backed medicine for in-
jured feelings.”).  
 335. THE NEW YORK TIMES INDEX: ANNUAL CUMULATIVE VOLUME YEAR 1935, at 714-15 
(1936); THE NEW YORK TIMES INDEX: ANNUAL CUMULATIVE VOLUME YEAR 1934, at 667-68 
(1935). Of course, the number of stories in 1935 was enhanced by articles discussing the 
then-ongoing campaign to abolish heartbalm suits. 
 336. The author’s unscientific survey of newspaper articles in the Chicago Daily Trib-
une and The Washington Post incorporating the phrase “alienation of affections” yielded 
the following results: 
NEWS ARTICLES REFERENCING “ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS” 
Years Chicago (Daily) Tribune The Washington Post 
1901-1905 8 7 
1906-1910 32 31 
1911-1915 38 41 
1916-1920 39 23 
1921-1925 56 27 
1926-1930 102 95 
1931-1935 230 105 
1936-1940 113 56 
1941-1945 15 19 
1946-1950 109 45 
1951-1955 50 22 
1956-1960 49 25 
1961-1965 39 6 
1966-1970 9 9 
1971-1975 3 12 
1976-1980 16 7 
The figures in this chart were drawn from searches of the archived compendia of Chicago 
Tribune and Washington Post articles available online at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/ 
chicagotribune and http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost. These totals capture nu-
merous articles having nothing to do with the heartbalm tort of alienation of affections, but 
a sampling of the articles indicates that a large percentage of the pieces returned through 
this search do involve this subject. 
 337. E.g., $4,000,000 Stern Balm Suit Is Settled, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1933, at 3; Balm 
Suit Asks Riches, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 1933, at A7; Cameron, supra note 298 (reporting on 
a breach of promise suit in which the plaintiff demanded $1,500,000); Oil Man Faces Se-
duction Suit Filed by Girl, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1926, at A2 (reporting on a $100,000 suit); 
Wealthy Long Beach Widow Named in $600,000 Alienation Suit Filed by Surgeon’s Wife, 
L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1930, at A2. The demands made in the seven heartbalm filings lodged 
with the Los Angeles Superior Court on the last day that California permitted such suits 
after enacting anti-heartbalm legislation are perhaps more representative of typical de-
mands. One plaintiff, suing her mother-in-law for alienation of affections, asked for 
$600,000; another plaintiff demanded $75,000; two others, $50,000 each; another, $25,867; 
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some juries were seizing the bait. One Michigan panel awarded 
$450,000 to a breach of promise plaintiff.338 An alienation of affec-
tions case tried in Vermont produced a $465,000 plaintiff’s verdict.339 
Awards of $50,000 or more to sympathetic plaintiffs were not espe-
cially rare.340 Courts sometimes reduced particularly generous jury 
verdicts,341 but since there were no real limits on the jury’s discre-
tion,342 verdicts awarding plaintiffs tens of thousands of dollars often 
held up on appeal.343 These riches were showered on a fortunate few 
plaintiffs in an era when per capita annual income was well less than 
$1000.344 These verdicts also towered above the awards given to 
plaintiffs in other types of personal injury lawsuits, as illustrated by 
two decisions rendered by the Missouri Supreme Court on a single 
day: June 12, 1934. The first of these opinions rejected as excessive 
an award of $15,000 to a young man left crippled and unable to work 
due to the defendant’s negligence.345 The second case was an alien-
ation of affections suit in which the trial court had cut a $120,000 
verdict to a mere $50,000; the state supreme court ultimately re-
versed the judgment on grounds unrelated to the amount of dam-
ages.346  
 This seeming onslaught of high-profile cases and staggering 
awards gave the misleading perception that the nation was suffering 
from a heartbalm “crisis” (while in fact, as previously discussed, 
these suits were not especially common) and added fuel to simmering 
resentment against these claims—especially the claim for breach of 
                                                                                                                     
another, $25,000; and the last, a mere $10,000. Rush to File Balm Suits Made, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 19, 1939, at 6.  
 338. The trial court reduced this verdict, but only to $150,000. Cleavenger v. Castle, 
237 N.W. 542, 545 (Mich. 1931). 
 339. This verdict was knocked down to $125,000 by the trial court; the state supreme 
court affirmed the judgment as modified. Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, 130 A. 758, 787-88 (Vt. 
1925).  
 340. See, e.g., Overton v. Overton, 246 P. 1095, 1098 (Okla. 1926) (reducing to $60,000 
a $150,000 verdict in an alienation of affections case but otherwise ratifying the judgment); 
Wins $100,000 from Bedford-Jones’s Wife, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1935, at 19 (reporting on the 
verdict in alienation of affections lawsuit).  
 341. E.g., Doroszka v. Lavine, 150 A. 692, 693 (Conn. 1930) (ordering a remittitur of 
the verdict in a criminal conversation case). 
 342. Indeed, one contemporary observer suspected that courts sometimes goaded juries 
toward higher awards. Feinsinger, supra note 301, at 417. 
 343. Brown, supra note 319, at 499 (stating that damages awards in alienation of affec-
tions suits are “left pretty much to the jury”); W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Excessiveness or 
Inadequacy of Damages for Alienation of Affections, Criminal Conversation, or Seduction, 
36 A.L.R.2d 548 (1954) (listing jury verdicts). 
 344. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SELECTED PER CAPITA INCOME AND PRODUCT ITEMS IN 
CURRENT AND REAL (2000) DOLLARS: 1929 TO 2005, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/ 
infousa/economy/industry/docs/07s0655.xls. 
 345. Harlan v. Wabash Ry. Co., 73 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1934).  
 346. Howard v. Boyle, 73 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. 1934). 
2008] WHY TORTS DIE 415 
 
promise to marry, with its gold digger prosecutrix.347 By the 1930s, 
people were talking about an upsurge of spurious heartbalm claims 
engendered by the apparent profitability of this type of action.348 
Other observers spoke of a “breach of promise business, by which 
millions have been collected.”349 A 1935 Los Angeles Times editorial 
remarked that “[b]reach of promise and ‘lost-love’ suits, frankly, are 
coming to be regarded in the light of shake-downs and blackmail—
which they frequently are.”350 The sham character of alienation of af-
fections suits became a national joke, even informing the plot of Li-
beled Lady, a 1936 comedy nominated for an Academy Award for 
Best Picture.351   
 These criticisms and snickers were certainly nothing new, but 
they gained just enough volume and attention in the mid-1930s to 
propel proposals to mend or end these heartbalm torts, which had 
stalled in years past,352 toward the top of the legislative agenda. The 
                                                                                                                     
 347. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 282, at 207; Feinsinger, supra note 281, at 1008-09 
(“[N]ewspaper emphasis has created an illusion of universality as to the evils of unfounded 
actions, coercive settlements or excessive verdicts which concededly exist in particular 
cases.”); R.M.J., supra note 281, at 211 (noting that “the brunt of the attack” on the heart-
balm torts in the mid-1930s centered on breach of promise claims).  
 348. Blake, supra note 318 (reflecting upon a balm suit in which damages of $150,000 
were awarded to the plaintiff, which “started a rise in the ‘wounded affections’ market”); 
Frown to Greet Damage Suits of the Lovelorn, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 18, 1930, at 1 (quoting a 
Chicago judge as saying that “[a] large verdict in a breach of promise case brings a flood of 
persons complaining of bruised hearts”). Interestingly, there may have been a modest de-
lay between the issuance of the most striking awards and the flashpoint of antiheartbalm 
furor. APSTEIN, supra note 304, at 25 (observing in 1935 that “the staggering settlements 
of pre-depression days are becoming fewer and fewer. Extortion is not so evident, and the 
legitimate claimant to a suit is given more careful consideration. Juries are less in sympa-
thy with these actions”); Fight Breach of Promise Laws in Four States, JEFFERSON CITY 
POST-TRIB. (Jefferson City, Mo.), Feb. 12, 1935, at 2 (observing that “[e]ven before the 
feminine wave of feeling against [the torts], the depression had badly dented the heart 
balm business. Where women once asked for a million, they are now likely to rate their 
sufferings at $100,000 or less and thank fortune if they are awarded as much as $15,000”).  
 349. Cameron, supra note 298. 
 350. Discarding Heart Balm, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1935, at A4. Another contemporary 
critic had this to say about certain heartbalm torts: 
Throughout the history of domestic relations in this country, the three most 
unpleasant phases for men have been breach of promise, alienation of affec-
tions and alimony. In point of age, breach of promise was really the first of 
these to be adopted as a racket by which a small percentage of American 
women could abuse their double-edged weapon, the law. 
APSTEIN, supra note 304, at 17.  
 351. In Libeled Lady, newspaper editor Warren Haggerty (Spencer Tracy) enlists a 
former reporter, Bill Chandler (William Powell), to pose as a married man and then ro-
mance Connie Allenbury (Myrna Loy), hoping that he can use the “affair” to blackmail Al-
lenbury into dropping her pending libel suit against his newspaper. Unfortunately for 
Haggerty, Allenbury and Chandler fall in love. LIBELED LADY (MGM 1936). 
 352. See COMM. ON STATE LEGISLATION OF THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., 
REPORT ON AN ACT TO AMEND THE PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW 1 (1932) (discussing then-
ongoing attempts to limit breach of promise suits in New York); Ending a Despicable 
Racket, LOWELL SUN (Lowell, Mass.), Apr. 10, 1933, at 6 (praising a bill introduced in the 
New York legislature that would have abolished claims for breach of promise to marry in 
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Law Reform Committee of the Association of the Bar for the City of 
New York prepared a report in January 1935 that recommended the 
outright abolition of criminal conversation suits (which, according to 
the report’s drafters, “put the marriage relation on a plane so sordid 
as to be comparable almost to the White Slave Traffic”),353 limiting 
alienation of affections suits to claims against in-laws (since suits 
against paramours were “as a general proposition, resorted to by un-
scrupulous men and women to extort money from defendants unwill-
ing to go through a trial of the issues for fear of publicity”),354 and re-
quiring written proof of the marriage promise in breach of promise 
cases, while limiting plaintiffs in these cases to actual expenses in-
curred in contemplation of marriage (as it was “generally believed 
that actions of this character verge on blackmail and that few self-
respecting women will lend their names to proceedings of this na-
ture”).355  
 Other circulating proposals went even further, urging the abro-
gation of all four heartbalm torts. The most notable advocate of out-
right abolition was Roberta West Nicholson, an Indiana state legisla-
tor. Mrs. Nicholson was what The Tipping Point refers to as a 
“saleswoman.”356 Nicholson was blessed with a gift for publicity, and 
in 1935 she became the face of the antiheartbalm movement357—or, 
in her words, “the standard bearer of a crusade” against the torts.358 
In numerous speeches Nicholson advanced an array of arguments for 
getting rid of the amatory torts. According to Nicholson, heartbalm 
suits were “merely legal blackmail”359 and had to be abolished “to 
[m]ake the [w]orld [s]afe for [m]en.”360 She argued that the torts rein-
                                                                                                                     
that state); Frown to Greet Damage Suits of the Lovelorn, supra note 348 (discussing the 
possible reform of pleading standards applicable to heartbalm suits in Illinois). 
 353. COMM. ON LAW REFORM OF THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., supra note 
299, at 4. 
 354. Id. at 3.  
 355. Id. (quoting a 1932 report issued by the Committee on State Legislation of the As-
sociation). 
 356. GLADWELL, supra note 163, at 70. 
 357. See, e.g., Gold Digger War Brought Here by Indiana Woman, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 
1935, at 16. Some of the articles and editorials discussing Nicholson and her campaign had 
a decidedly chauvinist air to them. In describing the anti-heartbalm deliberations in the 
Indiana House of Representatives, one article provided that Nicholson “expressed her feel-
ings so effectively that 86 of her fellow lawmakers, all masculine, gallantly leaped to her 
side.” Editorial of the Day, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 1935, at 12. Another piece made sure to 
mention that Mrs. Nicholson was a “handsome” lady. Fred Myers, Mrs. Nicholson’s Move to 
Stamp out Heart Balm Suits Gains Support Other States, THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER (Val-
paraiso, Ind.), Mar. 5, 1935, at 5. 
 358. Only Woman in Texas Legislature Offers Bill to Bar Heart Balm Suits, Protect Co-
respondents, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, Mar. 30, 1935, at 6. 
 359. Woman Presses Bill to End Balm Suit, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1935, at 2 (quoting 
Nicholson). 
 360. End of the Golden Heart-Balm Era as Vivid Vera Cashes In, FRESNO BEE, April 
28, 1935, Magazine, at 3 (quoting Nicholson). Other women echoed Nicholson’s arguments. 
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forced outdated views regarding the status of women, with anti-
heartbalm legislation being “symbolic of a change in attitude toward 
women. We don’t want to see inferior women pull down our sex.”361 
Nicholson also charged that the torts “induce[d] a sordid and vulgar 
conception of marital affairs in the minds of the immature” by ap-
pearing to place a dollar sign on love and affection and thereby re-
ducing marriage to a commodity.362  
 Of all these arguments, casting the torts as tools in the hands of 
unscrupulous blackmailers and canny gold diggers best resonated 
among state legislators.363 This was, in short, the “sticky” message of 
the day.364 Legislators wanted to put an immediate halt to what one 
New York lawmaker described as “a tribute of $10,000,000 paid an-
nually . . . to gold-diggers and blackmailers.”365 Ten million dollars 
was among the more conservative figures bandied about; one news-
paper article spoke of a “$2,000,000,000 ‘aching-heart-itching-palm’ 
industry.”366 Reflecting similar sentiments, New York’s antiheart-
balm law commenced with this revealing statement of policy: 
[R]emedies heretofore provided by law for the enforcement of ac-
tions based upon allege[d] alienation of affections, criminal conver-
sation, seduction and breach of contract to marry, having been 
subjected to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance, embar-
rassment, humiliation and pecuniary damage to many persons 
wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing, who were merely the 
                                                                                                                     
The president of the Los Angeles District of the California Federation of Women’s Clubs 
denounced heartbalm suits as unholy rackets, Grace Y. Hudson, Can Money Mend a 
Woman’s Heart?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1935, at J3, and the president of the General Fed-
eration of Women’s Clubs described these claims as “hold-ups.” Mrs. Grace Poole Thinks 
Most of Them Are Hold-Ups; ‘Debasing,’ Says Dr. Riley; ‘Blackmail,’ Declares Zioncheck, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1935, at 15; see also Foe of Heart Balm to Make U.S. Fight, 
MANSFIELD NEWS-JOURNAL (Mansfield, Ohio), Mar. 22, 1935, at 4 (quoting a female Ohio 
legislator as saying that the purpose of her antiheartbalm “bill was to protect the men, 
‘particularly those grown a bit old but who still loved to play around’ ”).   
 361. Gold Digger War Brought Here by Indiana Woman, supra note 357.  
 362. End of the Golden Heart-Balm Era as Vivid Vera Cashes In, supra note 360. 
 363. FRIEDMAN, supra note 282, at 208; Jack Cejnar, Victor Against Heart Balm to 
Make National Fight, THE MORNING HERALD (Hagerstown, Md.), Mar. 22, 1935, at 3 (quot-
ing an Indiana legislator as saying “that 999 out of 1,000 breach of promise and alienation 
of affections suits were nothing but ‘shakedowns’ ”); John Dunlap, Senate Move to End 
Overspending Threatens Pay of Thousand, TIMES & DAILY NEWS LEADER (San Mateo, Cal.), 
Mar. 9, 1939, at 9 (quoting a California legislator as saying that breach of promise actions 
were a “major ‘racket’ in California”); see also Kane, supra note 16, at 65-66 (observing that 
“[i]t can safely be said” that the argument “that money [cannot] compensate for wounded 
feelings” in fact “had very little to do with the adoption of [antiheartbalm] legislation”). 
 364. Mrs. Nicholson and her allies had a gift for sound bites that crisply communicated 
the blackmail message. Heartbalm suits were “merely legal blackmail,” while “[t]he afflic-
tion” redressed by these actions, Nicholson said, “is not so much an aching heart as an itch-
ing palm.” “Heart Balm” Bill Passed by House, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 2, 1935, at 8.  
 365. Move Planned in 8 Other States, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1935, at 3. 
 366. The New Laws to Stop the “Heart Balm” Suits, AM. WEEKLY, May 12, 1935, at 11 
(emphasis added). 
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victims of circumstances, and such remedies having been exercised 
by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment, and such 
remedies having furnished vehicles for the commission or at-
tempted commission of crime and in many cases having resulted in 
the perpetration of frauds, it is hereby declared as the public policy 
of the state that the best interests of the people of the state will be 
served by the abolition of such remedies.367 
 Nicholson’s other arguments were also well-chosen. By criticiz-
ing the torts as retarding the progress that women had achieved in 
the public sphere, she helped galvanize support for antiheartbalm 
bills among women legislators in several states.368 Her assertion that 
the torts cheapened marriage provided a hook for abolishing claims 
for alienation of affections and criminal conversation, which, due to 
their invocation by both sexes (and the fact that one could sue one’s 
in-laws for alienation of affections), did not mesh with the gold digger 
theme quite as neatly as breach of promise to marry and seduction 
suits did.  
 And so this first antiheartbalm campaign had spirited leader-
ship, dovetailed with the cultural zeitgeist, attacked already com-
promised torts, and leveraged powerful arguments against these 
claims. Even so, the movement failed in more states than it suc-
ceeded. In 1935, only seven states passed bills abolishing one or more 
of the heartbalm torts, while similar legislation failed in more than a 
dozen other jurisdictions.369 Indiana acted first among the states 
where antiheartbalm bills passed, enacting legislation in March 1935 
that abolished all four torts (except for seduction claims brought by  
 
                                                                                                                     
 367. Act of Mar. 29, 1935, ch. 263, § 61-a, 1935 N.Y. Laws 732, 732-33. 
 368. See Sinclair, supra note 10, at 66 (discussing the support of antiheartbalm meas-
ures by women legislators); Fight Breach of Promise Laws in Four States, supra note 348 
(discussing “the nation-wide feminine support” for antiheartbalm legislation); Heart Balm 
Bill Introduced in Ohio, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 6, 1935, at 1 (reporting on the prepara-
tion of antiheartbalm measures by women legislators in Ohio); Everett Holles, Move 
Against Gold Diggers Grows in U.S., OGDEN STANDARD-EXAMINER (Ogden, Utah), Mar. 22, 
1935, at 3 (observing that “[t]he loudest champions of the [antiheartbalm] legislation are 
women”); Mary Margaret McBride, Women Lawmakers of U.S. Would Force Heart Balm 
Off Gold Standard, LOWELL SUN (Lowell, Mass.), Feb. 11, 1935, at 11; Only Woman in 
Texas Legislature Offers Bill to Bar Heart Balm Suits, Protect Co-respondents, supra note 
358. Eleanor Roosevelt—probably the most prominent American female political figure of 
the era—also spoke out against heartbalm suits. The then-First Lady was quoted as saying 
“a woman’s heart, if genuinely broken, cannot be mended with money.” Frank A. Garbutt, 
Gold Diggers Decline, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 1935, at A4. 
 369. The authorities disagree on just how many states entertained antiheartbalm leg-
islation in 1935. Professor Sinclair counts twenty-two, Sinclair, supra note 10, at 65 & 
n.240, while an April 1935 newspaper article states that antiheartbalm legislation had ei-
ther passed or was under deliberation in twenty-seven states. Sigrid Arne, Love’s Old 
$weet $ong–Or, Is It Goodbye to Heart Balm?, KINGSTON DAILY FREEMAN (Kingston, N.Y.), 
Apr. 26, 1935, at 21. 
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or on behalf of plaintiffs under the age of twenty-one).370 In Illinois371 
and New York,372 legislatures rejected moderate reform proposals373 
in favor of laws that struck heartbalm torts from the books. Ala-
bama,374 Michigan,375 New Jersey,376 and Pennsylvania377 also banned 
or limited all or some of the amatory torts before the year ended. 
These measures typically passed by wide majorities. In Indiana, the 
state senate approved an antiheartbalm proposal by a 31-15 mar-
gin;378 the vote in the state house was even more lopsided, with a 
margin of 87-7.379 The Illinois House of Representatives voted 95-1 
(the entire debate and vote taking only five minutes) in favor of an 
antiheartbalm law,380 while the vote in the state senate was 37-0.381  
 Over the next decade, a trickle of states (most notably Califor-
nia) followed the lead of these trendsetting jurisdictions and abol-
ished one or more of the heartbalm torts.382 But by 1945 the burst of 
                                                                                                                     
 370. Act of Mar. 11, 1935, ch. 208, § 1, 1935 Ind. Acts 1009, 1009. 
 371. Act of May 4, 1935, § 1, 1935 Ill. Laws 716, 716 (abolishing claims for alienation of 
affections, criminal conversation, and breach of promise). In 1946, the Illinois Supreme 
Court found that this statute, to the extent it abolished claims for alienation of affections, 
violated a provision in the state constitution declaring an available remedy for all wrongs 
or injuries suffered. Heck v. Schupp, 68 N.E.2d 464, 466 (Ill. 1946). In response, the state 
legislature passed new laws that restored these torts but limited plaintiffs to actual eco-
nomic damages suffered. E.g., Act of July 18, 1947, § 4, 1947 Ill. Laws 796, 797 (reinstating 
claims for alienation of affections). 
 372. Act of Mar. 29, 1935, ch. 263, § 61-b, 1935 N.Y. Laws 732, 733 (abolishing all four 
torts). 
 373. Proposals also circulated in these states to heighten the standards of pleading of 
proof for heartbalm suits. None of these less extreme alternatives were enacted. See Wayne 
Thomis, 4 Bills to End Marriage Law Abuses Ready, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 1935, at 6; Ban on 
Heart Balm Is Made State Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1935, at 3. 
 374. Act of Sept. 7, 1935, No. 356, § 1, 1935 Ala. Laws 780, 780 (abolishing all four 
torts, except claims for the seduction of a female under the age of twenty-one). 
 375. Act of June 3, 1935, No. 127, § 1, 1935 Mich. Pub. Acts 201, 201 (abolishing all 
four torts, except seduction claims involving minors). 
 376. Act of June 27, 1935, ch. 279, § 2, 1935 N.J. Laws 896, 897 (abolishing all four 
torts). 
 377. Act of June 22, 1935, No. 190, §§ 1-2, 1935 Pa. Laws 450, 450-51 (abolishing 
claims for breach of promise to marry and alienation of affections claims alleged against 
paramours). 
 378. Anti-Heart Balm Bill Assured of Passage, LOGANSPORT PHAROS-TRIB. (Logansport, 
Ind.), Mar. 8, 1935, at 10.  
 379. Bill Provides Price Fixing by Governor, KOKOMO TRIB. (Kokomo, Ind.), Feb. 2, 
1935, at 9. 
 380. Percy Wood, Illinois House Votes 95-1 to Bar Love Suits, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21, 1935, 
at 1.  
 381. Love Suits Put Under Illinois Ban by Senate, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 18, 1935, at 1. Simi-
larly, the New York Senate passed antiheartbalm legislation by a vote of 36-9. ‘Balm’ Ban 
Is Voted by Albany Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1935, at 1. The Assembly in that state 
passed the legislation by a 134-6 margin. Assembly Without Debate Bans ‘Balm’ Suits and 
Speeds Measure to Governor Lehman, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1935, at 12.  
 382. Colorado abolished all four heartbalm torts in 1937. Act of Apr. 27, 1937, ch. 111, 
§ 1, 1937 Colo. Sess. Laws 403, 403. California did the same in 1939 (though preserving ac-
tions for seduction of a minor). Act of May 10, 1939, ch. 128, § 2, 1939 Cal. Stat. 1245, 
1245. Wyoming followed suit in 1941, Act of Feb. 10, 1941, ch. 36, § 2, 1941 Wyo. Sess. 
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antiheartbalm momentum seemed spent, with all four torts still alive 
in a large majority of the states. The perceived “heartbalm” crisis had 
passed, with Rosie the Riveter replacing the gold digger as the 
woman of the hour.383  
 The mixed results of the first antiheartbalm campaign demon-
strates how difficult it can be to rid the books of a well-established 
tort. Legislators in states where antiheartbalm bills failed or were 
never even introduced may have decided that antiheartbalm legisla-
tion was unnecessary, might be unconstitutional,384 or was too 
broad,385 or they may have held some combination of these reserva-
tions. Many more lawmakers may have agreed with the New York 
state senator who thought that antiheartbalm legislation provided 
too much protection to the “coal-oil johnnies, the rich philanderers, 
the stuffed shirts”386 while leaving innocent women defenseless387—in 
other words, that the heartbalm torts still served a useful purpose. 
These objections were not voiced solely by holdovers from Victorian 
times. In 1941, William Prosser wrote that the initial spate of anti-
heartbalm laws 
                                                                                                                     
Laws 32, 32, and Florida joined the trend in 1945. Act of June 11, 1945, ch. 23138, § 1, 
1945 Fla. Laws 1342, 1342. Other states acted more selectively during this period, banning 
one or two of the heartbalm torts. Massachusetts eliminated suits for breach of promise to 
marry in 1938. Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 350, § 1, 1938 Mass. Acts 326, 326. Maine and New 
Hampshire did the same in 1941. Act of Mar. 25, 1941, ch. 104, § 1, 1941 Me. Acts 140, 
140; Act of June 5, 1941, ch. 150, § 1, 1941 N.H. Laws 223, 224. Nevada abolished claims 
for alienation of affections and breach of promise in 1943, Act of Mar. 5, 1943, ch. 53, § 2, 
1943 Nev. Stat. 75, 75, and Maryland extinguished alienation of affections and breach of 
promise suits not involving pregnancies in 1945. Act of May 4, 1945, ch. 1010, § 2, 1945 
Md. Laws 1759.  
 383. DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION 
AND WAR, 1929–1945, at 776 (2005).  
 384. See APSTEIN, supra note 304, at 28-29 (quoting an opponent of antiheartbalm leg-
islation as expressing reservations about the constitutionality of eliminating a remedy for 
a wrong); Anti-Heart Balm Bill Assured of Passage, supra note 378 (quoting a foe of Indi-
ana’s antiheartbalm legislation as claiming that the bill would “remove the rights women 
have had for 150 years”). 
 385. Cf. Feinsinger, supra note 281, at 1008 (“There will be little regret at the passing 
of the action for breach of promise to marry. But there is room for an honest difference of 
opinion as to the actions of alienation of affections and possibly of criminal conversation . . 
. .”). Alienation of affections had especial appeal because a large percentage of these actions 
were brought against one’s in-laws. In 1978, the Iowa Supreme Court observed that a ma-
jority of alienation of affections cases that had reached that court (22 of 41) had been 
brought against family members instead of sexual paramours. Bearbower v. Merry, 266 
N.W.2d 128, 132 (Iowa 1978). 
 386. ‘Balm’ Ban Is Voted by Albany Senate, supra note 381. 
 387. See House Defeats Balm Suit Bill, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, Apr. 30, 1935, at 5 
(quoting a Texas legislator as opposing antiheartbalm legislation on the ground that “ ‘men 
who come down here and entice our maidens away with golden promises should not be 
given an opportunity to escape’ ”); Holles, supra note 368 (quoting Roberta Nicholson as 
saying that some bachelors opposed antiheartbalm bills because they “retain what might 
be called Victorian ideals about protecting womanhood”).  
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reverse abruptly the entire tendency of the law to give increased 
protection to family interests and the sanctity of the home, and 
undoubtedly they deny relief in many cases of serious and genuine 
wrong. It may be that they do away with spurious suits at too 
great a price, and that other methods of limitation or control are to 
be preferred.388 
Indeed, the very existence of the large awards to plaintiffs that 
prompted the crisis atmosphere revealed that when push came to 
verdict, a substantial share of the public still regarded the heartbalm 
torts as guarding valuable interests. The overwhelming votes for an-
tiheartbalm laws established that, if put on the record, most legisla-
tors would support abolitionist measures. Institutional prerogatives 
and procedures, however, conferred upon legislators every opportu-
nity to avoid shutting the door to these claims.389 And so most states 
simply did nothing and waited until the antiheartbalm furor faded, 
as it soon did.  
 While there was little legislative action vis-à-vis the heartbalm 
torts during the two decades following the end of World War II,390 
during this period the already meager flow of heartbalm suits con-
tinued to dry up. The initial catalysts for this trend were atmospheric 
in nature. Though the divorce rate dropped between World War II 
and the early 1960s,391 divorce was slowly but steadily becoming 
more available and accepted, lessening the stigma—and thus the 
damages—associated with a disrupted or failed marriage.392 Adultery 
became perceived as a subject of private concern rather than a mat-
                                                                                                                     
 388. PROSSER, supra note 97, § 101, at 938 (footnotes omitted). 
 389. See Arne, supra note 369 (noting how some antiheartbalm bills had died in com-
mittee). 
 390. In 1949, the Tennessee legislature raised the evidentiary threshold for breach of 
promise claims and limited plaintiffs in such suits to the recovery of their actual financial 
losses. Act of Apr. 8, 1949. ch. 161, §§ 1-4, 1949 Tenn. Pub. Acts 486, 486-87. Wisconsin 
abolished the breach of promise to marry tort in 1959. Act of Nov. 3, 1959, ch. 595, § 73, 
1959 Wis. Sess. Laws 740, 765. Montana wiped out alienation of affections and breach of 
promise suits in 1963. Act of Mar. 7, 1963, ch. 200, §§ 1-2, 1963 Mont. Laws 598, 598-99. 
 391. JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945–1974, at 
360-61 (1996). 
 392. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 441 (discussing the spread of de facto no-fault di-
vorce during this period); Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional 
Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1268, 1297 (1996); Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Lan-
guage: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1526-27 (2000). The 
divorce rate would soar in later years, thanks in part to the advent of actual no-fault di-
vorce in the 1970s. See DIFONZO, supra note 316, at 171-72 (discussing the spread of no-
fault divorce in the 1970s); Sally C. Clarke, Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics, 43 
MONTHLY VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 9 tbl.1 (Supp. 1995) (showing the divorce rate as rising from 
2.5 to 5.2 divorces per 1000 population between 1965 and 1980); Herma Hill Kay, From the 
Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family Law in the 
United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017, 2050-57 (2000) (dis-
cussing the advent of no-fault divorce). 
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ter requiring state intervention.393 Concurrently, breach of promise 
and seduction claims were being compromised by the acceptance of 
women into the workplace394 (which meant that a broken marriage 
promise did not carry the same financial consequences as it once had) 
and an allowance, if not an endorsement, of the fact that premarital 
sex was not quite as socially ruinous as had once been supposed.395  
 By calling into question the existence and extent of the injuries 
suffered by heartbalm plaintiffs, these developments placed the 
number of immense plaintiffs’ verdicts in these cases on a downward 
course.396 As it became clear that heartbalm torts were no longer a 
ticket to riches (assuming that they ever had been in the first place), 
prospective complainants filed fewer and fewer of these suits.397 The 
                                                                                                                     
 393. Gabrielle Vistor, Note, The Validity of Criminal Adultery Prohibitions After Law-
rence v. Texas, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 837, 842 & n.42 (2006) (listing states repealing 
criminal adultery statutes between the 1960s and the present day). 
 394. PATTERSON, supra note 391, at 644. 
 395. See id. at 788. 
 396. See, e.g., JACOBS & GOEBEL, supra note 292, at 40 (observing that “[s]ince the pas-
sage of heart balm statutes the awards (at least as they appear in the appeal cases of ju-
risdictions which had no such acts) seem to have been smaller”). My review of plaintiffs’ 
verdicts rendered between 1960 and 1964, as described in published decisions in heartbalm 
cases, reveals one extremely large award of $179,000 (in a lawsuit involving, by all ap-
pearances, very wealthy defendants), Turner v. Turner, 369 S.W.2d 675, 676 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1963), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 385 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1964); a number of mod-
estly lucrative suits, e.g., McNelis v. Bruce, 367 P.2d 625, 626, 632 (Ariz. 1961) ($22,500, 
reduced to $15,000); Vogel v. Sylvester, 174 A.2d 122, 124 (Conn. 1961) ($47,500); Farrier 
v. Farrier, 197 N.E.2d 163, 164 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964) ($20,000); Castner v. Wright, 127 
N.W.2d 583, 585 (Iowa 1964) ($45,000, reduced to $12,500 by court order); Poynter v. 
Albrecht, 123 N.W.2d 355, 355 (Minn. 1963) ($20,000); Edgren v. Reissner, 396 P.2d 564, 
565 (Or. 1964) ($12,000); Miller v. Liles, 370 P.2d 217, 217 (Or. 1962) ($25,000); Fennell v. 
Littlejohn, 125 S.E.2d 408, 410-11 (S.C. 1962) ($16,000, reduced to $10,000); Miller v. Gru-
enwald, 396 P.2d 554, 554 (Wash. 1964) ($20,000); Bowles v. Mitchell, 120 S.E.2d 697, 698 
(W. Va. 1961) ($15,000); and some rather modest returns, e.g., Leardi v. Gonser, 176 A.2d 
594, 595 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1961) ($1500); Kiger v. Meehan, 113 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 
1962) ($5600); Wallen v. Gorman, 176 N.E.2d 262, 264 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960) ($4000); 
Ondick v. Ondick, 160 A.2d 708, 709 (Pa. 1960) ($7500). If one were to remove the Tucker 
verdict and account for remittiturs, the mean plaintiff’s verdict in these reported decisions 
was approximately $15,000—not an insignificant sum, but one that pales in comparison to 
the amounts being awarded by juries in other types of tort suits around that time. See 
MARK A. PETERSON & GEORGE L. PRIEST, THE CIVIL JURY: TRENDS IN TRIALS AND 
VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960–1979, at 26 (1982). In all, heartbalm awards ap-
pear about the same or modestly higher (without accounting for inflation) than they had 
been in the late 1920s and early 1930s, except at the attention-grabbing top end of the 
range, where enormous verdicts were much less common than they had been. This sample, 
of course, captures only cases in which heartbalm plaintiffs prevailed at trial and therefore 
gives a misleadingly sanguine picture of a prospective plaintiff’s prospects.  
 397. See Felsenthal v. McMillan, 493 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tex. 1973) (commenting upon 
the infrequency with which criminal conversation suits were being brought); Alienation of 
Affections Trial Continues to Pack Court House; End Is Near, BURLINGTON DAILY TIMES-
NEWS (Burlington, N.C.), Feb. 3, 1950, at 9 (noting that a then ongoing alienation of affec-
tions lawsuit was the first of its kind to be tried in the county in more than twenty-five 
years); Is Awarded $1,200 in Alienation of Affections Claim, NEWARK ADVOCATE (Newark, 
Ohio), Oct. 21, 1955, at 1 (noting that the suit behind the headline was the first alienation 
of affections case tried in the county since the 1920s); Lovelorn Laws Face Abolition, 
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resulting drop in heartbalm suits, exacerbated by the prior abroga-
tion of these claims by several states, itself contributed to a sense 
that the claims were archaic and ill-suited to modern times.398 This 
view made plaintiff’s verdicts even more rare and modest399 and 
thereby cast an even darker pall upon the torts. The effects of this vi-
cious cycle can be measured by viewing the declining number of pub-
lished decisions concerning the heartbalm torts that have been is-
sued by state courts over the past several decades. In 1930, state 
courts produced thirty-three published decisions involving one or 
more of the amatory torts.400 By 1950, only eighteen reported deci-
                                                                                                                     
BENNINGTON BANNER (Bennington, Vt.), Mar. 29, 1973, at 1 (noting that very few heart-
balm suits had been brought in the state in recent years); What’s Required in Alienation 
Suit?, VAN WERT TIMES-BULLETIN (Van Wert, Ohio), Sept. 5, 1957, at 10 (observing the 
tort of alienation of affections “comes to public attention considerably less frequently than 
many others”). 
 398. See Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 874 (Idaho 1994) (noting that there had been no 
reported case concerning criminal conversation in the state since 1918 and surmising that 
the absence of claims owed to a change in societal views toward women that rendered the 
cause of action obsolete); Rich Tucker, Old Tort Puts Price on Adultery, FLA. TIMES-UNION, 
July 8, 2001, at B1 (quoting an Illinois lawyer as saying that courts are not receptive to 
alienation of affections cases and quoting a North Carolina attorney as saying that the 
burden of proving damages in alienation of affections suits is high). 
 399. See Florence Shinkle, Heart’s Balm, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 23, 1996, at 
1C (reporting that juries in recent alienation of affections cases had not gone “overboard in 
their awards and [had] not [given] damages at all in about three-fourths of the handful of 
cases filed in [recent] year[s]”). The dearth of heartbalm suits also made it increasingly dif-
ficult for plaintiff’s lawyers to avoid missteps in these cases. At least judging from news 
reports, modern heartbalm suits seem to involve a disproportionate number of pretrial 
dismissals on procedural grounds, e.g., Beauty’s Suit Is Tossed Out, THE TIMES (San Mateo, 
Cal.), Feb. 27, 1967, at 1; numerous mistrials or reversals of judgments in favor of plain-
tiffs, e.g., Larry Laughlin, Judge Strikes Down $75,000 Awards to Cuckolded Husband, 
CHILLICOTHE CONST.-TRIB. (Chillicothe, Mo.), Nov. 8, 1979, at 6; Socialite Sued for Heart 
Balm, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM (Long Beach, Cal.), Jan. 15, 1950, at A2; and many 
new trials ordered on the ground that the damages awarded were excessive. E.g., Alien-
ation Suit to Be Retried, MORGANTOWN POST (Morgantown, W. Va.), June 15, 1960, at 10 
(reporting the setting aside of a $200,000 jury verdict in an alienation of affections case). 
cf. Law Nixes Breach of Promise Liability, CHRON.-TELEGRAM (Elyria, Ohio), Mar. 28, 
1978, at 5 (quoting an Ohio lawmaker describing the difficulty associated with proving 
damages in heartbalm suits). 
 400. Alexander v. Johnson, 31 S.W.2d 304 (Ark. 1930) (alienation of affections); Belm 
v. Patrick, 293 P. 847 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930) (breach of promise); Orndorff v. Scharlin, 289 P. 
904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930) (breach of promise); Rogers v. Haines, 285 P. 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1930) (alienation of affections); Lessinger v. Miller, 152 A. 72 (Conn. 1930) (breach of prom-
ise); Glazer v. Rosoff, 151 A. 165 (Conn. 1930) (breach of promise); Doroszka v. Lavine, 150 
A. 692 (Conn. 1930) (criminal conversation); Davis v. Cochran, 155 S.E. 379 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1930) (criminal conversation); Johnson v. Richards, 294 P. 507 (Idaho 1930) (alienation of 
affections); Kralick v. Shuttleworth, 289 P. 74 (Idaho 1930) (seduction); Davidson v. Doug-
lass, 284 P. 427 (Kan. 1930) (alienation of affections); Lovendale v. Brown, 150 A. 916 (Me. 
1930) (criminal conversation); Scott v. Bontekoe, 233 N.W. 215 (Mich. 1930) (alienation of 
affections); Rockwell v. Rockwell, 231 N.W. 718 (Minn. 1930) (alienation of affections); 
Tucker v. Tucker, 31 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930) (alienation of affections); Williamson 
v. Williamson, 231 N.W. 506 (Neb. 1930) (alienation of affections); Ebmeier v. Ebmeier, 231 
N.W. 145 (Neb. 1930) (alienation of affections); Dunbeir v. Mengedoht, 230 N.W. 669 (Neb. 
1930) (alienation of affections); Simone v. Frobisher, 152 A. 669 (N.J. 1930) (alienation of 
affections and criminal conversation); Buermann v. Morris, 152 A. 341 (N.J. 1930) (alien-
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sions emerged from states in which these torts remained viable.401 By 
1970, only ten published decisions appeared concerning any of the 
heartbalm torts.402 In 1990, only seven such opinions emerged in the 
dwindling set of states still permitting these claims.403 By 2006, the 
number of published cases had dropped to four.404 Though these deci-
sions come from an ever-diminishing pool of jurisdictions recognizing 
these torts, even when this fact is accounted for and balanced against 
                                                                                                                     
ation of affections); Freund v. Freund, 151 A. 375 (N.J. 1930) (alienation of affections); 
Scharwath v. Brooks, 150 A. 211 (N.J. 1930) (alienation of affections); Ciaglia v. Ciaglia, 
148 A. 761 (N.J. 1930) (alienation of affections); Press v. Draper, 247 N.Y.S. 156 (Sup. Ct. 
1930) (breach of promise); Lonnborg v. Lipset, 241 N.Y.S. 691 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (alienation of 
affections); McCoy v. Justice, 155 S.E. 452 (N.C. 1930) (alienation of affections and crimi-
nal conversation); Tunder v. Hollowach, 10 Ohio Law Abs. 197 (Ct. App. 1930) (criminal 
conversation); Nester v. Karavas, 8 Ohio Law Abs. 449 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930) (alienation of 
affections and seduction); Boyer v. Hopper, 148 A. 854 (Pa. 1930) (alienation of affections); 
Bowman v. Hart, 33 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. 1930) (seduction); Bishop v. Webster, 153 S.E. 832 
(Va. 1930) (seduction); Essig v. Keating, 291 P. 323 (Wash. 1930) (alienation of affections); 
Swiger v. Reinier, 290 P. 842 (Wash. 1930) (alienation of affections). 
 401. Potter v. Appleby, 73 A.2d 819 (Conn. 1950) (alienation of affections); Steigman v. 
Beller, 17 Conn. Supp. 62 (Super. Ct. 1950) (breach of promise to marry and seduction); 
Myers v. Myers, 94 N.E.2d 100 (Ill. Ct. App. 1950) (alienation of affections); Goin v. Goin, 
230 S.W.2d 896 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950) (alienation of affections); Kugling v. Williamson, 42 
N.W.2d 534 (Minn. 1950) (breach of promise to marry); Gikas v. Nicholis, 71 A.2d 785 
(N.H. 1950) (breach of promise to marry); Stefancik v. Kuhns, 96 N.E.2d 318 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1950) (alienation of affections); McDowell v. Hannefeld, 95 N.E.2d 394 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950) 
(alienation of affections); Cade v. Thompson, 225 P.2d 396 (Or. 1950) (breach of promise to 
marry); Holmes v. Herrick, 75 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1950) (alienations of affections); D’Ambra v. 
Ohanian, 74 A.2d 646 (R.I. 1950) (alienation of affections and criminal conversation); 
Breault v. Karasek, 74 A.2d 450 (R.I. 1950) (alienation of affections); McQuarters v. Du-
cote, 234 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (alienation of affections); Oligny v. Underwood, 
71 A.2d 250 (Vt. 1950) (alienation of affections); Bowen v. Pernell, 57 S.E.2d 36 (Va. 1950) 
(alienation of affections and criminal conversation); Bernier v. Kochopulos, 223 P.2d 205 
(Wash. 1950) (alienation of affections and criminal conversation); Brown v. Brown, 214 
P.2d 706 (Wash. 1950) (seduction); Lankford v. Tombari, 213 P.2d 627 (Wash. 1950) (alien-
ation of affections and criminal conversation). 
 402. Roscoe v. Schoolitz, 464 P.2d 333 (Ariz. 1970) (alienation of affections); Tarquinio 
v. Pelletier, 266 A.2d 410 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1970) (criminal conversation); Kniznik v. 
Quick, 264 N.E.2d 707 (Ill. Ct. App. 1970) (alienation of affections); Lundberg v. Allen, 176 
N.W.2d 775 (Iowa 1970) (alienation of affections); McGregor v. Turner, 469 P.2d 324 (Kan. 
1970) (breach of promise to marry); Collett v. Bither, 262 A.2d 353 (Me. 1970) (alienation of 
affections); McDonald v. Vokaty, 180 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1970) (alienation of affections); 
Dube v. Rochette, 262 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1970) (alienation of affections); Leo v. Heller, 467 
P.2d 439 (Or. 1970) (alienation of affections); Maclay v. Kelsey-Seybold Clinic, 456 S.W.2d 
229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (alienation of affections). 
 403. Treiber v. Hess, 782 S.W.2d 43 (Ark. 1990) (alienation of affections); Loomer v. 
Rittinger, 789 S.W.2d 16 (Ky. 1990) (alienation of affections); Overstreet v. Merlos, 570 So. 
2d 1196 (Miss. 1990) (alienation of affections); Reiter v. Reiter, 804 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1990) (alienation of affections and criminal conversation); Crocker v. Larson, App. No. 
OA-A-01-9002-CV-00083, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 632 (Ct. App. Sept. 11, 1990) (alienation 
of affections); Hanover v. Ruch, No. 58, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 307 (Ct. App. May 1, 1990) 
(alienation of affections and criminal conversation). 
 404. Children’s Med. Group, P.A. v. Phillips, 940 So. 2d 931 (Miss. 2006) (alienation of 
affections); McCutchen v. McCutchen, 624 S.E.2d 620 (N.C. 2006) (alienation of affections); 
Stann v. Levine, 636 S.E.2d 214 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation); Fox v. Gibson, 626 S.E.2d 841 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (criminal conversation).  
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the nation’s growing population, the results exhibit an unmistakable 
downward trend.  
 The slow diminution of the heartbalm torts prepared these 
claims for a round of legislative and judicial housekeeping that began 
in the late 1960s. Starting then, the women’s rights movement405 and 
the sexual revolution406 drew renewed attention to the fact that these 
claims remained available to plaintiffs in most states.407 In the sec-
ond abolitionist movement that followed, legislators sought to clear 
the decks of torts that few modern plaintiffs were invoking, and 
which therefore came across as stale holdovers from an earlier day. 
Befitting the far from exigent circumstances, this second antiheart-
balm campaign had a languid air to it. Whereas the first antiheart-
balm push had exploded out of the gate in 1935 and then petered out, 
the second drive plodded along, one state legislature at a time, be-
tween the 1960s and the early 1990s. During this span, Connecti-
cut,408 Virginia,409 West Virginia, 410 Wisconsin,411 Delaware,412 Ver-
mont,413 Maine,414 Washington,415 Alaska,416 Texas,417 Oregon,418 Okla-
                                                                                                                     
 405. See Kay, supra note 392, at 2049-50. 
 406. See id. at 2048-50. 
 407. Cf. Patrick J. Powers, Ruling Denies Money Suits for Breaking up Marriage, 
BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (Belleville, Ill.), June 20, 2003, at 3B (quoting an Illinois 
state legislator as saying that he had never received any requests to have the state’s alien-
ation of affections law removed from the books, and “[i]t’s just something that’s not on the 
radar screen”).  
 408. Connecticut abolished suits for breach of promise and alienation of affections in 
1967, An Act Abolishing Breach of Promise and Alienation of Affection Suits, No. 275, § 1, 
1967 Conn. Pub. Acts 324, 324, and claims for criminal conversation in 1971. An Act Con-
cerning Criminal Conversation, No. 177, 1971 Conn. Pub. Acts 269, 269. 
 409. Virginia abolished claims for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and 
breach of promise to marry in 1968, Act of Apr. 5, 1968, ch. 716, § 1, 1968 Va. Acts 1259, 
1259, and suits for seduction in 1974. Act of Apr. 8, 1974, ch. 606, § 1, 1974 Va. Acts 1163, 
1163. 
 410. Act of Mar. 6, 1969, ch. 101, 1969 W. Va. Acts 1036, 1036 (abolishing claims for 
breach of promise to marry and for alienation of affections).  
 411. Act of Apr. 11, 1972, ch. 220, § 19, 1971 Wis. Sess. Laws 641, 646 (abolishing 
alienation of affections and criminal conversation). 
 412. Act of July 5, 1972, ch. 489, § 1, 58 Del. Laws 1601, 1601 (1972) (abolishing all 
four amatory torts). 
 413. Act of Apr. 2, 1974, No. 198, § 1, 1973 Vt. Acts & Resolves 208, 208 (abolishing all 
four amatory torts). 
 414. Act effective Oct. 3, 1973, ch. 298, 1973 Me. Acts 587, 587 (abolishing claims for 
alienation of affections). 
 415. Act of Apr. 10, 1973, ch. 154, § 121, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 1118, 1197 (abolishing 
claims brought by a woman for her own seduction). 
 416. Act of May 17, 1974, ch. 127, § 64, 1974 Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 12 (abolishing 
claims brought by a woman for her own seduction). 
 417. Act of June 19, 1975, ch. 637, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 1942, 1942 (abolishing 
claims for criminal conversation); Act of June 17, 1987, ch. 453, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 
2030, 2030 (abolishing claims for alienation of affections). 
 418. Act of July 2, 1975, ch. 562, §§ 1-2, 1975 Or. Laws 1285, 1285 (abolishing claims 
for alienation of affections and criminal conversation). 
426  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:359 
 
homa,419 the District of Columbia,420 Arizona,421 Minnesota,422 Ohio,423 
Nevada,424 Georgia,425 New Hamsphire,426 Kansas,427 North Dakota,428 
Massachusetts,429 Rhode Island,430 Nebraska,431 South Carolina,432 
Arkansas,433 and Tennessee434 all enacted legislation banning one or 
more of the heartbalm torts.435  
 The deliberations over antiheartbalm legislation in Tennessee, 
the last state to abolish amatory torts by legislative fiat, illustrate 
the desuetude into which these claims had fallen by the late 1980s 
and early 1990s and the attendant attitudes of state legislatures to-
                                                                                                                     
 419. Act of May 31, 1976, ch. 164, § 2, 1976 Okla. Sess. Laws 230, 230 (abolishing 
claims for alienation of affections and seduction, except seduction claims relating to minors 
and those of unsound mind). 
 420. Act of Apr. 7, 1977, 1977 D.C. Stat. 1-107, § 111(a) (abolishing claims for alien-
ation of affections, criminal conversation, and breach of promise to marry). 
 421. Act of May 31, 1977, ch. 138, § 16, 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws 645, 656 (abolishing 
claims for alienation of affections). 
 422. Act of Mar. 23, 1978, ch. 515, § 2, 1978 Minn. Laws 141, 141 (abolishing all four 
amatory torts). 
 423. Act of Mar. 8, 1978, 1978 Ohio Laws 137 (abolishing all four amatory torts, except 
for seduction as it applies to the seduction of incompetents and minors). 
 424. Act of June 2, 1979, ch. 584, § 2, 1979 Nev. Stats. 1171, 1171-72 (abolishing claims 
for criminal conversation). 
 425. Act of Apr. 4, 1979, No. 86, § 46, 1979 Ga. Laws 466, 496-97 (abolishing claims for 
alienation of affections and criminal conversation). 
 426. Act of June 2, 1981, ch. 192, § 1, 1981 N.H. Laws 165, 165-66 (abolishing claims 
for alienation of affections). 
 427. Act of Apr. 21, 1982, ch. 240, § 1, 1982 Kan. Sess. Laws 1083, 1083 (abolishing 
claims for alienation of affections). 
 428. Act of April 14, 1983, ch. 172, § 9, 1983 N.D. Laws 441, 445-46 (abolishing all four 
amatory torts). 
 429. Act of Sept. 18, 1985, ch. 274, § 1, 1985 Mass. Acts 536, 536 (abolishing alienation 
of affections and criminal conversation). 
 430. Act of June 14, 1985, ch. 123, § 2, 1985 R.I. Pub. Laws 182, 183 (abolishing alien-
ation of affections, criminal conversation, and seduction).  
 431. Act of Mar. 31, 1986, LB 877, § 1, 1986 Neb. Laws 1308, 1308 (abolishing alien-
ation of affections and criminal conversation). Several years earlier, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court had declined to abolish claims for criminal conversation, determining that if 
such a decision were to be reached, it would have to be made by the state legislature. 
Kremer v. Black, 268 N.W.2d 582, 584 (Neb. 1978). 
 432. Act of Mar. 21, 1988, No. 391, § 1, 1988 S.C. Acts 2783, 2783 (abolishing claims for 
criminal conversation). 
 433. Act of Nov. 14, 1989, No. 46, § 6, 1989 Ark. Acts 4112, 4114 (abolishing claims for 
alienation of affections and criminal conversation).  
 434. Act of June 2, 1989, ch. 517, § 1, 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts 902, 902 (abolishing tort of 
alienation of affections); Act of May 1, 1990, ch. 1056, § 1, 1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts 773, 773-
74 (abolishing claims for criminal conversation and seduction). 
 435. In some of these states, the impetus for legislation was likely a court decision that 
may have reminded legislators of the otherwise easily overlooked fact that the amatory 
torts remained on the books and capable of mischief. In Nebraska, for example, the legisla-
ture abolished the heartbalm torts one year after a majority of the state supreme court 
recognized the continued vitality of alienation of affections and criminal conversation in 
that state. Vacek v. Ames, 377 N.W.2d 86, 88-89 (Neb. 1985). In Rhode Island, antiheart-
balm legislation was passed around the same time that the state supreme court disallowed 
a claim seeking recovery for the loss of a parent’s affections. Zarrella v. Robinson, 492 A.2d 
833, 835 (R.I. 1985).  
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ward these torts. In deliberations over a proposal to ban alienation of 
affections suits, one state senator observed that no more than two 
such cases had been filed in the county containing the state capitol 
over the preceding ten or twelve years.436 A state representative 
claimed to have been practicing law for twenty-one years without 
having seen an alienation of affections suit filed.437 Another senator 
described the alienation of affections tort as “archaic, out of date, 
[and] unnecessary”438 and advised his colleagues that it was “time we 
did away with it.”439 The next year, while addressing another bill that 
would abolish the tort of criminal conversation, one senator admitted 
that he “had to go to the textbook in order to make sure that [he] was 
conversant on what criminal conversation [was].”440 Clearly, the 
heartbalm torts had seen better days; their disappearance from the 
courthouse had made them easy prey for criticism and abolition. 
 This second campaign against the heartbalm torts also differed 
from the first in that courts began to assert themselves as agents of 
the torts’ destruction. Outside of Louisiana, where a 1927 court deci-
sion ascertained that state law did not recognize alienation of affec-
tions claims,441 judges had played little to no role in the first anti-
heartbalm drive. Prior to the mid-1970s, courts demurred in the rare 
instances in which they had been asked to abolish one of these 
claims, identifying the issue as more appropriately addressed by 
their counterparts in state legislatures.442 Beginning in the bicenten-
nial year, however, courts started to strike down these torts. Be-
tween 1976 and today, courts in Pennsylvania,443 Iowa,444 Mary-
land,445 Oklahoma,446 South Dakota,447 Washington,448 New Hamp-
shire,449 Idaho, 450 Utah,451 Mississippi,452 and Missouri453 have abol-
                                                                                                                     
 436. Audio tape: Deliberations and Debate regarding House Bill 937, Tennessee State 
Senate, comments of Sen. Lashley (May 2, 1989) (on file with author). 
 437. Audio tape: Deliberations and Debate regarding House Bill 937, Tennessee House 
of Representative, comments of Rep. Buck (May 4, 1989) (on file with author). 
 438. Audio tape: Deliberations and Debate regarding House Bill 937, Tennessee State 
Senate, comments of Sen. Darnell (May 22, 1989) (on file with author). 
 439. Id. 
 440. Audio tape: Deliberations and Debate regarding Senate Bill 1087, Tennessee 
State Senate, comments of Sen. Haynes (April 4, 1990) (on file with author). 
 441. Moulin v. Monteleone, 115 So. 447, 456-57 (La. 1927).   
 442. See, e.g., Tarquinio v. Pelletier, 266 A.2d 410, 411 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1970); Gorder 
v. Sims, 237 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Minn. 1975); Felsenthal v. McMillan, 493 S.W.2d 729, 730 
(Tex. 1973). 
 443. Fadgen v. Lenkner, 365 A.2d 147, 152 (Pa. 1976). 
 444. Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Iowa 1978). 
 445. Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929, 933 (Md. 1980). 
 446. Lynn v. Shaw, 620 P.2d 899, 902-03 (Okla. 1980). 
 447. Hunt v. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818, 821 (S.D. 1981).  
 448. Irwin v. Coluccio, 648 P.2d. 458, 461 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).  
 449. Feldman v. Feldman, 480 A.2d 34, 36 (N.H. 1984). 
 450. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994). 
 451. Norton v. MacFarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 17 (Utah 1991). 
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ished criminal conversation actions within their respective states. 
Courts in Washington,454 Iowa,455 Idaho,456 South Carolina,457 and 
Missouri458 have abolished claims for alienation of affections.459 The 
Kentucky Supreme Court has abolished claims for “intentional inter-
ference with the marital relation,” a cause of action that encom-
passed facts that, in other states, would give rise to claims for alien-
ation of affections or criminal conversation.460 Courts in Utah461 and 
Kentucky462 have limited claims for breach of promise to actual eco-
nomic damages suffered (such as wedding expenses).463 Finally, 
Georgia464 and Alabama465 courts have abolished claims for the seduc-
tion of female minors.466  
 This surge in judicial activity merits notice. For more than four 
decades, courts stood on the sidelines of the antiheartbalm debate. 
Suddenly, they jumped into the fray headfirst. This sequence of 
events probably owes more to the inherent conservatism of courts 
and judges than to any upswing in judicial activism beginning in the 
1970s. Jurists were simply not prepared to abolish the heartbalm 
torts until a near-consensus emerged that these claims were some-
how categorically deficient—that is, that the torts implicated no in-
jury that was properly compensable in tort, served no deterrence 
function, or were completely out of tune with modern values. Charac-
terizing the torts as overly susceptible to abuse or as too generous to 
plaintiffs had proved persuasive among legislatures in decades past. 
These arguments carried less weight with courts because similar 
criticisms could be lodged against many other causes of action, and 
courts, unlike legislatures, have to defend their decisions as the prod-
ucts of coherent, neutral rules. If the heartbalm torts were to be abol-
ished because they were misused by extortionists and occasionally 
                                                                                                                     
 452. Saunders v. Alford, 607 So. 2d 1214, 1219 (Miss. 1992). 
 453. Thomas v. Siddiqui, 869 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Mo. 1994). 
 454. Wyman v. Wallace, 615 P.2d 452, 455 (Wash. 1980).  
 455. Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1981). 
 456. O’Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693, 698 (Idaho 1986). 
 457. Russo v. Sutton, 422 S.E.2d 750, 753 (S.C. 1992). 
 458. Helsel v. Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Mo. 2003). 
 459. Other courts, meanwhile, recently have declined invitations to abolish this tort. 
See, e.g., Bland v. Hill, 735 So. 2d 414, 418 (Miss. 1999) (declining to abolish alienation of 
affections); Veeder v. Kennedy, 589 N.W.2d 610, 616 (S.D. 1999) (same). 
 460. Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Ky. 1992). 
 461. Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685, 687 (Utah 1995). 
 462. Gilbert v. Barkes, 987 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Ky. 1999).  
 463. Cf. Stanard v. Bolin, 565 P.2d 94, 98 (Wash. 1977) (refusing to allow for recovery 
for loss of anticipated post-marriage financial and social position). 
 464. Franklin v. Hill, 444 S.E.2d 778, 781 (Ga. 1994). 
 465. Edwards v. Moore, 699 So. 2d 220, 222-23 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997). 
 466. Decisions by other courts over this span have stopped short of abolishing a heart-
balm tort but made it clear that they found the pertinent cause of action distasteful. See, 
e.g., Breece v. Jett, 556 S.W.2d 696, 707-08 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (seduction); Thompson v. 
Chapman, 600 P.2d 302, 304 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (alienation of affections).  
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produced lucrative awards, judges must have asked, what of the 
many other claims that also suffered from similar ills? Were they 
also to go, even though they generated comparatively little contro-
versy?467 The threat of blackmail was an argument that legislators 
could accept as an adequate basis for abolishing the heartbalm torts. 
Judges needed more. 
 The gradual disappearance of heartbalm suits in the postwar 
era finally produced the sort of unqualified, categorical arguments—
no injury, no utility as a deterrent, no connection with modern mor-
als—that courts could endorse, with the other criticisms of the torts 
riding shotgun. The rarity of these suits by the mid-1970s, and the 
often meager returns realized in these cases, bolstered long-
circulating468 arguments that the torts served no useful compensa-
tory469 or deterrence470 function, and that the claims vindicated val-
ues that society had left behind.471 The ongoing abrogation of these 
torts by other state courts and legislatures gave these arguments ad-
ditional weight, and ensured that courts snuffing out the torts could 
see themselves as part of an emerging consensus repudiating these 
causes of action. By striking down these torts, after all, judges were 
simply conducting formal burials of claims that society had already 
left for dead.  
 So what is the state of the heartbalm torts today? As mentioned 
earlier, alienation of affections and criminal conversation are both 
holding on in just a handful of jurisdictions, while breach of promise 
to marry and seduction claims, though nominally available to plain-
tiffs in about half of the states, are invoked extremely infrequently. 
                                                                                                                     
 467. Even back in the 1930s, some observers recognized that the circulating anti-
heartbalm rhetoric might prove too much. One journalist wrote, “[I]nsurance companies, 
railroads and most other large corporations are constantly bled by unjust damage suits. If 
every law that can be perverted into a racket were repealed, what would become of the 
courts and all their employees?” The New Laws to Stop the “Heart Balm” Suits, supra note 
366. 
 468. See, e.g., Feinsinger, supra note 281, at 995. 
 469. Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 791 (Iowa 1981); see also Russo v. 
Sutton, 422 S.E.2d 750, 753 (S.C. 1992); Hunt v. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818, 821 (S.D. 1981). 
Likewise, one court has discerned that criminal conversation suffers from “[a] fundamental 
flaw,” in that it allows an award of damages “without regard to the viability of the mar-
riage relationship” and notwithstanding the fact that the marital relationship may not 
have been affected adversely by an affair. Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Iowa 
1978). 
 470. O’Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693, 698 (Idaho 1986); Russo, 422 S.E.2d at 753; 
Hunt, 309 N.W.2d at 822; see also Smeath, supra note 32 (quoting a North Carolina attor-
ney as saying of heartbalm torts, “It has been my experience in handling some of these 
cases over the years that it’s a very poor vehicle for preserving the institution of marriage. 
There are other ways that are more effective.”).  
 471. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 874 (Idaho 1994); Bearbower, 266 N.W.2d at 135; Hoye 
v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422, 426 (Ky. 1992); Feldman v. Feldman, 480 A.2d 34, 36 (N.H. 
1984); Hunt, 309 N.W.2d at 822; Irwin v. Coluccio, 648 P.2d 458, 460 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1982).  
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In North Carolina, virtually the only place in which heartbalm suits 
(most often, alienation of affections claims) could be described as 
common enough to have developed a substantial body of modern case 
law,472 abolitionist legislation has been introduced, but unlike similar 
bills in other states, it has not passed473—suggesting yet again that a 
tort stands a better chance in the legislature when it appears in the 
courthouse, as well.474 But North Carolina is just about the only 
bright spot for these claims. The present for the heartbalm torts is 
dim, and from this vantage point, the future looks dark.475   
 The disappearance of the heartbalm torts teaches that the death 
of a well-established common law tort may follow only from the ser-
endipitous interaction of multiple contributing factors. For the 
heartbalm torts, these circumstances began with a host of attributes 
that exposed the claims to attack, such as the conceptual awkward-
ness of the breach of promise theory, the absence of meaningful limi-
tations on damages, and a dearth of evidentiary safeguards built into 
the claims. When the cultural atmosphere surrounding the torts 
changed, a few forceful agents capitalized on these flaws to circulate 
arguments that struck a chord with at least one audience, legisla-
tures. Though this initial campaign was a mixed success, it helped 
induce the gradual disappearance of heartbalm torts from the na-
tion’s courtrooms, and in so doing, made the torts more susceptible to 
another atmospheric shift. The ensuing second campaign against the 
heartbalm torts did not depend on forceful agents for its success. 
Rather, the rust that encrusted the heartbalm torts by that time lent 
credence to arguments, accepted by courts and legislatures alike, 
that the claims represented archaic holdovers from earlier days. In 
short, atmosphere, arguments, audiences, agents, and the attributes 
of the heartbalm torts all have contributed to the demise of these 
claims.  
                                                                                                                     
 472. See Scelfo, supra note 31, at 57; Tucker, supra note 398 (quoting L. Stanley Brown 
of North Carolina as saying that he has handled “hundreds” of alienation of affections 
cases).  
 473. See Christopher Kirkpatrick, Civil Law Allowing Jilted Spouses to Sue Stays 
Alive, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Sept. 5, 2001, at C5 (reporting on the failure of a bill 
that would have abolished criminal conversation and alienation of affections suits in North 
Carolina). 
 474. In North Carolina, pro-family groups have rallied to the defense of the heartbalm 
torts. See Scelfo, supra note 31, at 57. One such group has said that the torts of “alienation 
of affections and criminal conversation, erect a wall of protection around marriages from 
outside interference and adultery.” JOHN RUSTIN & JERE Z. ROYALL, PROTECTING 
MARRIAGE: 10 GOOD REASONS TO PRESERVE MEANINGFUL TORT LAWS 1 (2002) (dissemi-
nated by the North Carolina Family Policy Council). 
 475. But cf. Chet Brokaw, 1877 Law Will Stay on Books, ABERDEEN AM. NEWS (S.D.), 
Jan. 26, 2002, at 5A (reporting on failure of legislation that would have banned alienation 
of affections suits in South Dakota).  
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VII.   CONCLUSION 
 The three case studies teach a few important lessons regarding 
the lives and deaths of torts. For one thing, while atmosphere is cer-
tainly an important factor in the deaths of torts, it would be a mis-
take to regard tort law and those who shape it as entirely reactive to 
changes in the ambient cultural environment. As illustrated by the 
slow demise of the heartbalm torts, the institutions and individuals 
that make the law have agendas and limitations that may stymie the 
extinction of a seemingly doomed tort. Likewise, the disappearance of 
the tort of insult teaches that law itself is capable of innovations—
such as alternative theories of liability—that may contribute to a 
tort’s death. And, as shown by the struggles of the “obesity lawsuit,” 
the fate of a tort may also depend on the character of its friends, its 
foes, and the claim itself—in other words, on agents and attributes. 
In sum, atmosphere, arguments, audiences, agents, alternatives, and 
attributes all may contribute to the disappearance of a tort, and any 
comprehensive obituary of a cause of action must at least consider 
the possible impact of each of these factors.  
 The case studies also suggest that a neglected tort is an endan-
gered tort. Claims for insult and the heartbalm torts have been 
caught in vicious cycles in which a declining number of suits sent 
these claims into a death spiral. A reduction in insult suits deprived 
this tort of needed exposure, making the insult theory increasingly 
difficult to discern and apply; meanwhile, the disappearance of 
heartbalm suits from state courts has emboldened legislatures and 
especially courts to sweep these torts aside with little regret or resis-
tance. Obesity lawsuits likewise have suffered from their novelty and 
attendant rarity, with few attorneys being willing to fight for the re-
tention of these claims.   
 And finally, the case studies hint at a possible long-term effect of 
tort reform campaigns. Although court decisions striking down a tort 
and legislation abolishing a claim seize headlines, torts die just as of-
ten from the actions of thousands of individual prospective plaintiffs 
who collectively turn their backs on a cause of action. As shown by 
the sad fate of the heartbalm torts, this mass desertion of a claim 
may set the stage for its ultimate abrogation. Abandonment com-
monly occurs when a tort becomes economically unattractive from 
the plaintiff’s perspective. Though the vast majority of tort reform 
measures do not single out a claim for elimination,476 by driving up 
the costs of a suit or reducing its potential returns, many of these 
                                                                                                                     
 476. See generally Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms (Nw. Univ. 
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-08, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstracts=902711 (comprehensively listing enacted tort reforms, arranged 
state-by-state). 
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laws make certain tort claims less profitable and thus less attractive 
to plaintiffs and their lawyers. These reforms are sometimes cast as 
saving tort law from itself, minimizing the threat of an even more se-
vere backlash. But by increasing the costs and lowering the benefits 
associated with a cause of action, these measures may in fact have 
the opposite effect, contributing to the disappearance of a tort or 
torts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
